This paper formulates a basic system of ontology that has several interesting qualities: (1) it is suggested very strongly by the most naive and simplest consideration of certain perplexities involving psychological states; (2) the system does justice to several apparently conflicting insights that have been debated by many philosophers; (3) the system separates the a priori from the empirical elements of the world very nicely and neatly; (4) indeed, the system concentrates all the empirical elements of the world on two irreducible dyadic predicates; (5) for this reason the system seems to be a nice formulation of a conception of the world that was started by Plato, was envisioned by Leibniz, guided Frege, at least in part, and was defended by Meinong. The system appears, therefore, to have the historico-philosophical value of illuminating the long and important abstractist and rationalist tradition. I motivate its development with an initial discussion of a problem widely discussed nowadays. This is meant to honor those great metaphysicians by suggesting how contemporary their insights into the problems were, even if their solutions are not followed.

Among other things, the system accomplishes the following: (i) provides an account of possible objects; (ii) provides
an account of predication; (iii) furnishes an analysis of ordinary particulars; (iv) preserves the fundamental feature of identity, namely, the identity of indiscernibles; (v) eschews representationalism; (vi) drops the dichotomy sense-referent, by making, so to speak, the sense of a single term the latter’s referent; (vii) explicates the fundamental connections among actuality, concreteness, and existence; (viii) characterizes the objectification of impossible individuals by thinking, (ix) provides an easy account of transworld identity, for those who like so-called possible-world semantics; (x) yields an account of trans-story identity for fictional entities; (xi) furnishes a new ground for the assimilation of sense-data and physical objects.

I

**Ontological Data and Problems**

1. **Frege’s triad**

As is well known, Frege was perplexed by the apparent truth of triples of propositions like this:

1. Tom believes that the morning star is Venus.
2. Tom does not believe that the evening star is Venus.
3. The morning star = the evening star.

He could not understand how a thing a and a thing b can be really identical and yet differ in some property, e.g., the property of being believed by Tom to be Venus. Frege insisted correctly, as Quine has done in recent years, that the indiscernibility of identicals is the central part and parcel of the concept of identity. As is also well known, Frege attempted to solve the perplexity of the triad (1)-(2)-(3) by claiming that the terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ are ambiguous, having in (3) one sense and one referent, and another of each in (2), or (3), respectively. I propose not to follow the details of his theory at this juncture.
There is, however, a naive solution to Frege's perplexity. Take (1) and (2) as the proof that (3) is false if ‘\(\equiv\)’ is taken to mean literal identity. On the other hand, (3) is true if it is a proposition about a relation weaker than identity. On this naive solution, Frege's (1) and (2) establish that the evening star and the morning star are really different entities. Of course, identity is governed by Leibniz's principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. Whatever is genuinely identical with the morning star is indeed believed by Tom to be Venus, if (1) is true.

This naive solution was briefly considered by Quine in his short essay, “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic”, for the case of another similarly perplexing triad:

(4) It is necessary that the morning star be the morning star.

(5) It is not necessary that the morning star be the evening star.

(6) The morning star is the evening star.

Quine suggested, apparently tongue is cheek, that the consistency of (4)-(6) be explained by taking the ‘is’ of sentence (6), not as expressing honest-to-goodness identity, but a weaker relation, for which he proposed the name ‘congruence’. He used the letter ‘C’ to represent perspicuously the ‘is’ of (6). Quine's purpose was, apparently, to discredit interpreted modal logic by showing how it involves the repudiation of material objects on the best interpretation.

It may be protested, however, that the view that the morning star and the evening star are not genuinely identical does not imply a repudiation of material objects. It is the material evening star which is not genuinely identical, a philosopher may hold, with the material morning star, even though they are congruent and, if you wish, are the same material object. But we won't pursue this discussion now.

2. Quine's argument against intensional entities

Later on Quine was able to make a stronger attack against both modal logic and quantification into belief contexts than his accusation of repudiation of material objects. We discovered a persuasive argument to show that introducing intensional entities as the value of the variables of quantification does not resolve the original perplexity. This argument Quine has iterated several times. One of his earliest versions appears in From a Logical Point of View:

\[ \text{[If] A is any intensional object, say an attribute, and 'p' stands for an arbitrary true sentence, clearly} \]
\[ (35) \quad A = (\exists x) [p \cdot (x = A)]. \]

Yet, if the true sentence represented by 'p' is not analytic, then neither is (35), and its sides are no more interchangeable in modal contexts than are 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star', or '9' and 'the number of planets'. (p. 153)

Quine is talking about modal contexts like (4)-(5), but his point is applicable to Frege's triad. Let A be the morning star, and let 'p' stand for any proposition about which Tom has absolutely no idea at all. The identity (35) should require that Tom believes that \((\exists x) [p \cdot (x = A)]\) is Venus, but since Tom has no idea of what 'p' represents, it is not the case that he believes that \((\exists x) [p \cdot (x = A)]\) is Venus.

Obviously, Quine's argument must be met by denying that his (35) is true if '=' expresses genuine identity. But to defend this one must explain why this is so, and this requires a theory of both what exactly an individual is and what it is for an individual to have properties. In short, the naive solution to Frege's puzzle has to become sophisticated: there is really no naive solution without a theory of predication and of individuality. But before embarking in the formulation of one such theory, let us consider other puzzles that seem to

require a solution very much like the naive solution suggested for Frege's perplexity. A solution common to all is definitely superior, by being systematic and not ad-hoc.

3. Geach's puzzle

In "Intentional Identity", Geach raised a nice problem. He presented it by means of an example about witches, which by non-existing make the puzzle somewhat more dramatic, but also misled some critics by suggesting to them that the puzzle pertains to fictional entities. A pedestrian illustration is this:

(7) John believes that there is a man at the door, and Paul believes that he [that man] is a burglar.
(8) But there is no one at the door.

The problem is precisely the existential quantifier 'there is a man', which in (7) appears in the scope of 'John believes' and yet binds the occurrence of the variable of quantification 'he [that man]' which appears in the scope of 'Paul believes'. Clearly, the quantifier 'there is a man' cannot be placed at the beginning of (7) and be given the whole of (7) as its scope, if that quantifier is supposed to range over existing persons. To do so would conflict with (8). Thus, we have Geach's problem of identifying the entity which is the object of John's and Paul's beliefs. This problem remains even if the problem about the scope of the quantifier disappears.

One naive solution is this: take the quantifier 'there is a man' to range not only over existing objects, but also over non-existing possible objects. This solution is like the one discussed in section 1, in that it introduces non-material objects in our ontological inventory. If in the case of Frege's triad we take the evening star to be an existing (material)

\[^{3}\text{P. T. Geach, "Intentional Identity", The Journal of Philosophy LXIV, No. 20.}\]
object, which is the selfsame whether it exists or not, we can take the possible objects required for the solution to Geach’s problem to constitute the same domain of objects required for the solution to Frege’s perplexity.

4. Impossible objects

We have talked about possible objects. But we must reckon with impossible objects as well. Geach’s problem need not be the one created by two men thinking of a possible man. It can arise from two men thinking about impossible objects.

(9) John believes that there is a blue round square and Paul thinks that it is hollow.

To be sure, all kinds of solutions supported by their corresponding theories of predication and individuation can be constructed. The point here is that once we adopt the path of intensional entities for Frege’s and Geach’s puzzles, we should naturally go further in that path and consider Meinongian impossible objects.

5. Cross-attitudinal references

The problem raised by Geach involves two thinkers. But the problem is more general. It appears in the case of just one person who has several different attitudes toward an entity and his attitudes form part of one unitary consciousness or mind. Consider, for instance:

(10) Benjamin believes that there is a fountain of life and he hopes to drink from it.

The quantifier ‘there is (a fountain of life)’ has to be the dominant operator so that it can bind references to the same entity both within the scope of ‘believes’ and within the scope of ‘hopes’. So, we seem committed to introducing non-existing objects once again as values of the variables of quantification.
Patently, such non-existing objects may very well be impossible, self-contradictory objects.

6. Reality and thinking

Thinking is oriented toward the world, and often succeeds in hitting a real thing. A central problem is the nature and structure of that success. In particular, we must explicate how the very same entity that exists in the world is exactly what a successful episode of thinking is about.

