EMOTION, FEELING, AND BEHAVIOR

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The word “emotion” is used in a greater variety of ways than certain thinkers seem to recognize. One group of thinkers recognize that it is used in one way, but fail to see that it also has another, different use, whereas another group realize that it has this different use, yet fail to see that it also has the use which the first group recognize. In consequence, each group develops a theory of emotion which does justice more or less to the uses of “emotion” which it recognizes, yet fails to do justice to those uses which it fails to recognize. In order, however, for a theory of emotion to be adequate, it must do justice to all the standard ordinary uses of the word, and not merely to some restricted use or set of uses. A theory of emotion based on a consideration of some restricted use or set of uses of “emotion” may be adequate as a theory of these uses of the word, but as a theory of emotion in general it will be an over-simplification, because inadequate to those uses of “emotion” which it fails to take into account. Instances of such over-simplified theories of emotion are (1) the behavioralistic view that a satisfactory behavioralistic account can be given of all emotions, (2) the anti-behavioralistic view that no satisfactory behavioralistic account can be given of any emotion, (3) the view of someone such as Dr. Anthony Kenny that all emotions are essentially intentional, and (4) what I shall term the “social contextualism” of someone such as Mr. Errol Bedford. I turn first to behaviorism and anti-behaviorism.
1. Behaviorism and Anti-behaviorism. It is a mistake to think that a satisfactory behavioristic account can be given of all emotions, but it is also a mistake to think that no adequate behavioristic account can be given of any emotions. Such an account can be given of some instances of emotion, and cannot be given of others. The kind of behaviorism I am referring to is the extreme or radical behaviorism which identifies emotions and other so-called mental phenomena with bodily behavior, facial expressions, and sounds issuing from mouths, and not the methodological behaviorism which maintains that the best if not the only scientific way to study emotions and other mental phenomena is to restrict yourself to the observation, description, prediction, and explanation of behavior without raising questions concerning the existence and nature of inward, private phenomena of which behavior is only the outward, public manifestation. The radical behaviorist not only raises such questions but also answers them unequivocally by saying that there are no inward, private phenomena. If he is right, then the methodological behaviorist is also right in his view of the best scientific way of studying mental phenomena, for if the radical behaviorist is right then there are no inward, private phenomena to be studied in the first place. Even if the radical behaviorist is wrong the methodological behaviorist may still be right, for even if there are inward, private phenomena which are not identical with their outward, public manifestations, the best and indeed the only scientific way of studying mental phenomena may still be through restricting yourself to a study of behavior. But though this might still be the best or only scientific way of studying mental phenomena—whether it would be or not would depend at least in part upon how one uses “science” and “scientific method”—it would not be the best of all possible ways, scientific or not, of studying inward, private phenomena and their relations to their outward, public manifestations. Nor, if the extreme behaviorist is wrong and there are inward, private phenomena, would it
even be the best of all possible ways of studying behavior so far as behavior is a manifestation of these inward phenomena. For if I restricted myself merely to the study of behavior I could neither adequately understand its origin or source so far as it is a manifestation of inward phenomena nor adequately understand its significance so far as it in turn influences the private phenomena which follow it.

To show that a satisfactory behavioristic account of certain mental phenomena cannot be given is to show that behaviorism as the thesis that such an account can be given of all mental phenomena is false. But it is not to show that anti-behaviorism—the thesis that a satisfactory behavioristic account cannot be given of any mental phenomena—is true. Anti-behaviorism is the contrary of behaviorism, and the fact that a proposition is false does not mean that its contrary is true; instead, its contrary may be false too. Both behaviorism and anti-behaviorism are extreme theses; the behaviorist and the anti-behaviorist are both making claims about all mental phenomena. I seek to show, not that one position is true and the other false, but that both are false. To succeed in showing this is also in the process of doing so to succeed in showing that whether an adequate behavioristic account can be given of mental phenomena of a specific sort or not can be determined only by considering phenomena of the kind in question, and not by making extreme antecedent claims about all mental phenomena of all types. In particular, if I succeed in showing that a satisfactory behavioristic account can be given of certain instances of emotion and not of others, nothing follows concerning the possibility of giving such an account of emotions and other mental phenomena I do not here explicitly consider.

