If an object can be identified in one set of circumstances according to one criterion of identity, for example, spatio-temporal continuity, and it can be identified in another set of circumstances according to another criterion of identity, for example having the same parts in the same relative place, can a proper name that designates that object designate the same object in all possible worlds in which it designates? It has been suggested that this is not possible.¹

I argue in this paper that this suggestion is wrong. Context sensitive criteria of identity do not generate hypothetical situations that are incompatible with Saul Kripke’s semantical account of proper names. However, the suggestion I am contesting is based on an intuition as to how we would use proper names in hypothetical circumstances that involve dominant and recessive criteria of identity. I try to explain the basis of this intuition, and I also try to show why it should lead us to accept a “referential” or “quasidemostrative” account of some uses of a proper name. An account which is similar in some respects to Keith Donnellan’s concept of a referential use of a definite description.

According to Kripke definite descriptions and proper names designate in different ways. In the case of definite descrip-

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¹ I am grateful to Howard Rolston for his helpful criticisms of this paper.

tions truth conditions both establish and maintain the relation of designation. Not so in the case of proper names. This means that proper names are not synonymous with definite descriptions and that the relation of designation in the case of proper names is not maintained by the definite descriptions that may be associated with the proper name.

What, according to Kripke, are the conditions necessary for establishing and maintaining a name-relation? The referent of a proper name is established as such historically by means of an act of ostensive reference. This act can be performed in many ways. In most cases it will be performed by gestures of pointing together with some means of calling attention to the relevant name-expression. Definite descriptions can also be used to establish name-relations. But in these cases the definite descriptions are used solely to pick out the referent of the name-expression: they work as gestures helping to establish the designative relation. Once this relation is established it no longer matters whether the definite description so used remains true of the object for that object to be related to the relevant name-expression as its semantic referent. Just as we do not need to keep pointing to an object, once a name has been ostensively defined, in order to name it. This is what Kripke calls using a definite description to “fix a referent.”

When the semantic referent of a proper name is fixed it is fixed once and for all. In other words, a proper name is used correctly only if it is used in accordance with the rule of designation that was established by the ostensive act that

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3 Ibid, 255-303 passim.
4 Ibid, page 343 (footnote 3): Kripke's use of 'semantic referent' is such as to satisfy the schema, “the referent of 'X', is X”, where 'X' is replaceable by any name or definite description. Referential uses of definite descriptions do not have a semantic referent since like demonstratives they are context dependent. Kripke also suggests here that there are referential uses of proper names which also would not have a semantic referent because they are context dependent. This discussion will surface in the latter part of this paper.
Kripke calls the “initial baptism.” But we are also interested in how this rule of designation is maintained. Kripke’s account of proper names, and others like it, are known as causal or historical theories because of their explanation of how the rule of designation is preserved. In a manner similar to P. F. Strawson, Kripke and others, envisage a causal network of users that transmit the semantical rule for the use of the name from one to another.

It is clear that the set of objects that can be named is limited: first by the set of objects that exist in the actual world, and, second, by the set of name-relations that have been established in the actual world. What we accept as the actual world and what we do in it places limits on what we can name, but does not place similar constraints on what definite descriptions can designate. It is this disparity between the designative powers of proper names and definite descriptions that leads to a difficulty in analyzing identity statements with respect to context sensitive criteria of identity. It is the purpose of this paper to clarify this problem.

II

The concept of a rigid designator is introduced by Kripke.