7. Existence

Thinking is oriented toward the world, the existents in the world: to think of an object and to think of its as existing seem to be the same thing. Yet, somehow, thinking is impermeable to existence. Thinking is quite comfortable in the contemplation of the existent as in the contemplation of the non-existent. Thus, existence appears to be both a differentiating feature that some, but not all, objects of thought possess and a non-feature at all incapable of differentiating one object from another. In traditional terms, existence is not a real predicate; yet it is not a logical or formal predicate, for existence, that is, the existence of material and mental things and events, is precisely the innermost core of contingency.

8. The fundamental problem

The nature of existence is a most serious problem. But there is underlying it the problem of the constitution of an object. The unity of a thing and its possession of properties is the primary philosophical problem. Does the unity of a thing consist of an underlying substrate? Or of something else? How do properties compose a thing? These questions include as a special case the way in which existence enters into objects or how existence enters into objects or how existence accrues to objects. The fundamental problem is, therefore, the problem of the most elementary (and trivial)
structural relationships among the basic categories of the world: Thing, Property, Predication, Existence, Identity, and Thought. It is the problem of the connection between Thinking and the Fundamental Structure of the World that appears to consciousness or, for that matter, that thinking itself creates. Which of these disjuncts is the case belongs to a discours de métaphysique, and goes beyond our present ontological (i.e., phenomenologico-ontological) concern. (Phenomenological ontology is epistemologically prior to metaphysical ontology.)

II

The Abstractist Ontology: Informal Presentation

1. Ontological atoms

In good old Platonistic style, the abstractist conception of the world takes properties by themselves, i.e., separated from particulars, to be ultimate components of the world. There is a verbal issue as to whether quantifiers are properties. To avoid it, let us say that the ultimate components of the world are Forms, and these divide into properties and operators. The former are ranked into monadic, dyadic, triadic, . . . , in short, n-adic properties for any natural number n.

Among the operators are those that operate on properties yielding complex properties. Some, like non-vacuous quantifiers, diminish the n-adic rank of properties. Others, like logical connections, increase the rank of a property. Individuals are operators that diminish a property's rank, too. (Formally, the most elementary mechanisms of property composition can be neatly described by systems of quantification that use operators instead of variables, as, e.g., in Quine's "Variables Explained Away").

For convenience we shall use variables of quantification. Ontologically, we can regard the introduction of variables, let us call it variabilization, as the operation that transforms abstract properties into propositional functions, which are concrete properties entering in the composition of individuals.

2. Individuals

There is one operator, let us represent it by braces, that operates on entities and forms sets. The primary sets are composed of concrete properties. Sets are abstract individuals.

Another operator, let us represent it by $c$, operates on sets of Monadic properties (or propositional functions), whether simple or complex, and yields concrete individuals. From now on 'individual' means concrete individual. These are, roughly, Frege's senses of definitive descriptions. For example, the round square is the individual $c \{\text{being round and square}\}$. The individual composed of the properties roundness and squareness $c \{\text{being round, being square}\}$. They are different because the sets of properties composing them are different: the former is a unit set, the latters is a pair. There is, of course, an intimate connection between them, and we discuss it in §6 below.

Suppose that, as it seems likely, the round square was Meinong's favorite impossible object. That is to say, consider the individual $c \{\text{being Meinong's favorite impossible object}\}$. This is, obviously, quite a different individual from the $c \{\text{being round and square}\}$. Thus, the italicised occurrence of the word 'was' in the first sentence of this paragraph does not express genuine identity. We shall say more about identity below.

3. Meinongian predication

An individual is in an obvious sense a cluster of properties. Most of them are finite clusters. Clearly whatever pro-
property Fness we consider, the Fer is F, and necessarily so, if ‘is’ is meant in the sense of ontological composition. Thus, Meinong’s persistent claim that “the Fer is F” is analytically, or logically, true, is correct in the primary sense of ‘is’.

Let us call the primary predication Meinongian predication, and let us represent it by expressions of the form “a(F)”, where ‘a’ denotes an individual and ‘F’ a property. Thus, the proposition expressed by a sentence of such a form is true, if and only if the property denoted by ‘F’ is a member of the set of properties constituting the individual denoted by ‘a’.

Many of us have an inclination to think that Mount Everest neither possesses the property of being an even number nor possesses the property of not-being an even number, even though the two properties seem to be mutually exclusive. This inclination is at bottom an intuition of the primary Meinongian predication. Evidently, for any property Fness we consider, many concrete individuals do not include in their constituting set the property Fness or its denial not-Fness.

We also have an inclination to say that for any property Fness anything has Fness or has not Fness. That inclination is the intuition that in our confrontation with the world we also use another conception of predication. We discuss it below in §5.

4. Identity

Genuine identity is as it is normally conceived to be. It is a very special dyadic relation, which is reflexive and is governed by Leibniz’s Law of the indiscernibility of identicals. In short, we have the following two fundamental ontological principles:

\[ \text{Id.1. } x = x \]
\[ \text{Id.2a. } (x = y) \equiv (x (F) = y (F)) \]

Entering in a fact is, of course, not a property. But identity
requires the fact-indiscernibility of identicals. Let \( \varphi[a] \) express a fact, simple or complex, in which the individual denoted by 'a' enters and \( \varphi[a;b] \) the same fact with the individual denoted by 'b' entering in some positions in that fact instead of the individual denoted by 'a'. Then we have the law:

\[
\text{Id.2b. } (a \equiv b) \supset (\varphi[a] \equiv \varphi[a;b])
\]

5. Actuality

Actuality, which accrues to concrete individuals, is most mysterious. It is the ultimate act, in Aristotle's sense that contrasts act with potentiality, and lies wholly outside the realm of abstracta. (Note that as Plato observed, the realm of abstracta is so comfortable to the mind that it looks like its natural habitat.) Actuality must, of course, be at least obscurely and partially apprehensible. Otherwise, there would not even be a reference to a real world. Actuality has to be thinkable, and this means that there is a Form, a sort of property, under which it is conceivable. This suggests another form of predication, connecting a concrete individual with other properties, which do not constitute it. Now, the previous characterization of an individual makes an individual bounded, determined exactly by a set of properties which may be finite and, hence, is not even closed under logical implication. Thus, actuality must not only connect an individual to other properties not in it, but must connect them in an external way. Furthermore, this external way has to preserve the total individuality of each individual, namely, the individuality required by self-identity, i.e., by Leibniz's Law.

Well, all these vague considerations gain body in the view that among the properties there is a dyadic relation, which I call consubstantiation or co-actuality. This is the only relation that connects different concrete individuals, and makes them both exist.

Let us represent consubstantiation with the symbol 'C'.
(The asterisk comes after the letter 'C' to indicate that we are dealing with an *a posteriori*, or contingent, relation. The fact that there is only one asterisk indicates that this is the fundamental, the number one, contingent relation; in a world deprived of thinking it would be the only one. Thus, if 'a' denotes the morning star and 'b' the evening star, what is ordinarily meant by the sentence ‘The morning star is the evening star’, or by the sentence, ‘The morning star is the same as the evening star’, can be more perspicuously put as the fact that

\[ C^*(a, b). \]

To explain the nature of consubstantiation better let us analyze some ordinary statements. Consider

(11) The Principal is bald.
Most likely a person making a statement by means of sentence (11) would not intend to assert the Meinongian statement:

(11a) The Principal (baldness).
Most likely, such a person would be meaning to assert that the Principal exists and has baldness, not as an ontologically constitutive property, but as a contingent property. Thus his statement is more likely this:

(11b) There is an individual \( y \) such that: both \( C^*(y, \text{the Principal}) \) and \( y \) (baldness).

Consider now a relational proposition:

(12) The Principal kissed the Art Teacher.
Once again, there are the Meinongian, a priori, trivial propositions, which are palpably false:

(12a) The Principal (kissed-the Art-Teacher-ness);
(12b) The Art Teacher (being-kissed-by-the-Principal-ness);

(12c) (12a) & (12b).
But more likely whoever uses sentence (12) to make a statement in practical life wants to convey some non-trivial infor-
mation like this:

(12d) There is an individual $y$ and there is an individual $z$ such that: $C^*(y, \text{the Principal}) \& C^*(z, \text{the Art Teacher}) \& y (\text{kissing-the-Art-Teacher-ness}) \& z (\text{being-kissed-by-the-Principal-ness})$.