The question of whether a satisfactory behavioristic account can be given of all emotions is partly verbal, partly non-verbal. It is verbal so far as the answer depends upon discovering how we do in fact use words standing for emotions, non-verbal so far as the answer depends upon determi-
ing whether there are in fact phenomena corresponding to these various uses. I shall try to show two things. The first is that some emotion words are sometimes used to stand for inward, private events and states such as feelings and felt moods, sometimes to stand for outward, public events and states such as facial expressions and bodily and linguistic behavior, and sometimes to stand for both inward, private phenomena and outward, public phenomena. The second is that sometimes there are in fact inward phenomena named by these words which cannot be identified with the outward phenomena which they also name. I must, however, confess that my use of “show” here may be somewhat misleading. I cannot present a demonstration of the truth of my thesis in the sense of presenting a set of premises each of which is self-evidently true and which conjointly entail my thesis as a conclusion, so that you contradict yourself if you accept my premises and reject my conclusion. All I can do is to ask you to reflect upon knowledge of the ordinary uses of emotion words and upon your own experience of your own emotions and those of others and then see whether your own conclusions are compatible with mine or not. If they are not, then, of course, it may very well be that you are right and I am wrong and have made a mistake some place. But I must also confess that I am fairly confident of the truth of what I have to say, or else I should not present it to you.

I seek to show, then, that emotion words are sometimes used to refer to inward, private phenomena, sometimes to outward, public phenomena, and sometimes to both inward, private phenomena and also to outward, public phenomena. When used to refer to inward, private phenomena they refer to what are sometimes termed “felt” or “experienced” emotions. More specifically, as used to refer to inward events they refer to what are sometimes called “feelings”, and when used to refer to inward states they refer to what are sometimes called “moods”. This is to say that moods are ne-
cessarily states extending over some expanse of time, and are never momentary. I may be afflicted with a momentary feeling of depression, but not with a momentary mood of depression, which is a contradiction in terms. Emotions, on the other hand, may either be momentary or else extend over some expanse of time. Thus I may be subject to a momentary surge of anger and also be in an angry mood which persists for some time. Emotions, then, may be either events or states, whereas moods are necessarily states. But these are not the only uses of “feeling” and “mood”. They both are used to refer to phenomena other than emotions. Thus “feeling” is sometimes used to refer to sensations, and “mood” to refer to non emotional inclinations or dispositions. For example, we sometimes say that we feel hungry or feel cold or feel tired, and we sometimes say that we are in a mood for a movie or for music, etc. But while “feeling” and “mood” are alike in the sense that they are sometimes used to refer to phenomena other than emotions, they also differ in the sense that “feeling”, at least when used to refer to emotions, is used to refer only to emotions as inward or private, that is, to felt or experienced emotions, whereas “mood” is used to refer to emotions either as inward and private, as outward and public, or both.

What is intended by terming phenomena such as felt or experienced emotions “inward” or “private” is that it is impossible in principle for anyone other than the person who has them to have as direct an access to or knowledge of them as he can have. Although some of your emotions as felt by you may be qualitatively identical with some of mine as felt by me, yours are still numerically distinct from mine. Yours are yours alone, and mine are mine alone. You alone have yours, and I alone have mine. You cannot have mine, and I cannot have yours. You alone immediately feel or experience yours, and I alone immediately feel or experience mine. You alone can have direct access to and knowledge of yours, and I alone can have direct access to and knowledge
of mine. You can have only an indirect access to and knowledge of mine, and I can have only an indirect access to and knowledge of yours. But although felt or experienced emotions are private to the person who has them, they often have an outward, public bodily, facial, or verbal expression or manifestation. What is intended by terming their outward expressions or manifestations "public" is that it is possible in principle for two or more persons to have equally as direct an access to or knowledge of them. Although your bodily behavior and facial expressions are yours alone and mine are mine alone, in principle you can have as direct an access to and knowledge of mine as I can have, and I can have as direct an access to and knowledge of yours as you can have. In this sense your bodily behavior and facial expressions are public and so are mine. It is only through my experience of this public expression of your felt emotions that I can have even the indirect knowledge of them which I do have, and through your experience of this public manifestation of my felt emotions that you can have the indirect knowledge of them which you have.