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P. F. Strawson is probably the originator of the idea in a footnote to page 181 of Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959). Strawson makes his point more explicit in a footnote to page 59 of Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (London: Methuen, 1974). Kripke is at pains to distinguish his account of how the name-relation is maintained from Strawson’s version. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ (op. cit. pages 297-300) he imputes to Strawson the view that the speaker must rely on knowing who provided him with the means to use a proper name correctly. According to Kripke if the speaker misunderstood who taught him how to use the name “Strawson’s paradigm would give the wrong result.” It is true that in Strawson’s account the rule of designation for the use of a proper name involves identifying knowledge about a particular, but knowledge of the source of that knowledge need not be part of the identifying knowledge that we need in order to use proper names in Strawson’s account. Of course Strawson’s insistence that we must have some identifying knowledge of an item in order to name it, does distinguish him from Kripke. But he also notes that in general a speaker cannot acquire such knowledge “save by a causal route originating in some fact about the particular concerned.” (Strawson’s emphasis.) Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (op. cit. page 59.)
to clarify the use of designators in modal statements. According to one definition a rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists. For example, if numbers are objects then many definite descriptions designate rigidly. Making that assumption Kripke uses the arithmetical expression ‘The square root of 25’ to illustrate the concept and some of its uses in “Identity and Necessity.”

Proper names are rigid designators if and only if they designate in all possible worlds the same object that they designate in the actual world. It is understood that the object that a rigid designator designates may not exist in some possible worlds, with respect to those possible worlds that rigid designator would not designate. Since a proper name is used with semantic correctness only if it designates the same object to which it was originally connected in the initial baptism, it follows that all proper names are rigid designators.

If all proper names are rigid designators then all true identity statements that have only proper names as terms are necessarily true. For there could not exist a possible world with respect to which the proper names used in such a statement would designate different objects. If two proper names designate the same thing in this world they designate the same thing in every possible world with respect to which they designate, and in which that object exists.

Hugh S. Chandler in “Rigid Designation?” argues against these claims. He holds that some identity statements whose only terms are proper names are merely contingently true. And from this he infers that some proper names are not rigid designators. Chandler’s example of a contingently true identity statement of the relevant kind is based on a resol-
ution of Hobbes's account of the paradox of Theuseus's ship, as discussed by David Wiggins in *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity*.20

However, if we follow Kripke's account of designation, consideration of Chandler's example of a contingently true identity statement will show that he is mistaken.

III

Suppose that a wooden ship is disassembled plank by plank, the planks are taken across an isthmus and reassembled into a ship in the same order and relative place that they were in originally. Suppose, furthermore, that there are no other ships in the world. Do we have a new ship? According to Chandler we do not: the assembled ship is the same ship as the original ship. These circumstances are called by Chandler "The reassembly world."

On the other hand, suppose that on the high seas every plank on the original ship is replaced by an aluminum plank.21 The replacement is staggered, requiring many days until finally it is completed, and the replaced wooden planks are removed on barges. Later the wooden planks are assembled into a ship with each plank in the same relative place it was in originally. Now we have two ships. And suppose that there are no other ships in the world than those which have been mentioned so far. Which of the two ships is the original ship? Chandler argues —following Wiggins22— that both ships are legitimate claimants to be the original ship. The assembled ship's claim is based on the fact that it contains the original parts in their original order; the aluminum ship's claim is based on the fact that it has spatio-temporal

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continuity with the original ship. Chandler — again following Wiggins — argues that in this conflict of claims the criterion based on spatio-temporal continuity is dominant, while the criterion based on having the same parts in the same relative place is “recessive.” This means that the aluminum ship is the original ship and the assembled ship is a different ship. These circumstances of designation are called “Hobbes’s world.”

The upshot of this discussion is that, although in certain circumstances the same parts—same relative place criterion is sufficient to justify a claim of identity, in other circumstances it is not.

IV

Chandler believes that if the circumstances described above hold, then we can construct contingently true identity statements whose only terms are proper names. In what follows I shall show that Kripke’s account of proper names can allow for these circumstances without giving up the claim that all true identity statements whose sole terms are proper names are necessarily true.

In order to resolve the problem we must talk about possible languages in the sense that a different possible language is not necessarily a language with a different syntax, or with a different set of predicates, or even a language with a different set of rules of designation for its names. Rather a possible language is a language whose names have been fixed with respect to the circumstances of a possible world. Furthermore our discussion requires the following convention: relative to a language the actual world is the set of circumstances, hypothetical or not, with respect to which the referents of the proper names of that language are fixed. This relativizes the concept of an actual world to the rules of designation that we accept for a given language. Possible languages have actual worlds.