Consubstantiation is an equivalence relation within the actual. It conglomerates infinities of individuals. Thus, the old Platonic idea that actuality is community receives here one of its clearest expressions.

5.1 Existence

On the present ontological view, existence is analyzed as self-consubstantiation. Thus, we can introduce the linguistic abbreviation:

$\text{Def. } x \text{ exists} = \text{def. } C^*(x, x)$.

We also have the law, or axiom:

$C^*.1. \ C^*(x, y) \supset C^*(x, x)$.

5.2 Consubstantiation: Equivalence properties

Because consubstantiation is an equivalence property within the real of existents, indeed, the most important equivalence property from the point of view of the contingency of the world, the word 'is' expresses it. Thus, besides $C^*.1$, we have the laws:

$C^*.2. \ C^*(x, y) \supset C^*(y, x)$
$C^*.3. \ (C^*(x, y) \& C^*(y, z)) \supset C^*(x, z)$

5.3 Consubstantiation: actuality properties

Consubstantiation is governed by the law of consistence, i.e., that only logically compatible sets of properties determine actualizable concrete individuals.
C*.4a. \( C^*(x,x) \supset (x(F) \supset \sim x(\sim F)) \)
C*.4b. \( C^*(x,x) \supset (x(\sim F) \supset \sim x(F)) \)

In order to simplify the statement of the next laws of con-substantiation, let us introduce a simple convention:

**Convention.** An expression of the form "\( a[cp] \)" is an abbreviation of an expression having the operator 'c' prefixed to an expression of the union of the set of properties making up the individual denoted by the sign \( a \) and the unit set whose member is the property denoted by the symbol \( \varphi \). For example, if \( a \) is \( c \{ \text{Round, Square} \} \), \( a[Gold] \) is \( c \{ \text{Round, Square, Golden} \} \).

I shall refer to the individual denoted by an expression of the form "\( a[\varphi] \)" as the \( \varphi \)-protraction of the individual denoted by \( a \).

The communizing character of actuality is spelled out by the following laws.

**The Law of Contiguity:**
C*.5. \( C^*(x,y) \supset (y(F) \supset C^*(x,x[F])) \)

**The Law of Completeness:**
C*.6. \( C^*(x,x) \supset (C^*(x,x[F]) \lor C^*(x,x[\sim F])) \)

**The Law of Logical Closure:**
C*.7. \( C^*(x,x) \supset (C^*(x,x[F_1]) \& \ldots \& C^*(x,x[F_n]) \supset C^*(x,x[G])) \), provided that "\( (F_1 \& \ldots \& F_n \supset G) \)" is a theorem in standard quantificational logic.

The Law of Closure C*.7 is, of course, only the most general and fundamental law of closure there is. Laws of nature are specific laws of closure. The pattern of the law is the same throughout. All we need to change is the condition that a certain formula be a theorem in some system of laws of nature, instead of being a theorem in quantificational logic.
5.4 Consubstantiation: Uniqueness

One of the errors of Meinong was to confuse the incomplete object. The Circle with the property circularity. The latter is present in every existing circle, but the former is not. The entity The Circle is \( c \{ \text{Circle} \} \), i.e., the individual which alone is a circle. Hence if The Circle exists, there exists only one consubstantiation cluster in which circularity enters. Thus we have the law:

\[
C^*.(x,x) \supset (\forall y) \ (C^*(y,y) \ & \ (\forall F) \ (x(F) \supset \ y(F)) \supset C^*(x,y)). \quad \text{If } x \text{ exists, then whatever existent has Meinongianly all the properties } x \text{ has Meinongianly is consubstantiated with } x. 
\]

5.5 Consubstantiation: Compossibility

Some relations require that if a relatum exists so do the others. If the Principal kisses the Art Teacher, the Art Teacher exists and is in reality kissed by the Principal. On the other hand, if the Principal looks for the art teacher of his dreams, the latter need not exist. Thus, for some relations

\[
S.C^*9. \ C^*(x,x[R_y_1, \ldots, y_i, x, y_{i+1}, \ldots, y_n]) \supset \ C^*(y,y[R_y_1, \ldots, y, x, y_{i+1}, \ldots, y_n], \quad \text{for every } i = 1, \ldots, n. 
\]

This law combines Leibniz's reduction of relations to qualities with Nino Cocchiarella's e-attributes, i.e., attributes that imply existence.\(^6\)

6. Objectification or Consociation

Concrete individuals are objects of thought, and as such, they are all on equal footing, whether they are impossible,

\(^6\) Nino Cocchiarella, "Some Remarks on Second-Order Logic with Existence Attributes", *NouS II* (1968), pp. 165-175.
merely possible, or actual. Of course, some individuals are seldom thought of, and some will probably never be thought of. Those that are thought of enter in an empirical relatedness to a mind. And this relation requires analysis. The first thing to note about the objectification of an individual is that, as Meinong remarked, to think of an individual (an object in his terminology) is to confer upon the individual some sort of existence, even if the object is non-existent, alas! even if it is impossible. Thus, objectification is like actuality, but it is not actuality. Hence, objectification must be analyzed as involving a special empirical, and therefore, external, dyadic relation between two concrete individuals, as well, of course, as the fundamental Meinongian predication. Let us represent this new empirical dyadic relation by the symbol 'C**', where the letter 'C' signals again the community of being, the double asterisk signals the secondary character of the community in question, and their postposition to 'C' signals the a posteriori nature of that community. Let us call this relation co-objectification or consociation.

Consider the sentence:
(13) Meinong used to think of the round square.
A partial ontological analysis of what (13) expresses is revealed by:

(13a) There is an individual x such that: x (being thought of by Meinong) & C** (x, c \{being round and square\}).

Naturally, (13a) does not analyze the way in which the individual Meinong enters into what (13) expresses. In the light of our discussion of actuality, presumably another part of (13) is:

(13b) There is an individual y such that: y (thinking of the round square & C*(y, Meinong)).

I submit that (13) is simply an abbreviation of

(13c) There are individuals x and y such that: x (being
thought of by Meinong) & \gamma(\text{thinking of } c \{\text{being round and square}\}).

A fuller understanding of \((13c)\), or \((13)\), requires an understanding of the role of the proper name 'Meinong'. In section II.13 we say something about the roles of proper names.

Using a mixture of ordinary language and the notation introduced above in section II.5.3, we can abbreviate \((13c)\) as follows:

\((13c')\) \(C^*(\text{Meinong, Meinong [thinking of the round square]} \& C^{**}(\text{the round square, the round square [being thought of by Meinong]})\).

Consociation is like consubstantiation, not only in being a dyadic external, genuine relation, but also in being an equivalence relation within its field. Thus, we have the laws:

C**.1. \(C^{**}(x,y) \supset C^{**}(x,x)\)
C**.2. \(C^{**}(x,y) \supset C^{**}(y,x)\)
C**.3. \((C^{**}(x,y) & C^{**}(y,z)) \supset C^{**}(x,z)\)

On the other hand, consociation is not consubstantiation. It lacks the features of consistency, closure, contiguity, and completeness.

7. Conflation

Besides genuine identity or selfsameness, characterized in section II.4, there is another important \textit{a priori} relation. It is like identity in that it deals with the internal constituents of an individual. But it has a somewhat external character, being a genuine mechanism of a pervasive and \textit{a priori} community of being. I call it conflation, and represent it by the symbol ‘C*’. It is, like identity, an unrestricted equivalence relation:

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The law of internality that governs conflation is this:

*C.4. *C(c \{ \ldots , F, \ldots , G\} , c \{ \ldots , F\&G, \ldots \}).

Law *C.4. and *C.1 together justify the trivial claim that the man who murdered both Napoleon and Caesar is the same as the entity that alone has the following properties: first, is a man; second, murdered Napoleon; and third, murdered Caesar.

The following law may be called the “self-identity property of conflation”:

*C.5. *C(x, c \{ x+=--\})
which is *C(x, cy \{ x+=y\}), in a notation with variables instead of operators.

Law *C.5 establishes the conflation of each individual with the individual constituted by the property of being identical with the former individual. Obviously, the two individuals are different, since they have different properties as constituents. Their community is, however, trivial and profound; that is, they conflate.