These public manifestations of felt emotions are frequently so intimately related to them that the names of the latter are sometimes used to refer to both the public expression and the private feeling. Thus "anger", for example, is sometimes used to refer both to a felt emotion of a certain sort and also to the public expression of this felt emotion. We say of someone not only that he feels angry but also that he acts or behaves angrily. And in certain contexts we have no hesitation in ascribing to someone the felt emotion of anger on the basis of his bodily behavior, facial expressions, and/or verbal behavior even though he stoutly denies that he is angry. We believe, on the basis of his behavior, that he is angry, even though he insists that he is not. This, however, does not mean that we are identifying his anger with his behavior. When we say that someone is angry on the basis of his behavior we are not necessarily describing his behavior.
alone, if indeed we are describing his behavior at all, but instead are ascribing to him, on the basis of his behavior, the felt emotion of anger. And when he denies that he is angry he need not be denying that he is behaving angrily (although he may be denying this), but is denying that he is angry, i.e. that he feels angry (or anger). Thus even though we use the names of certain emotions such as anger to refer to both the inward, private feeling—the feeling of anger—and also to its outward, public manifestation—the angry behavior—the name as such, even on such a use, does not refer merely to the outward expression any more than it refers merely to the inward feeling. Instead, it refers to what may be termed the “total” or “complete” emotion, consisting of both the inward feeling and the outward manifestation. The total emotion itself is a complex whole which is no more identical with its public manifestation than is its inward, private aspect.

The fact that emotions, neither as total emotions nor as inward feelings and felt states, cannot be identified with their outward expression is perhaps even more evident from the fact that we can both pretend to have certain private feelings that we do not in fact have and also pretend not to have certain private feelings which we do in fact have, and succeed in the pretense. I may successfully pretend to be momentarily angry when in fact I am not, so that you judge me to be angry on the basis of my momentary angry behavior when in fact I am not angry. In such a case I am angry if and only if I feel angry, and not merely if I behave angrily without feeling angry. Although I can behave angrily without feeling angry, and therefore without being angry, I can neither feel angry without being angry nor be angry without feeling angry, since to feel angry is to be angry. It is hard to see how this would be possible if my anger, either my total anger or my feeling of anger, were simply identical with my bodily, facial, and/or verbal behavior. It is therefore also hard to see how an adequate behavioristic account can be given of all emotions. But even though such an ac-
count cannot be given of all emotions, it does not follow that it cannot be given of any emotions. As we have seen, the fact that behaviorism is false does not mean that anti-behaviorism is true. Having argued against behaviorism, I turn now to argue against anti-behaviorism.

Anti-behaviorism is false because it is possible that I should have certain emotions without feeling them and without knowing that I am subject to them. By this I do not mean merely that it is possible to have certain feelings without being aware of them or conscious of them in the sense of being unable verbally to identify them correctly. A small child who has not yet acquired a vocabulary for referring to his feelings is not aware of or conscious of them in the sense of being able to identify them verbally. He does not know that he has them in the sense in which knowledge of having them entails being able verbally to identify them. But though he lack the capacity to identify them verbally, he nevertheless has them, and may be said to know them in the sense of having experienced them. In this sense a small child who has been angry or who has experienced anger has known anger. To say, however, that he has known anger is only another way of saying that he has been angry or has experienced anger. But in addition to this situation in which one knows certain experiences in the sense of having them even though one does not know that one has them, through being unable verbally to identify them, there is another situation in which I can be subject to a certain emotion which I could identify verbally if I knew I were subject to it, and yet not know that I am subject to it. Thus I may be jealous of someone, even though I do not know that I am. In this case I am ignorant of my jealousy, not because there are no instances in which I can apply the term "jealousy" to myself correctly, but because I do not feel jealous and do not realize that I am behaving jealously. If I felt jealous I should have no difficulty in labelling my feeling as that of jealousy, nor should I have any difficulty in labelling my behavior as
jealous if I realized that I am behaving jealously. In such a case I am jealous even though I do not know it simply because I am behaving jealously, and my jealousy consists of my jealous behavior.