Ibid.
Assume that the reassembly world is the actual world and that in this world the original ship is named ‘Anaximander’ while the assembled ship is named ‘Basileides.’ We do not know the particulars of how Anaximander was named ‘Anaximander,’ but we do know that the assembled ship received the name ‘Basileides’ in an initial baptism that took place miles away from the ship. In the ceremony the owner of the ship used the definite description ‘The ship recently assembled with planks P1, P2, P3, . . . ’ to fix the referent of ‘Basileides.’ In these circumstances Chandler believes that someone can say:

(1) Basileides is Anaximander, but if things had gone differently Basileides would not have been Anaximander but some other ship.

Chandler assumes that this is a true assertion in the reassembly world. Perhaps it is, but before addressing that issue we must first ask what it means. According to Chandler (1) implies that in some possible world ‘Basileides is Anaximander’ is false. Therefore this sentence expresses a contingent identity, true in the reassembly world but false in Hobbes’s world. If ‘Basileides is Anaximander’ is contingently true, then either ‘Basileides’ or ‘Anaximander’ are not rigid designators. In this case Chandler would have a counterexample to the claim that all true identity statements whose terms are proper names are necessarily true, and he would also have a counterexample to the claim that all proper names are rigid designators.

The key to his argument is the interpretation of (1). What could have gone differently? How could such a difference affect the rules of designation of ‘Basileides’ and ‘Anaximander’? According to our convention to say that the reassembly world is the actual world means that the described cir-

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34 Chandler, op. cit. page 366. Actually Chandler says that it is a reasonable remark to make in these circumstances. This must mean that it is a true remark to make in these circumstances.
cumstances of the reassembly world are used to establish the rules of designation of the proper names that we are using. What could have gone differently? How can that possible difference affect these rules?

In Hobbes’s world, a possible world from the point of view of the reassembly world, a different criterion of identity would apply to that object which in that world satisfied the definite description ‘The ship recently assembled with the planks P1, P2, P3, . . . ’ But this does not imply that Basileides would not have been Anaximander.

How can the dominance of the spatio-temporal criterion of identity in a possible world affect a rule of designation for the proper name ‘Basileides’ that has been established once and for all in an initial baptism that occurs in the actual world which is the reassembly world? If we follow Kripke’s account of designation what happens in a possible world cannot affect the rules of designation of the proper names that we are actually using.

Chandler’s only reason for holding that ‘Basileides’ would not be the name of Anaximander in Hobbes’s world is that he thinks that ‘Basileides’ can be synonymous with the definite description ‘The ship recently assembled with the planks P1, P2, P3, . . . ’ But as had been emphasized, according to Kripke the definite descriptions that are used to pick out the referent of a proper name in the act of establishing a name-relation are not synonymous with that name. True: if the criterion of identity is applied in accordance with the circumstances of Hobbes’s world then, in that world, the recently assembled ship would not be Anaximander. But this does not affect the designative relation of ‘Basileides’ which is established in only one world, the actual world, and in this case the actual world is the reassembly world.

As we have seen in Kripke’s theory definite descriptions and proper names designate according to different kinds of rules. The rules of designation for definite descriptions are

15 Chandler, op. cit. page 367.
based on truth conditions, therefore their referents can vary in different possible worlds. But the rules of designation for proper names are established in the actual world, and they stipulate that one and the same object is the *semantical* referent of the name.

Changing our suppositions imagine that the actual world is Hobbes’s world, and that in this world the original ship is named ‘Anaximander’, and that the recently assembled ship is named ‘Basileides.’ Furthermore: we do not know how Anaximander received its name, but we do know that the recently assembled ship received the name ‘Basileides’ in a ceremony in which the definite description “The ship recently assembled with planks P1, P2, P3,…’ was used to fix the referent of ‘Basileides.’ Surely in these circumstances Basileides would not be identical to Anaximander. Has Chandler made his case?