Law *C.6 is the most obvious case of the general law of the conflation of self-congruents:

*C.6. *C(x, c \{ C(x, --) \}), or *C(x, cy \{ C(x,y) \}),
where 'C' is either '*C', 'C*' or 'C**' or '=' or, for that matter, some other congruence relation that constitutes the community of being.

This law shows part of the redundancy of the relations of ontological congruence. Another part of such redundancy is captured by the law:
8. **Existence again**

The special case of law *C.6 involving the relation C* is worthy of special mention. It lies at the center of the perennial disputes about whether existence is a predicate (i.e., a property) or not. In the present ontological theory this issue receives a "yes and no" answer.

On one hand, existence is a property in that it is thought of through the property Form C*. It is a compound property in that it is the special monadic case of C* operated on by Reflexivity.

On the other hand, existence is not a property in that it is the contingency of the world underlying the property C*, but lying otherwise fathomless beyond the jurisdiction of the mind as the target of thought. Part of this fathomlessness of existence is captured by Law C*.6, of the completeness of co-actuality. Yet again, existence must be somewhat docile and accessible to a mind that is not to stop chasing it filled with the despair of failure. This partial docility of existence is captured by the other laws of co-actuality, especially the laws of consistency and closure. (Are these laws imposed by the mind itself to a somewhat complacent underlying reality?)

Existence is mysterious. It is rich and complex as shown by its laws; it is what in the end the whole of what thinking and acting is about. Yet it seems redundant and empty. As Kant put it, "the real contains no more than the merely possible". More specifically, for any property Fness, the existing Fer is the same as the Fer. In the example that interested Meinong, the existing round square is the same as the round square. (I am not sure that Meinong clung fast enough to this sameness in his dispute with Russell.) This sameness,

\*I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A599.
i.e., the fundamental redundancy of the property of existence, is partially captured by the special laws:

*C.6. \( \forall x, \forall y \{ C^*(x,y) \} \)
*C.7. \( \forall x \{ \text{being } C^* \text{ with } x \} \)

An alternative approach, which I find tempting, is to revise the notion of individual and require that \( C^* \) be a member of the set of properties constituting an individual. This would make existence more patently redundant.

9. The Meinong-Russell debate on existence

It may not be amiss to make some comments on the Meinong-Russell dispute concerning the existing round square. It will be recalled that Meinong claimed both that the round square is round and that it is square. Russell argued that Meinong's principle that the Fer is F yields contradictions. Russell's first argument was that it is a contradiction to say that the round square is both round and square. His second argument was that, by that principle, the existing round square, which we know not to exist, is existing; thus, we have another contradiction. Meinong's replies were as follows: (1) the law of contradiction applies only to the real, not to the merely possible or the impossible; (2) there is a difference between saying (a) the existing round square is existing, and (b) the existing round square exists.⁷

On point (1) the present ontological theory sides with Russell on one issue: the law of contradiction must prevail throughout the realm of truth. But it concedes a point to Meinong: it recognizes impossible objects. On point (2) Russell contented himself with saying that he did not see any difference between (a) and (b) However, the present ontological theory sides with Meinong on this point as well.

logical theory can formulate the difference and score a point for Meinong.

The sentence

(14) The existing round square is existing.

Can naturally be taken to express a proposition about Meinongian predication, so that it must be analyzed as:

(14a) The existing round square (being self-consubstantiated).

Of course, sentence (14) can be interpreted also as expressing a different proposition, namely, the one naturally expressible by sentence (15) below.

(15) The (existing) round square exists.

Most likely (15) expresses a proposition about actuality, so that it must be parsed as

(15a) C*(the (existing) round square, the (existing) round square).

We can drop the parenthetical word ‘existing’ in moving from (15) to (15a) by virtue of Law *C.7. In any case, Meinong seems to be right in insisting on a distinction between two natural interpretations of (14) and (15). If our exegesis of his claim is correct, namely, that he meant (14) as (14a) and (15) as (15a), then he is right in holding that what (14) expresses is true while what (15) expresses is false.

Meinong did not proceed to explain his claim about the difference between (14) and (15) as the difference between (14a) and (15a). He went on to speak of a modal aspect in the thinking of the proposition expressed with (15). But this is an obscure doctrine.

10. Ordinary material objects and counting

On the ontological view being developed here, the concrete individuals our definite descriptions refer to are the same whether they exist or not. Our concrete individuals are material entities when they are actualized. Thus, the
term 'the present Queen of England' refers to the individual constituted by the property present-Queen-of-England-ness, or the propositional function of being a present Queen of England. That term does not refer, at least not in its primary and basic meaning or use, to the individual the wife of the present Duke of Edinburgh. Nor does the term 'the present Queen of England' refer in its primary meaning or use, to the set of all those concrete individuals consubstantiated with the wife of the present Duke of Edinburgh. Of course, this set of individuals is consubstantiated with the set of individuals consubstantiated with the present Queen of England. But the term 'the present Queen of England' does not even refer, in its primary meaning or use, to this latter set.

Yet there are occasions on which an utterance of the term 'the present Queen of England' may perhaps refer to the set of concrete individuals consubstantiated with the present Queen of England. If it really exists, such use of the term is derivative and rests on its primary and basic use. Clearly, the use of a term 't' as short for an expression of the form 'the set of concrete individuals consubstantiated with t' can be understood only on the assumption that the use of 't' in the unabbreviated description is both understandable and different from its abbreviated use. At any rate, when we count "The (present) Queen of England, the King of Denmark, the Emperor of Japan, the Duchess of Tuscany, the Dictator of Nicaragua, ...", we seem to be counting the sets of individuals consubstantiated with the individuals being listed.

It must be emphasized that the view we are expounding does not identify material objects with the sets of mutually consubstantiated individuals. Sets are always abstract individuals. Thus quantification over our concrete individuals is quantification over material objects, and quantification over sets of mutually consubstantiated concrete individuals is not quantification over material objects.

An ordinary material object is at its core an aggregate of
properties, or propositional functions. Indeed, we may say that an ordinary object, material or otherwise, is a bundle of properties, including relational ones, to underscore the fact that it is not a mere aggregate or set of properties: the set has to be operated on by the concretizing operator $c$. Furthermore, an ordinary actual individual, material or not, is itself bundled up, i.e., consubstantiated, with an infinity of other individuals.

Thus, the present ontological theory sides with the bundle-of-universals theorists, but it parts company with those theorists who equate bundles with sets. Apparently our theory also differs from standard bundle theories in its account of bundlehood. Our theory also differs from the theory put forward by Plato in the *Phaedo*\(^8\) that an ordinary object is a set of particulars that exemplify just one property. It also differs from the view often attributed to Stout, that an ordinary object is an agglomeration of particularized properties. (I often miss the distinction between a particularized property and a simple or perfect particular that exemplifies just one property.)

11. *Leibnizian individuals*

From the laws of contiguity and consistency governing consubstantiation it follows that each individual, say the Fer, that exists determines a set of sequences of mutually consubstantiated individuals that culminate in one infinite individual, i.e., one individual that is constituted by a maximal consistent set of properties. Such infinite individuals I call *Leibnizian concrete individuals*. Naturally, they are beyond the apprehension of finite minds. To apprehend a Leibnizian individual one must be able to contemplate the set of properties *in propria persona*, with all its members in full view. As Leibniz noted, such individuals (which he called *concepts*,

---

for reason beyond our present compass) are fitting objects for a divine understanding.

Also as Leibniz noted, given that a Leibnizian individual contains in its constituting set of properties all its relations to all other individuals, each Leibnizian individual contains in its inside the whole history of a possible world. Any two Leibnizian individuals mirror each other. A Leibnizian individual can belong to just one possible world.

Leibnizian individuals are wholly beyond our reach. Well, yes, they are beyond our direct reach. But they are indirectly accessible: they are pointable. Since sets of properties constitute the core of concrete individuals, there are quasi-Leibnizian individuals available to us. These are the individuals whose core is a property of the form having all the properties of a certain Leibnizian individual. Such quasi-Leibnizian individuals must perforce exist and be consubstantiated with actual Leibnizian individuals. For instance, consider the individual the present Queen of England. It is consubstantiated with the married present Queen of England, with the present Queen of England that is married and has a living husband and begat children who are living such that one of them is consubstantiated with (if you wish, is the same as) the Prince of Walles, and ... The sequence ends with a Leibnizian individual. I cannot present it here or anywhere else. But the quasi-Leibnizian c \{being the Leibnizian culmination of the sequence of mutually consubstantiated individuals that begins with the present Queen of England\} is consubstantiated with the Leibnizian individual at the end of that very sequence of individuals.