2. The Intentionality of Emotion. So much for behaviorism and anti-behaviorism. If the preceding considerations be sound both positions are inadequate—behaviorism because instances of certain emotions do not consist simply of behavior of a certain sort, anti-behaviorism because, given certain contexts, instances of certain emotions sometimes do consist of behavior of a certain sort. We turn now to consider the intentionality and non-intentionality of emotions. Here two extreme positions are possible—one being that all emotions are necessarily intentional, the other that no emotions are intentional. Dr. Kenny, in over-reacting to the second extreme position, takes the first extreme position, maintaining that emotions "are essentially directed to objects" and that "the connection between emotions and their objects is not a contingent one."¹ I shall argue that both positions are inadequate—that some emotions are indeed essentially intentional, and that some are sometimes intentional, sometimes non-intentional. I do not believe that any are necessarily or essentially non-intentional.

An "intentional" emotion is one which is directed at some object of consciousness and exists at least partly because of one's consciousness of this object. A "non-intentional" emotion is one which is not directed at some object of consciousness. An example of an essentially intentional emotion is grief. In order that I grieve it is necessary that I suffer some loss or affliction, or at least believe that I have. Unless I believe that I have suffered some loss or affliction I cannot grieve, so that a necessary condition of the existence of grief is belief. Moreover, the object of my grief—that about which

or over which I grieve—is the loss or affliction which I believe I have suffered, and my belief that I have suffered this loss or affliction is at least part of the cause of my grief. It is thus self-contradictory to say of someone that he is grieving yet does not believe that he has suffered some loss or affliction. Unless this belief is present he can only pretend to grieve, not really grieve. Nor will it do to say that beasts grieve, yet cannot properly be said to believe that they have suffered some loss or affliction. If it is proper to say that the cow loving in the pasture is grieving for her absent calf (who has been taken to market to be sold for slaughter), then it is proper to say that she laments what she believes to be a loss or affliction. But regardless of whether it is proper to say that brutes believe and grieve or not, the fact remains that human grief depends upon belief. If the belief is true, then the grief may, but need not, be objectively justified or appropriate, depending upon the nature of the loss or affliction and its relation to the grieving person. But if the belief is false, then the grief cannot be objectively justified, although it may be subjectively appropriate in the sense that it would be objectively appropriate if the belief were true.

An example of an emotion that is sometimes intentional, sometimes non-intentional, is depression. I may be depressed, just as I may be grieved, over some loss or affliction which I believe I have suffered. But whereas I cannot grieve without believing that I have suffered some loss or affliction, I can be depressed even though I be conscious of nothing that depresses me. Although I cannot grieve without grieving over something, real or supposed, I can be depressed without being depressed over anything. In this event my depression is simply given me as a datum and is not directed at anything; I am conscious of nothing over which I am depressed which is the source or cause of my depression. My depression is simply there without pointing at any object. This, however, does not mean that non-intentional emotions do not have cau-
sees, nor does it mean that the person subject to them must be ignorant of their causes. They, like intentional emotions, like mental events and states in general, and indeed like events and states of all sorts, undoubtedly do have causes, and just as I may know why I grieve, so also I may know why I am depressed. I may know that when I drink more than a certain amount of alcohol I have a tendency to depression, and may ascribe my present depression to the fact that I have drunk more than that certain amount. This, however, does not make my depression intentional. I am not depressed over the fact that I have drunk too much, but because I have drunk too much, whereas in the case of some intentional emotion such as grief I grieve not only because I believe I have suffered some loss but also over the affliction I believe I have suffered.

The predicates justified and unjustified, appropriate and inappropriate, do not apply to non-intentional emotions, any more than they do to a sensation of blue which I have when I look at the sky. At least they do not apply to them in the sense in which they apply to intentional emotions. Since they are not directed at objects, they cannot be justified or unjustified, depending upon whether my beliefs about this object are true or false and upon its relation to me. Since they are not directed at any object, I cannot have any beliefs about or stand in any relations to an object which would enable them to be appropriate or inappropriate. They, can, however, lead to action or behavior to which such predicates do apply. Thus a non-intentional state of depression may lead me to fail unjustifiably to fulfill some obligation, and a non-intentional state of elation may lead me to act appropriately toward someone I do not like and toward whom I might not act appropriately were it not for this state of elation. They may also be fortunate or unfortunate, either intrinsically or extrinsically. Thus a state of depression may be intrinsically unfortunate because of its unpleasantness, a state of elation intrinsically fortunate because of its pleasantness. And a
state of either kind may be either extrinsically fortunate or extrinsically unfortunate, as having either desirable or undesirable consequences.