Again he has not. These circumstances do not falsify the statement made in the language of the reassembly world that Basileides is identical to Anaximander. The ‘Basileides’ of the reassembly world is not the ‘Basileides’ of Hobbes’s world in the sense that they are not linguistic terms of the same name-relation. In fact they do not belong to the same language. We have here two name-relations and not one.

To avoid confusion we should say that if the reassembly world is the actual world, then Basileides (R) is necessarily identical to Anaximander; but if Hobbes’s world is the actual world, then Basileides (H) is necessarily not identical to Anaximander. The subscripts indicate the historical circumstances of the possible world that are relevant for determining the rules of designation of the proper names we are using in making those statements.

We can conclude that, according to Kripke’s account of the rules of designation of proper names, Chandler has not shown that ‘Basileides (R) is Anaximander’ is an identity statement which is both true and contingent, nor has he show that some proper names are not rigid designators.
Chandler's argument begs the question at issue. Overlooking the way definite descriptions are used to fix a referent in Kripke's explanation of the name-relation, he assumes that 'Basileides' is synonymous with a definite description in the identity statement that he constructs. This, of course, is exactly what Kripke denies. But it is only by implicitly assuming what Kripke denies that Chandler is able to make his case.

V

Chandler's argument is based on his belief that (1) is true. This statement is a conjunction. According to Chandler,

(1a) Basileides is Anaximander

is contingently true—from the point of view of the reassembly world—and

(1b) If things had gone differently Basileides would not have been Anaximander but some other ship

is also true, from the same point of view. In fact the truth of (1b) is the reason for the contingency of (1a). This would also show that 'Basileides' would have designated a different object had things gone differently. 'Basileides' would not be a rigid designator.

However, we have shown that if the two occurrences of 'Basileides' in (1) designate according to Kripke's account of the name-relation, then (1a) is necessarily true. It follows that (1b) is false. In conclusion (1) is false and an unreasonable thing to say from the point of view of the reassembly world. But my analysis assumes the truth of Kripke's account of the name-relation, therefore, by itself, it begs the question against Chandler.

How can we decide this issue without begging the question? It seems that if (1) is true then Kripke's theory is in doubt, while if Kripke's theory is true then (1) must be false.

We might say that our reasons for upholding Kripke's theory are sufficiently strong to override an intuition to make and isolated statement that would contradict his theory. Specifically when such a temptation arises in a highly improbable
hypothetical circumstance such as that of the reassembly world. But still we would require an explanation as to why that temptation arises in this specific case, and why it points Chandler's intuition, and perhaps our own, in the direction of accepting (1) and ignoring the theory. In the rest of this paper I try to provide such an explanation.

VI

Spatio-temporal objects are time consuming processes that have stages. This is true of rivers and it is true of ships. But in naming an object we do not name one of its stages, rather we name the object as a whole. For example, in naming the recently assembled ship 'Basileides' a stage of that object was described in order to name it, the stage of being a recently assembled ship, but the name refers to the object as whole and not to the stage that was described in order to give it its name.

Furthermore it is a common occurrence to imagine circumstances in which stages of actual objects do not occur. For example we might imagine that someone we know as a grown man had died in childhood, and had not passed through his adolescence. In describing this situation we would be entitled to use his name because the name refers to the person as a whole and not to any of his stages.

The case of the ship in the reassembly world can be considered in an analogous way. Imagine the capitan saying:

(2) That ship over there is Anaximander, but if things had gone differently that ship would not be Anaximander but some other ship.

One interpretation of (2) is the following. In the first sentence before the comma, 'that ship' is used to refer to the same object, the same time consuming process, as 'Anaximander.' But in the conditional statement after the comma, the capitan claims that if things had gone differently that
stage of the process, which he points, would not have belonged to that process but to some other time consuming process, another ship. Ostension, as Quine suggests, can be used to indicate a process as a whole or just a stage of the process. Quine actually says that “pointing is of itself ambiguous as to the temporal spread of the indicated object.” He adds that “Such ambiguity is commonly resolved by accompanying the pointing with such words as ‘this river’.”