Quasi-Leibnizian individuals are rather cheap and obscure. But they are our only links with Leibnizian individuals. They provide us with guidance in our formidable task of lengthening our acquaintance with chains of mutually consubstantiated finite individuals.

We said above that when we are engaged in so-called counting material objects we seem to be counting sets of
mutually consubstantiated individuals. Of course, we are. But we are also counting Leibnizian, as well as quasi-Leibnizian individuals. Thus when we count “The Queen of England, the King of Nairobi, the President of Venezuela, the Dictator of Portugal, ...”, we may take each of these definite descriptions as being used in a special sense as abbreviations for descriptions referring to quasi-Leibnizian individuals. This is perfectly fine. What is crucial to keep in mind is that the abbreviational uses, again, must be derivative and presuppose the primary use of referring to an individual having uniquely the property being mentioned.

Many Leibnizian individuals are material individuals. Thus, if we allow that there is an absolute space and time at which consubstantiated individuals consubstantiate, we might think that our ontology contradicts the principle of the impenetrability of matter. There is, of course, no such contradiction. This principle has to be analyzed in terms of individuals. What it says is that one region \( R \) of space cannot be occupied at a given time \( t \) by material individuals that are not mutually consubstantiated. But a Leibnizian individual, the finite individuals consubstantiated with it, and the quasi-Leibnizian individuals consubstantiated with them both, can, and must, occupy the same region of space at the same time.

Existing objects belong into semi-lattices of consubstantiations, at the apex of which semi-lattices lie Leibnizian individuals.

12. Time and Transubstantiation

There is no space here to discuss time and space. There are at this juncture two conceptions to explore. One is to internalize time and space to each cluster of consubstantiated individuals. Another is to treat them as absolute framework within which existence unfolds. (They themselves do not exist in any case.) In such a view the clustering a consubstantiated clusters along a spacetime vector must be viewed as
another contingent genuine relation: the transubstantiation of consubstantiation clusters.

13. Proper names

There are several theories about how proper names refer to individuals and how they relate to definite descriptions. Many of the existing theories are built on the non-differentiation between the pure and strict reference of a name, i.e., the reference made by the speaker, and the reference made by the hearers of a name. Obviously, names do not refer to anything by themselves. It is also obvious that mere pairings of names and entities, sometimes called semantical functions over, or interpretations of, a set of names, do not bestow any referential powers on names. The references expressed by a name are references made by the thinker who uses the name.

The view that I find congenial is this. (i) Sentences containing names of individuals do not express propositions (facts, or states of affairs), but propositional functions; (ii) a name has the logical role of a free variable of quantification, indicating the positions of an element of the proposition before the mind of the speaker, which element he is leaving unexpressed; (iii) a name also has the logical role of expressing that the element left unexpressed is a quasi-Leibnizian individual; (iv) a proper name has an intended causal role, namely, that the hearer’s perception of the name will cause him/her to apprehend a proposition that converges with the proposition before the mind of the speaker. By convergence here I mean that the proposition P before the speaker and proposition P’ before a hearer, in case the intended causality of the name is successful, have as components the same logical operations, the same copula and community relations, and differ, at most, by having different individuals, but these individuals are consubstantiated, or consociated, or conflated, depending on which type of proposition the speaker intends. In short, P can be obtained from P’ by replacing in it some occurrences of individuals
with occurrences of appropriately congruent individuals, and the appropriateness of the ontological congruence is determined by the communication intentions of the speaker.

When I think of Leibniz I am thinking of one or more finite individuals, e.g., the author of the *Discours de Metaphysique*, or the inventor of the standard notation for the differential calculus, or of the man who was engaged with Clarke on a correspondence about time and space. At different times I undoubtedly think of different individuals within the same set of mutually consubstantiated individuals. When I say “Leibniz was a skillful diplomat” I am not revealing to my audience the individual that is the subject of the proposition I am thinking. My words reveal the propositional function “\(C^*(x, x[\text{being a skillful diplomat}])\).” Hopefully my audience will be composed of persons who have the name ‘Leibniz’ in their language. But to have a name in one’s language is nothing more than to be part of a causal network such that one’s perceiving the name causes in normal circumstances the apprehension of a proposition having as a component a certain individual. Thus, if my audience has acquired the name, i.e. has undergone the proper re-arrangement of capacities so as to have the mechanism to react to my utterance by having thoughts about individuals congruent with the one I am thinking of, I do succeed in communicating by means of the use of the name. My hearer will, thus, think two propositions, just as I do. He thinks, say, the proposition “\(C^*(\text{the author of the Monadologie, the author of the Monadologie [being a skillful diplomat]}\)”. And on believing that such author existed, he also thinks the quasi-Leibnizian proposition “\(C^*(\text{the Leibnizian individual on which the author of the Monadologie culminates, the author of the Monadologie [being a skillful diplomat]}\)”. On this view, proper names do refer, namely, to whatever individual the speaker is referring to when he uses the name. Also, since variables of quantification are essentially mechanisms of reference, proper names can be said to have a
primary or essential referential role. A proper name has, on the other hand, a general sense, namely, a certain Leibnizian individual on which a certain ontological chain of consubstantiations culminates. This feature of the meaning of names also adds to the enhancement of their referential role. By referring to a quasi-Leibnizian individual they point, so to speak, to the Leibnizian individual that underlies all the individuals the speaker or the hearer are referring to during the act of communication. It is crucial, however, to fasten to the idea that sentences of the form “Name φs” do not express a proposition: what they express is neither true nor false: there are no propositions having as components special individuals not fully specified by descriptions to which names refer.

14. Propositions

On the present view propositions are exactly what are often called states of affairs. We do not need a representationalist duality between states of affairs and before-the-mind intermediaries. We are epistemological realists: the contents of thinking are states of affairs. Furthermore, facts are true propositions.

15. Concepts

The individuals of the present view are genuine individuals, and not so-called individual concepts. We think of individuals by having them before the mind. There are no Fregean senses or Carnapian concepts mediating between individuals thought of and thinking. Thought is always direct in its reference to objects, always successful in reaching an object, always transparent in its contents, always translucid in its reference. To think of the Queen of England is to apprehend the Queen of England (i.e., to have the Queen of England before one’s mind) in person, whether she exists or not. This realistic thesis is the only one that fits the
conception of existence, clearly contemplated by Kant, according to which existence adds nothing to the content of what is thought of.

16. Frege's sense-reference distinction

As is well known, Frege postulated two kinds of entity, senses and referents, partly under the pressure of representationalism, but partly under the pressure of so-called non-denoting descriptions. As you recall, his view of the meaning of a definite description D assigns to D two series of entities: its referents and its senses. If D appears in a sentence S embedded in *n oratio obliqua* constructions, then D has in S as referent and as sense the nth referent and the nth sense, respectively, of the preceding series. Frege simplifies his ontology by identifying the nth referent of D with its *(n-1)*th sense, for *n>*1. Contrariwise, on the present ontological view all these "entities" are expunged. Inexactly put, on the present view the referent of a definite description D is its Fregean sense. But this is inexact, since Fregean senses are necessarily non-material, and they relate to their referents by something like *instantiation*, when the descriptions they are referents of denote. On our view, if a definite description D denotes, then what it denotes both exists and is, as Kant would have it, genuinely identical with the individual D refers to in any case.

On the present view, in the sentence

(16) My friend came, but while Jones believes that my friend came Martha does not believe that Jones believes that he came

the clause 'he came' has exactly the same sense in its three occurrences. Likewise, the two occurrences of the term 'my friend' and the occurrence of the pronoun 'he' all refer to a certain individual, the finite individual *c* \{being a friend of mine *φ*\}, where *φ* is an ordered triple of a concrete individual,
a place, and a time. No doubt, whoever uses (16) assertively will most likely assume that such individual is consubstantiated with an infinity of individuals. But in any case the predicative nexus between that individual and the property of having come $\varphi$ is the same throughout (16).^{10}

The present ontological view, thus, restores (or preserves) the unity of oratio recta and oratio obliqua.