3. Social Contextualism. These considerations, I believe, are sufficient to show that some emotions are essentially intentional, whereas others are not, but are sometimes intentional, sometimes non-intentional. We turn now to consider the adequacy of what I have termed "social contextualism." There are three possible varieties of social contextualism, one of which is a modification of radical behaviorism, and two of which are modifications of methodological behaviorism. Although the position I here refer to as "social contextualism" is taken by Mr. Bedford, he does not distinguish between these three varieties of the position, nor is it always clear which variety he accepts. But since, as will appear, the third variety is the least unacceptable, I should like to think that it is the one he accepts.

The radical behaviorist straightforwardly identifies emotions with facial expressions, bodily behavior, and/or verbal behavior. The form of social contextualism which is a modification of radical behaviorism, and which may be referred to as "radical social contextualism," rejects radical behaviorism as a crude over-simplification, and contends instead that emotions can be identified with facial expressions and bodily and verbal behavior only as these exist or occur in social contexts of various sorts. Thus whereas the radical behaviorist would say simply that a facial expression of a certain sort or a piece of bodily or verbal behavior of a certain sort is an emotion of a certain sort, the radical social contextualist is more sophisticated. He refuses to make the straightforward identification which the radical behaviorist makes, and maintains instead that a facial expression or a piece of bodily or verbal behavior of a given kind may in a social context of one kind constitute an emotion of one sort.

and in a social context of another kind constitute an emotion of another sort. Thus for the radical social contextualist an emotion of a certain kind is a function of two factors: (a) a facial expression or a piece of bodily or verbal behavior of a certain kind, and (b) a social context of a certain kind. Thus for the radical social contextualist an (a) factor of one kind may in a social context of one kind constitute an emotion of one sort, whereas an (a) factor of precisely the same kind may in a social context of a different kind constitute an emotion of a different sort.

But although the positions I have just distinguished as radical behaviorism and radical social contextualism are both distinct and possible positions, in the sense that one could conceivably accept either of them and reject the other, I cannot help but believe that those who have termed themselves or who have been called “radical behaviorists” by others have really intended to assert the position I have referred to as “radical social contextualism”. No one, so far as I know, has intended to accept radical behaviorism and reject radical social contextualism. I may, of course, be mistaken about this. If I am, then anti-behaviorism is an acceptable position; but if I am not, then it remains an unacceptable position. But whether I am or not is of no importance so far as my intentions in this paper are concerned.

A consideration of the distinction between emotions as felt, inward, and private and their outward, public manifestations, is sufficient, I believe, to justify, not only a rejection of radical behaviorism, but also a rejection of radical social contextualism. The radical social contextualist, as we have just seen, is not so crude as to reduce emotions to the (a) factor, and is sufficiently sophisticated to see that the (b) factor is also necessary if the position the radical behaviorist seeks to assert is to be given any plausibility at all. But to maintain that emotions are a function of both the (a) factor and the (b) factor and nothing more is still not enough to do justice to the inward, private, and felt aspect of emotions.
Both the (a) factor and the (b) factor are public and not private. Neither factor taken singly is an emotion as inward, private, and felt, nor do both taken together constitute or yield an emotion as felt. The consequence is that radical social contextualism as well as radical behaviorism founders on emotions as felt, and is therefore inadequate as a theory of emotion. We turn now to see whether the forms of social contextualism which are modifications of methodological behaviorism fare any better.

