ON KINDS OF RELEVANCE
(REPLY TO RAYMUNDO MORADO)

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I think Raymundo Morado’s criticism of my article1 is right. When I wrote “Deducibility Implies Relevance? A Negative Answer”2 I tried to prove that A&B’s objections to classical deductibility fail, but I agreed with them that some of the inferences justified by classical logic are “irrelevant” in some intuitive sense. As I defended those inferences (in rejecting A&B’s objections), my conclusion was, then, that *deducibility does not imply relevance*. Morado makes clear that the only kind of relevance analyzed in my article is what he calls “A&B-relevance”, and that this fact leaves open the possibility that *deducibility implies relevance*, in another sense of this last notion. Due to this, my conclusion would be misleading. Morado suggests also a new way of understanding relevance and claims that in this new sense, classical deductibility does imply relevance.3 I agree with the criticism and consider the proposal interesting. I still maintain my objections to A&B are correct (in fact, they are not affected by Morado’s remarks), but now I would entitle my article “Deducibility Implies A&B-relevance? A Negative Answer”, leaving the situation about other sorts of relevance open.

I will finish this note with some remarks about Morado’s

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1 The criticism appears in his paper ‘Deducibility Implies Relevance? A Cautious Answer’, published in this issue of *Crítica*.
2 Published in two parts, the first one in *Crítica*, Vol. XV, No. 43, the second one in *Crítica*, Vol. XV, No. 44.
3 Afterwards, in a paper presented at the IV Simposio Internacional de Filosofía del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, August ’83, Morado formally developed this notion of relevance and proved a theorem to the effect that deductibility of the classical first-order calculus satisfies this sort of relevance. (The paper is forthcoming in the proceedings of the forementioned Symposium.)
treatment of relevance. His analysis has a rather surprising result, because by using his notion of relevance it is possible to prove that classical logic is relevant in a more intuitive way than analogue proofs for relevant logics. In fact, there exists a semantics for the relevant system E (developed in the second volume of A&B’s *Entailment*), but it is a typical technical semantics, not clearly based in previous “intuitive” semantical notions and hence does not allow one to prove a theorem establishing that deducibility of E implies always a certain intuitive kind of relevance. Javier Sánchez Pozos has developed intuitive semantics for relevant systems, with the help of which it is possible to define notions of *semantical content* and *relevance* which allow one to prove that the truth-functional relevant deductions are *relevant* in an interesting sense. But his result is less strong than Morado’s, owing to two reasons: (i) His theorem applies only to a fragment of E (that one which studies the entailments of degree one), and (ii) In order to build such a semantics it is necessary to admit states descriptions that do not satisfy the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle (that is rather counter-intuitive). In contrast, Morado’s analysis applies to the whole classical first-order calculus and is based on intuitive notions that have widespread acceptance among many philosophers. Because of these reasons, I think Morado’s proposal can help in the study of deducibility and relevance problems.

4 Cfr. his papers ‘Semánticas Intuitivas’ (Departamento de Filosofía, UAM, México, 1980) and ‘Deducción Lógica, contenido semántico y formas normales relevantes’ (Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM, 1978). In fact, Javier Sánchez Pozos’ formal analysis of relevance yields as a partial result, a theorem for classical logic essentially identical to that of Morado’s which is included in the paper mentioned in footnote 3.