17. **Negative existential propositions**

The present ontological view, by treating existence as an external relation to concrete particulars, provides a simple solution to the problem of negative existential propositions. On this view, a definite description does not have a different meaning in sentences attributing a shape or color to the entity it refers to, from the meaning it has in sentences denying existence to such entity. Thus, consider:

(17) The tallest man of Brasilia likes strawberries and

(18) The tallest man of Brasilia does not exist.

In both cases the definite description 'the tallest man of Brasilia' refers to one and the same entity, namely, the obvious one: the tallest man of Brasilia, whether he exists or not. The two sentences are, in their most natural meanings, partially analyzable as:

(17a) C*(the tallest man of Brasilia, the tallest man of Brasilia [liking strawberries])


and

(18a) It is not the case that C*(the tallest man of Brasilia, the tallest man of Brasilia).

Thus, the present view maintains the concreteness of ordinary individuals and maintains the unity of thought and speech about existence: the negation and the affirmation of existence are both about the same entities.

18. Singular generalization

On the present view individuals can be generalized upon, whether they occur in propositions about psychological states or not. Thus,

(19) Anthony believes that the oldest spy is a spy
implies the singularly generalized proposition
(20) There is [not, of course, exists in the sense of self-consubstantiation] a concrete individual x such that Anthony believes that x is the oldest spy.

Both (19) and (20) are ambiguous sentences, depending on whether the ‘is’ predicating spyhood is meant in the sense of the primary Meinongian copulation, or in the sense of consubstantiation. But this ambiguity does not alter the validity of the step from (19) to (20), provided that the same copulation is meant in both cases.

Sleigh and Kaplan have both objected to a move from (19) and

(21) The oldest spy exists.

to

(22) (Ex) (Anthony believes that x is a spy).

Here the quantifier ‘(Ex)’ is an existential singular quantifier.11

On the present view Quine's original intuition that (19) and (21) imply (22) is reinstituted. And this implication holds, regardless of the copula expressed by the 'is' before 'a spy'. Thus the implication of (22) by (19) and (21) involves two cases:

(I) (19a) and (21) imply (22a):

(19a) Anthony believes that the oldest spy (being a spy)
(21) C*(the oldest spy, the oldest spy)
(22a) There is an individual x such that: both C*(x,x) and Anthony believes that x (being a spy).

(II) (19a) and (21) imply (22b):

(19b) Anthony believes that C*(the oldest spy, the oldest spy [being a spy])
(22b) There is an individual x such that: both C*(x,x) and Anthony believes that C*(x,x [being a spy]).

What then of Sleigh's and Kaplan's arguments? For one thing, their arguments seem to be couched in terms of quantifiers that have as values strange entities that seem to be a cross between Leibnizian individuals and sets of self-consustantiated individuals. They will probably call them "ordinary individuals". But the reader of the preceding sections will undoubtedly find them mysterious. It is not easy to determine what exactly their internal constitution is. For another thing, Sleigh and Kaplan both seem to think that quantifying into psychological contexts must attribute to the subject special powers of identification. This idea has been fostered on a wholesale basis by Hintikka, indeed, that idea is one of the more fundamental ideas underlying his systems of epistemic

W. V. O. Quine, "Reply to Sellars", Ibid., pp. 327-340, pp. 337ff, and Quine, "Reply to Kaplan", Ibid., pp. 341-345, pp. 341ff. In these replies Quine accepts the invalidity claim made by Sleigh and Kaplan.
and doxastic logic in his *Knowledge and Belief*, as well as of his subsequent writings on the topic. Hintikka has forcefully argued that the logic of quantification into knowledge contexts is precisely the logic of knowing-who. Yet it seems to me that that idea can be resisted. Naturally, that idea has an important grain of truth at its basis. This grain of truth is this: there is a crucial difference in sense between.

(23) Anthony believes that there exists someone who is a spy
and
(24) There exists someone whom Anthony believes to be a spy.

As Quine says, (24) conveys certain “urgent information” not conveyed by (23). But what is this information? The striking difference in information between (23) and (24) is the indeterminateness of (23) and the determinateness of (24). Evidently, (23) attributes to Anthony a belief about no one in particular, while (24) attributes to him a belief about a *particular person*. One is tempted to make the meanings of (23) and (24) more explicit by developing them as follows:

(23a) Anthony believes that there exists someone, *whoever he may be*, who is a spy
(24a) There exists someone, *namely . . .*, whom Anthony believes to be a spy.

The phrase ‘whoever he may be’ in (23a) suggests that according to (23a) Anthony need not have an answer to the question “Who is that person?” By contrast, one is dragged into thinking that (24a) and (24) must, perforce, differ from (23) and (23a), by requiring that Anthony have an answer to that question. If this is so, Anthony must, then, if

(24) is true, have some way of identifying the spy in question. I think that something like this seduction has exercised its power. Yet I propose to resist it at all costs. I will resist it even if the ontological view I have been developing cannot ultimately be defended. Undoubtedly, (24) has something to do with identification. But it is not identification by Anthony, but possible identification by whoever asserts (24). Note that the ‘namely’-rider belongs outside the scope of the belief operator ‘Anthony believes that’. Yet, it may be adduced, the indeterminateness of (23) that contrasts with the determinateness of (24) has to do, not with the speaker, but with Anthony. This is true. But this contrast is nothing other than the following:

(A) Each proposition normally expressible with (24) implies that there is a true proposition of the form “Anthony believes that \( \alpha \) is a spy” for some singular term replacing ‘\( \alpha \)’.
(B) No proposition normally expressible with (23) implies that there is a proposition of the form “Anthony believes that \( \alpha \) is a spy”, for any term replacing ‘\( \alpha \)’.

19. Knowing-who and subject’s identification

In English we attribute the power of identifying an individual by means of the locution ‘knows who’. Undoubtedly, this locution is connected with ‘knowledge’. But it is more complicated. It does not seem to me that knowing-that belongs to the propositional level and knowing-who to the quantificational one. It seems evident that there is a quantificational level of knowing-that. There is no time to enter into an examination of the view that equates quantification-into with possession by the subject of identification powers. I simply proceed to outline what seems to me a satisfactory view of knowing-who.

Knowing-who requires a relativized conception of know-
ledge-that. This is a relativization to a set of identification procedures. Let us use the letter ‘\( w \)’ to represent sets of identification procedures, and let us write ‘Knows\( ^w \)’ to denote knowledge-that relativized to some such set \( w \). Then, part of the analysis of knowing-who is this:

\[
(K.C^*) \quad X \text{ knows}^w \text{ who the } \varphi \text{er is } = \text{ There is a property } \Psi \text{-ness such that } \Psi \text{-ness belongs to } w \text{ and } X \text{ knows that } C^* \text{(the } \varphi \text{er, the } \varphi \text{er}[\Psi \text{-ness}]).
\]

\( (K.C^*) \) represents the analysis of the most empirical, ordinary part of knowing-who. There are other parts and they can be obtained from \( (K.C^*) \) by replacing ‘\( C^* \)’ with a sign for some other ontological congruence.

20. Fictional entities

Fictional entities have always been a problem. I used to think that the best treatment of them consisted in supposing that for each story there is an intentional operator, like \( \text{It is thought that} \), that would be implicitly enunciated in statements about fictional characters. Thus, for example, the sentence

\[
(25) \quad \text{Don Quijote enjoyed his misfortunes}
\]

is true and must, on that view, be understood as short for

\[
(26) \quad \text{In } \text{Don Quijote, Don Quijote enjoyed his misfortunes.}
\]

By assuming an implicit \( \text{story} \) operator one, on one hand, can reject the implication that there exists a man who is Don Quijote, and can, on the other hand, claim that all the words in (25) have their ordinary meanings. This second point is important, because some of us do not want to accept that the truth of (25) with its lack of existential commitment requires that in it ‘enjoying one’s misfortunes’ has a special meaning.
Undoubtedly, there are story operators, as in (26). But this analysis of (25) does not suffice to elucidate propositions about fictional characters. For one thing, there are fictional stories about real persons and things. For another, there are statements that refer to characters across different stories. For example:

(27) Don Juan becomes more human and sensitive in the works of German writers than he ever was in the Spanish plays about him.