I am arguing that it is not completely resolved in all cases. In the context we are discussing the demonstrative cum sortal ‘that ship’ is used in two ways: to refer to the ship as a whole and to refer to one of its stages. The sortal predicate ‘ship’ restricts the ambiguity of the demonstrative but it does not resolve it.

Admitting that demonstratives with descriptive phrases can be used to refer either to spatio-temporal objects as wholes, or to their stages, we can make good sense of a statement such as (2), accept it as true, and not give up the claim that the initial identity statement in the sentence, i.e., “That ship over there is Anaximander” is necessarily true. This analysis relies on the fact that the demonstrative ‘that ship’ in (2) is ambiguous: in its first occurrence it refers to the ship as a whole, in its second occurrence it refers to a stage of the ship.

Given that (2) is a true statement made from the point of view of the reassembly world, how can we go from this fact to an understanding of the use of the name ‘Basileides’ in (1)? The problem is that proper names, unlike demonstratives, do not seem to have this kind of ambiguity. In the reassembly world (2) is true but it does not entail (1).

We begin to see what might happen in the reassembly world. A reflective person realizes that the stage of the ship that is before him might not have counted as a part of the time consuming process that it now forms a part of. He would state this realization by uttering a sentence such as (2) in which the demonstrative devices are used ambiguously

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as explained. Or he might make a different statement using the same sentence. In the latter case the two occurrences of 'that ship' would be used unambiguously to refer only to a stage of the ship. Thus:

(2') That ship over there is Anaximander, but if things had gone differently that ship would not be Anaximander but some other ship.

In this case:

(2'a) That ship over there is Anaximander.

would state a contingent truth of class inclusion and not a necessary identity as it does in:

(2a) That ship over there is Anaximander.

The underlined demonstrative expression indicates that it is being used to refer to a stage of the ship, the demonstrative expression without underlining indicates that it is being used to refer to the ship as a whole. In any case both interpretations of this sentence are true in the reassembly world and both are compatible with the falsity of (1). But, then, how does the transition to (1) occur?

The problem is to explain how proper names can be used to state the apparently correct intuitions expressed by (2) and (2').

When a reflective man makes a statement such as (2) or (2') he may be asked for an explanation of what he means. In order to explain himself he will have to specify the ship stage he is talking about. This can be done by using the definite description 'The ship recently assembled with planks P1, P2, P3,...' Furthermore he will also have to use that definite description in order to provide a rather involved explanation of why that ship stage might not have counted as a stage of the time consuming process it is now a part of. This explanation would involve him in a discussion of dominant and recessive criteria of identity.

Now given the circumstances of the reassembly world
which include: an assembled ship, the naming of that ship; the use of the definite description 'the ship recently assembled with planks P1, P2, P3, . . . ' in that act of naming; it is not hard to imagine how someone might use the recently given name to state the truth expressed by (2) and/or (2'). The proper name is available and it is directly, though contingently, connected to all these circumstances. But here ‘Basileides’ would not be used semantically as a proper name, nor would it be used as an abbreviation or a synonym for a definite description. ‘Basileides’ is used as a demonstrative that refers to a stage of a process that is uniquely delimited by a definite description used in the naming ceremony.

Therefore the bridge between the truths (2) and (2') and the reasonableness of (1) is made possible by a special use of proper names in the context of the recent occurrence of a naming ceremony, the use of a certain definite description to fix the referent in that ceremony, and the presence of a sufficiently reflective person who would speculate about it all. Therefore

(1) Basileides is Anaximander, but if things had gone differently Basileides would not have been Anaximander but some other ship

is a reasonable comment to make only if all these circumstances are taken into account. More specifically: the sea captain would make a true statement only if he uses the underlined occurrence of ‘Basileides’ as a demonstrative to single out a stage of the ship. Admittedly this would be an improbable use of a name, but not an impossible one. It is strikingly similar to the referential use of a definite description.