Here we need an individual, who, though nonexisting, is the subject of several stories, and who remains somehow the same while undergoing all sorts of changes. We have therefore, in the case of fiction, a problem analogous to the one discussed above in Part I, 3-5.

The story operator approach is, however, correct in pointing out that stories are creations of minds, so that a story is simply a set of propositions contemplated by a story-maker. Thus, the connection between the propositions making up a story is nothing but the connection created by thinking, and the unity of a fictional character is, therefore, nothing but the unity of a chain of consociations. Once it is created by an author, a chain of consociations constituting a certain fictional character remains available for public examination on a piece of writing or in the memory of a storyteller. Thus, (25) above, which of course rests on (26) for its truth, is

(25a) C**(Don Quijote, Don Quijote[enjoying his misfortunes]).

Clearly, the original Don Quijote is just the chain of consociations created by Miguel de Cervantes, but he has gained other consociation links in different authors or critics. Don Quijote himself, like any other outstanding fictional hero, developed throughout Don Quijote: among other things, he became more tolerant and more appreciative of other dimen-
sions of human nature, besides those of being a foe, being a friend, and being an object of injury or protection. This development cannot, naturally, be transubstantiation, but it is something analogous. We may call it transconsociation. This is the phenomenon described in (27) above.

It is important to fasten to the fact that psychological attitudes and acts, whether massive enough to constitute the creation of a story or not, involve consociation (and transconsociation), and not consubstantiation (or transubstantiation). Consider (19) and (21) above again:

(19) Tom believes that the oldest spy is a spy;
(21) The oldest spy exists.

Consider the property of being such that Tom believes that he is a spy, i.e., the property Tom believes that \( u \) is a spy. Undoubtedly this property is possessed by the oldest spy. But this possession is, obviously, not Meinongian predication. But it is not consubstantiation either; it is consociation. Thus, (19) and (21) fail to imply, together or separately, that \( C^* \) (the oldest spy, the oldest spy [Tom believes that \( u \) is a spy]). They imply together, and (19) implies by itself, that

(28) \( C^{**} \) (the oldest spy, the oldest spy [Tom believes that \( u \) is a spy]).

Remember that consociation is not governed by the laws of closure or consistency.

III

Properties: A Metaphysical Glimpse

Throughout Part II we have assumed that properties are the building blocks of the world and of the framework of possible and impossible objects sustaining it. Aside from nominalistically inclined philosophers, that central assumption has been challenged by other philosophers also belong-
ing to the abstractist tradition. They think that ordinary properties are too concrete. That the properties we find in the world are in fact complexes of some more basic contents of the world. They may even add the Kantianesque thesis that the properties we find are products of the interaction of the mind are Reality, and that other Minds would find, or actually find, analyses for our properties. Others hold that there are no absolute atoms, so that whatever "metaphysical atoms" a creature may find, at his level of penetration, another creature can find them to be complex.

We cannot discuss such claims here. (We are not doing metaphysics here, only phenomenological ontology.) But we can remark that the structure of the world developed in Part II is compatible with the claim that the properties assumed there are complexes of metaphysical micro-entities. Indeed, the same type of analysis could be applied to properties so that they turn out to be special sets of proto-properties, and the same for these. Likewise, our consubstantiation lattices and consociation chains may indeed form more complex entities as well. Thus, the ontological scheme of Part II is compatible with the metaphysical claim that, given the type of minds we have, we zero in at a certain level of metaphysical complexity in a hierarchy of being that is infinite in every direction.

We also leave it open whether the ontological structure developed in Part II is merely a picture, a façon d'imaginer, which is at most a barren epiphenomenal by-product in the midst of their interaction of humans' exercises of their complex capacities to throw noises to one another. This is nominalistic metaphysics liberal enough to recognize the fact of consciousness.

The system of Part II interweaves the insights of the great historical figures mentioned in Part I or in Part II. Naturally, the fundamental assumption of the system, namely, its Platonism, has been steadily challenged throughout the history of philosophy by Nominalists and Materialists (or Physi-
We cannot engage here in an attack of Nominalism. This is a perennial issue, and perhaps it is not amenable to a total solution. Perhaps we are condemned to see the two types of metaphysical nature always fighting with each other in an avoidable historical dialectic through which clarifications and developments of the two types of view must take place. Perhaps in this case philosophical progress consists in seeing more clearly and more of each of the two main conceptions of the world.

IV

Conclusion

The ontological scheme unfolded in Part II conforms to the data deployed in Part I. It solves the puzzles discussed there as well as the problems mentioned in Part II itself. The reader can assure himself that this is so.
Este artículo formula un sistema básico de ontología que parece ubicarse en la línea de Platón, Leibniz, Frege y Meinong, arrojando así luz sobre la tradición racionalista y abstraccionista.

I. Datos y problemas ontológicos

El problema que surge al considerar las expresiones ‘Estrella de la Mañana’ y ‘Estrella de la Tarde’ en contextos intensionales, fue resuelto por Frege diciendo que ambas expresiones eran ambiguas y que tenían, por tanto, distinto sentido y distinto referente en diferentes oraciones. Por otra parte, Quine sugirió que el ‘es’ de ‘La Estrella de la Mañana es la Estrella de la Tarde’ expresaba no una relación de identidad, sino la relación, más débil, de congruencia. Este problema le sirvió igualmente para atacar a la lógica modal y a la cuantificación en contextos de creencia, en una versión sofisticada de la ya conocida. Esta solución no puede darse sin una teoría de la predicación y de la individualidad. Esta teoría tiene que tomar en cuenta también problemas como el que Geach, plantea en “Intentional Identity”. Una solución ingenua a este problema consiste en permitir que el cuantificador existencial tenga en su dominio objetos posibles no existentes u objetos no materiales. Igualmente debe tenerse en cuenta el problema de contextos de creencia que se refiere a objetos imposibles, así como el caso de una persona que tiene diferentes actitudes hacia una misma entidad.

Uno de los problemas centrales de toda ontología es el de explicar cómo una entidad que existe en el mundo es la misma sobre la que versa un acto de pensamiento. Este se orienta hacia la existencia en el mundo, pero al mismo tiempo es impermeable a la existencia, la existencia parece ser una característica que permite diferenciar algunos objetos de pensamiento de otros; pero a la vez parece no ser característica alguna. La naturaleza de la existencia constituye, por tanto, un serio problema el cual se halla a su vez subordinado al de la constitución de los objetos, su unidad y su posesión de propiedades.