In “Naming and Necessity” Kripke suggests that Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of a definite description could be extended to cover some “referential uses” of proper names. Kripke has

Kripke, “Naming and Necessity”, op. cit.: footnote 3 on page 343.
in mind cases in which we would misname an object, i.e. refer to it by its wrong name when the object is in sight. However, he excludes this sense of 'refer' from his theory of proper names. But this is not to deny the fact that we sometimes use names to successfully pick out an object in this way relying to a great extent on the information that is supplied by the context of its use. I have simply extended this suggestion to include those cases in which we would use a proper name as a demonstrative to pick out a stage of the process that it semantically designates.¹⁸

To use a name in this way is not to give a counterexample to Kripke's thesis that all proper names are rigid designators, nor is it to show that some identity statements which have only proper names as terms are contingently true.¹⁹ One does not identify a proper name in its semantical category, i.e. as a proper name, by its "referential" use. Proper names are identified as such because they have semantical rules of designation. In fact these rules are what make for the possibility of their "referential" use by helping to restrict the set of objects to which it can be used to refer in this way. The quasi demonstrative use of a proper name is in this sense parasitical on its rule of designation, just as the referential use of a definite description is parasitical on its attributive use. If one does not understand the attributive use of a definite description, then one cannot use it referentially. In other words referential uses of proper names and definite descriptions are context dependent uses, and part of the relevant context

¹⁸ But there is a difference. In my account the semantical rule of designation of the proper name restricts the range of ambiguity in the "referential" or "quasi-demonstrative" use of that name to stages of a temporal process that the name has as its semantical referent. For Kripke any misuse of a name, that results in picking out an object that is sensibly present, would count as a referential use of a name.

¹⁹ If we interpret (1) as (2), then the identity statement in the first conjunct is necessarily true, since 'that ship' refers to the ship as a whole in our explanation of (2). On the other hand, if we interpret (1) as (2') then the first conjunct is no longer an identity statement, but rather a contingent statement of class inclusion. I am assuming that in each of its uses a demonstrative expression refers "rigidly".
is the knowledge of the semantical rules of designation of
the proper name or the definite description. The fact that
these semantical rules are different in kind should not blind
us to this fact, for it is this knowledge which distinguishes
the referential uses of definite descriptions and proper names
from pure demonstratives.

VI
Chandler has confused the issue. He explains why it would
be reasonable to say that

(1) Basileides is Anaximander, but if things had gone
differently Basileides would not be Anaximander but
some other ship

in terms of the description theory of proper names. In fact
he takes 'Basileides' as a synonym for the definite descrip-
tion that would "fix its referent." But then this explanation
cannot be used to construct counterexamples to Kripke's
theory of proper names since it assumes from the outset that
Kripke's theory is false.

However, Chandler's intuition about (1) is in an impor-
tant sense valid. I have tried to give an interpretation of (1)
based on that intuition by developing an account of the "ref-
erential" or "quasi-demonstrative" use of proper names.
Such an account does not contradict Kripke's account of the
semantical rules of designation of proper names. In fact it
depends upon some account of the rules of designation of
proper names, and Kripke's will do. Furthermore my account
is similar to Kripke's suggestion that Donnellan's notion of a
referential use of a definite description can be extended to
proper names, however my explanation of the "referential"
use of proper names is different from the one Kripke suggests
in the footnote in "Naming and Necessity."\footnote{See footnote 18 above.}

In conclusion, in a special context with all the ingredients
specified above: a reflective sea capitan who has read De Corpore; a recently assembled ship; a recent naming ceremony involving that ship; the use of the definite description 'The ship recently assembled with planks P1, P2, P3...' in that ceremony; and, even, the proximity of the sea capitan to the ship; the proper name 'Basileides' could be used "referentially" in (1) and this statement would be true. But this is not a counter-example to Kripke's semantical account of proper names. It simply shows that a semantical theory is incomplete. Proper names, like definite descriptions, can be used to refer in certain contexts with some independence of their respective semantical rules of designation. A complete account of the workings of language must take these contexts into account if it is to avoid metaphysical confusion.
En este artículo Mario F. del Carril ataca la sugerencia de Hugh S. Chandler consistente en que si un objeto puede ser identificado en un conjunto de circunstancias de acuerdo con un criterio A, y puede también identificarse en otro conjunto de circunstancias de acuerdo con un criterio de identidad B, entonces no es posible que un nombre propio que designa a ese objeto pueda designar el mismo objeto en todos los mundos posibles en los que el nombre propio designa.

Para del Carril, los criterios de identidad dependientes del contexto no generan situaciones hipotéticas incompatibles con la explicación semántica que Kripke da de los nombres propios. Esto se basa en una intuición acerca de cómo usaríamos los nombres propios en circunstancias hipotéticas que requiriesen criterios de identidad dominantes y recesivos. Se intentará mostrar el fundamento de tal intuición, así como también que ésta debe conducirnos a aceptar una explicación “referencial” o “casi-demostrativa” de algunos usos de un nombre propio. Esta explicación será similar en algunos aspectos al concepto de Keith Donnellan sobre el uso referencial de una descripción definida.

La primera parte del artículo sintetiza las características y relaciones de los nombres propios y las descripciones definidas dentro de la teoría de Kripke. Una de estas características, la disparidad entre los poderes designativos de los nombres propios y de las descripciones definidas, originará dificultades para analizar los enunciados de identidad con respecto al criterio de identidad dependiente del contexto. “El propósito de este artículo es clarificar este problema.”

Para Kripke los nombres propios son designadores rigidos (un designador rígido es una expresión que designa el mismo objeto en todos los mundos posibles en los que ese objeto existe) si y sólo si designan en todos los mundos posibles el mismo objeto que en el mundo real. Todos los nombres propios son designadores rigidos, pues un nombre propio se usa con corrección semántica sólo si designa el mismo objeto con el cual estaba conectado desde el “bautismo inicial”. Por tanto, los enunciados de identidad verdaderos que tienen como términos sólo nombres propios son necesariamente verdaderos.
Hugh S. Chandler argumenta, contra Kripke, que algunos enunciados de identidad cuyos términos son únicamente nombres propios no son necesariamente verdaderos sino contingentesmente verdaderos. Y de esto infiere que algunos nombres propios no son designadores rígidos. El ejemplo de Chandler gira en torno a la paradoja del barco de Teseo.

Del Carril contesta a la crítica de Chandler que si seguimos la explicación de Kripke con respecto a la designación, veremos que la sugerencia de un enunciado de identidad contingentemente verdadero es errónea.

En la tercera parte del artículo se discute el ejemplo del barco de Teseo. La actitud de Chandler frente a la paradoja es la siguiente: basta el criterio basado en la continuidad espacio-temporal para justificar una pretensión de identidad. La posición de Mario F. del Carril es ésta: aunque en ciertas circunstancias el criterio de las mismas partes y del mismo lugar relativo es suficiente para justificar una pretensión de identidad, en otras circunstancias no es suficiente.

En la cuarta parte del artículo se golpea con fuerza la tesis de Chandler consistente en que, siendo válido el criterio espacio-temporal, es posible construir enunciados de identidad cuyos términos sean sólo nombres propios y que sean contingentemente verdaderos. Se muestra que el tratamiento que Kripke da a los nombres propios puede aceptarse para el ejemplo del barco de Teseo sin tener que renunciar a la pretensión de que todos los enunciados de identidad verdaderos, que sólo contengan nombres propios como términos, son necesariamente verdaderos.

En las secciones cinco y seis se señala que los contraméritos opuestos a la tesis de Kripke, de que todos los nombres propios son designadores rígidos, fallan. También se muestra por qué no es un contramérito dar algún enunciado de identidad contingentemente verdadero, con términos que nada más sean nombres propios.

La última parte del trabajo apunta, de manera ingeniosa, que los intentos de Chandler para construir contraméritos en contra de la teoría de Kripke de los nombres propios fracasan, debido a que asume desde el principio que la teoría de Kripke es falsa.

(Resumen de Sebastián Lamoyi)