II. La ontología abstraccionista: presentación informal

Una ontología abstraccionista considera a las propiedades, en sí mismas, totalmente separadas de los particulares, como los constituyentes últimos del mundo. Estos constituyentes pueden llamarse...
formas, que a su vez pueden subdividirse en propiedades y operadores. Hay operadores que disminuyen y otros que aumentan el rango n-ádico de las propiedades. Hay un operador que opera sobre entidades y forma conjuntos, y éstos últimos son individuos abstractos. Otro operador opera sobre propiedades monádicas y produce individuos concretos. Un individuo es un grupo de propiedades, y muchos de estos grupos son finitos. Hay un sentido primario de 'es' que origina una predicación primaria a la que se puede llamar predicación meinongiana. En cuanto a la identidad genuina, es una relación diédica muy especial regida por la Ley de Leibniz de la indiscernibilidad de los idénticos que requiere una indiscernibilidad fáctica. La actualidad (en oposición a la potencia) es sumamente misteriosa y produce individuos concretos totalmente fuera del reino de lo abstracto, sirviendo además para preservar, de los demás individuos, la individualidad requerida por la autoidentidad. Hay una relación diédica que puede llamarse de consustanciación o coactualidad, y es la única relación que conecta diferentes individuos concretos y los hace existir. La consustanciación es una relación de equivalencia que conglomerará a infinidad de individuos y mediante tal relación se puede expresar con mayor claridad la idea platónica de que la actualidad es comunidad. Bajo este punto de vista, la existencia se puede analizar como autoconsustanciación. La consustanciación, que es una relación de equivalencia, es expresada por la palabra 'es'. Esta relación se rige por la ley de consistencia, o sea, que sólo conjuntos de propiedades lógicamente compatibles determinan individuos concretos actualizables. Meinong cometió el error de confundir el objeto incompleto el círculo con la propiedad de la circularidad. Esta última se presenta en todo círculo existente, pero el primero no. Hay algunas relaciones tales que si uno de los relatos existe, tanto los otros deben existir; aquí hay composibilidad. Los individuos que son objetos de pensamiento entran en relación empírica con alguna mente. Según Meinong, pensar en un individuo es conferirle algún tipo de existencia, aunque sea no existente, o más aún, imposible. Esto se llama objetivación. Esta, a su vez, implica una relación diédica empírica especial entre dos individuos concretos que puede llamarse coobjetivación o consociación. Esta, como la consustanciación, es una relación diédica externa y una relación de equivalencia dentro de su campo, pero carece de las características de consistencia, clausura, contigüidad y completud. Además de la identidad genuina, hay una relación de comunidad a priori del ser que puede llamarse de co-fusión, que, además de ser una relación de equivalencia, se rige por una ley de interioridad en virtud de la cual el hombre que asesinó
a Napoleón y a César es la entidad que tiene la propiedad de ser hombre, de haber asesinado a Napoleón y de haber asesinado a César. Rigen a la co-fusión también la ley de la “Propiedad de Autoidentidad de la Co-fusión” y la de la co-fusión de los autocongruentes. La teoría ontológica expuesta aquí da una respuesta afirmativa y otra negativa a la cuestión de si la existencia es un predicado y a la vez permite mostrar que la existencia es redundante y vacía, a pesar de que sobre ella versan la totalidad del pensamiento y la acción. Al mismo tiempo, en tanto que concuerda con Russell en algunos puntos, favorece a Meinong en otros, como en el reconocimiento de objetos imposibles. En esta teoría, los individuos concretos a que se refieren nuestras descripciones definidas son los mismos, existan o no. Estos individuos concretos son entidades materiales cuando se actualizan. Debe enfatizarse que esta teoría no identifica a los objetos materiales con conjuntos de individuos mutuamente consustanciados. Los conjuntos son siempre individuos abstractos, y la cuantificación sobre individuos concretos es cuantificación sobre objetos materiales; no sucede lo mismo con la cuantificación sobre conjuntos de individuos concretos mutuamente consustanciados. La presente teoría establece una distinción entre colecciones (bundles) y conjuntos o agregados (sets, aggregates), se coloca del lado de los teóricos de las colecciones de universales, y se aparta de los que establecen una igualdad entre colecciones y conjuntos. Pero esta teoría difiere de las teorías comunes de colecciones en cuanto a su concepción de lo que sea una colección. De las leyes de contigüidad y consistencia que rigen a la consustanciación se sigue que cada individuo que existe determina un conjunto de secuencias de individuos mutuamente consustanciados que culminan en individuos infinitos llamados individuos concretos Leibnizianos, y que se encuentran más allá de la aprehensión de las mentes finitas; son, sin embargo, indirectamente accesibles mediante los individuos cuasi-leibnizianos, cuya propiedad fundamental es de la forma tener todas las propiedades de cierto individuo leibniziano. Muchos individuos leibnizianos son materiales, pero no va contra el principio de la impenetrabilidad de la materia el permitir que haya consustanciación en el espacio y tiempo absolutos. Se puede hablar inclusive de la transustanciación de los grupos de consustanciación.

Hay varias teorías sobre la referencia de los nombres propios a individuos y su relación con las descripciones definidas, las cuales están basadas en la falta de diferencia entre la referencia pura y la referencia estricta de un nombre. (1) Las oraciones que contienen nombres de individuos no expresan proposiciones, sino funciones
proposicionales; (II) Un nombre desempeña el papel lógico de una variable libre de cuantificación, que indica las posiciones de un elemento de la proposición que tiene en mente el hablante, elemento que no queda expresado; (III) Un nombre también desempeña el papel lógico de expresar que el elemento no expresado es un individuo quasi-leibniziano; (IV) Un nombre propio desempeña un supuesto papel causal, o sea, que la percepción del nombre por parte del oyente lo lleva a aprehender una proposición que converge con la proposición que tiene en mente el hablante. Tener un nombre en una lengua no es sino ser parte de un circuito causal que hace que la percepción de un nombre ocasione en circunstancias normales la aprehensión de una proposición que tiene como componente a cierto individuo. Se puede decir que los nombres propios desempeñan un papel referencial esencial, por un lado, y por otro tienen un sentido general.

Las proposiciones son, pues, situaciones objetivas, y toda la teoría expuesta sostiene un realismo epistemológico. Según éste, los individuos son genuinos individuos, y no conceptos individuales. El pensamiento siempre es directo en su referencia a los objetos. Pensar en la Reina de Inglaterra es aprehender a la Reina de Inglaterra (tenerla en mente) en persona, exista ella o no. Frege postulaba dos tipos de entidad: sentidos y referentes. Tales entidades son suprimidas en esta teoría, en la que se restaura la unidad de la oratio recta y la oratio obliqua. En cuanto a las proposiciones existenciales negativas, esta teoría atribuye el mismo significado a oraciones que atribuyen un color a una entidad y a oraciones que niegan la existencia de tal entidad. Aquí se sostiene la concre- tez de los individuos ordinarios y se sostiene la unidad del pensamiento y lenguaje que versan sobre existencia: la negación y la afirmación de existencia son ambas sobre las mismas entidades. En esta teoría se puede generalizar sobre los individuos (generalización singular), aparecen o no éstos en proposiciones sobre estados sicológicos. Esta teoría permite validar algunas inferencias de Quine que habían sido objetadas por Sleigh y Kaplan (objeciones aceptadas por Quine). Se sostiene aquí que no es cierto que saber que pertenezca al nivel proposicional y saber quién al nivel cuantificacional. Parece claro que hay un nivel cuantificacional de saber que. Saber quién requiere de una concepción relativizada de saber que. En cuanto a las entidades de ficción, siempre han constituido un problema. Antes pensaba que el mejor tratamiento de éstas consistía en suponer que para cada narración (story) hay un operador intensional, como se piensa que, que estaría implícito. Pero este análisis es insuficiente, pues hay narraciones ficticias so-
bre personas y cosas reales, y, por otra parte, hay enunciados que se refieren a personajes de narraciones distintas. Sin embargo, el enfoque del operador narrativo es correcto cuando señala que las narraciones son creaciones mentales. Así pues, la conexión que se da entre las proposiciones de una narración no es sino la conexión creada por el pensamiento, y la unidad de un personaje ficticio no es sino la unidad de una cadena de consociaciones. Esto hace posible que Don Quijote, por ejemplo, siendo la cadena de consociaciones creada por Cervantes, adquiera otros lazos de consociación en diferentes autores o críticos; no se puede llamar a esto transubstanciación, sino transconsociación.

III. Propiedades: atisbos metafísicos

En la parte II hemos asumido que las propiedades son los materiales de construcción del mundo y de la estructura de los objetos posibles e imposibles que lo sustentan. Varios filósofos, además de los nominalistas, han dudado de esta asunción pensando que las propiedades ordinarias son demasiado concretas. La estructura del mundo expuesta en la parte II es compatible con la afirmación de que las propiedades asumidas en ella son complejos de microentidades metafísicas, sin embargo, el mismo tipo de análisis puede hacer aparecer las propiedades como conjuntos especiales de protopropiedades. Queda abierta la cuestión de si la estructura ontológica expuesta en la parte II es una mera representación o façon d'imagerie. El sistema de la parte II se entrelaza con las intuiciones de las grandes figuras históricas mencionadas en las partes I y II. La asunción fundamental de este sistema, o sea su platonismo, ha sido atacada en la historia de la Filosofía por los nominalistas (o fisicalistas). No podemos enfrascarnos aquí en un ataque al nominalismo. Esta es una cuestión perenne que quizá carezca de una solución total. Quizá estemos condenados a contemplar indefinidamente el enfrentamiento entre dos tipos de naturaleza metafísica en una dialéctica histórica inevitable en la que deben tener lugar las clarificaciones y desarrollos de los dos tipos de visión. Quizás el progreso filosófico consista en ver cada vez más y con mayor claridad cada una de las dos principales concepciones del mundo.