These forms of social contextualism may be labelled "methodological social contextualism". One of them maintains that all emotions, both those of others and also my own, can justifiably be ascribed, either to others or to myself, only through attending to the facial expressions, the bodily behavior, and/or the verbal behavior, either of others or of myself, and to the social context in which these exist or occur. This form, which may be referred to as "extreme methodological social contextualism", like the methodological behaviorist and unlike the radical behaviorist and the radical social contextualist, takes no position concerning the ontological status of emotions as inward, private, and felt. It neither asserts nor denies their existence or occurrence. As such, it, like methodological behaviorism, is an insomplete theory of emotion, and is faced with what must be an embarrassing question for a proponent of the position --- what is it that we are ascribing to others or to ourselves when, on the basis of attending to (a) factors and to (b) factors, we ascribe emotions? There appear to be only three possible answers to this question, none of which are sufficient to save either methodological behaviorism or extreme methodological social contextualism from embarrassment.

One answer is that we are ascribing nothing when we ascribe emotions to ourselves or to others on the basis of attending to (a) and (b) factors. But it is difficult, to say the least, to see how we can be ascribing anything to anyone if we are ascribing nothing to them. This first answer clearly
will not do. A second answer is that we are simply ascribing the (a) factor in the context of the (b) factor, and nothing more. But if this answer be given extreme methodological social contextualism reduces to radical social contextualism and methodological behaviorism to radical behaviorism, and they become subject to the objections which have been levelled against these positions. A third answer is that at least sometimes we are ascribing emotions as felt, inward, and private. This answer amounts to a repudiation of radical social contextualism and radical behaviorism, and therefore escapes the objections to which these positions are subject. It recognizes that although a radical social contextualistic account of instances of certain emotions such as jealousy may sometimes be adequate, such an account is not always satisfactory. It sees that although certain instances of jealousy and certain other emotions sometimes consist simply of behavior of a certain sort in a certain social context, they do not always do so but instead sometimes also involve certain feelings or felt moods which are inward and private rather than outward and public.

This third answer therefore escapes the objections to which the second is subject. But it is nevertheless subject to the following objection. It recognizes that we can ascribe emotions to others only on the basis of our observation of their behavior in a certain social context. It recognizes also that in the case of instances of certain emotions such as jealousy we can sometimes ascribe these emotions to ourselves only through coming to recognize that we have been acting jealously, i.e. behaving jealously in certain social contexts. But it fails to recognize that there are certain emotions such as depression which we can sometime ascribe to ourselves regardless of whether we have been behaving in a depressed way or not, simply through coming to recognize that we feel depressed. Someone subject to such emotions can come to realize that he has been or is subject to them without employing the behavioral evidence or criteria which someone else must use
if this other person is to know that he has been or is subject to them. You can know that I have been in a depressed mood only through observing the outward, public manifestation of my depression or through being informed by me that I have been in such a mood. I, however, need not in every case observe my behavior to know this, and I cannot learn it through informing myself of it, since I should first have to know it before I could inform myself of it, so that the notion of my learning it through informing myself of it is self-contradictory. But if I cannot inform myself of it, and if I do not know it through reflecting upon my behavior, it seems that I can come to know it only through coming to realize that I have felt depressed. This consideration, I believe, establishes the inadequacy of the third answer and therefore also the inadequacy of extreme methodological social contextualism as a theory applicable to all emotions. It also leads on to a consideration of the other form of methodological social contextualism.

This second form of the position may be referred to as "moderate methodological social contextualism". It, like the extreme form of the position, recognizes that we can ascribe emotions to others only on the basis of an observation of their behavior in a certain social context. But it, unlike the extreme form, also recognizes that we can sometimes correctly ascribe certain emotions such as depression to ourselves regardless of whether we have been acting in a depressed way or not, simply through coming to recognize that we feel depressed. But, it may reasonably be asked, if it recognizes this how can it be classed as a form of methodological social contextualism? The answer is that it may be so classed because of its account of how we come to recognize that we feel depressed. Its account consists of maintaining that we come to recognize that we feel depressed through coming to recognize that we are inwardly inclined or disposed to behave in a depressed way. This account is connected with its contention that there are no distinctive feelings uniquely
associated with emotions of various sorts. If there were such feelings then I could recognize that I am subject to an emotion of a certain sort simply through recognizing that I have a feeling of the distinctive sort uniquely associated with that emotion. But if there are no such feelings, then, of course, I cannot come to recognize that I am subject to a certain emotion in this way. The question of the adequacy of moderate methodological social contextualism therefore turns upon the question of whether there are such distinctive feelings. If there are no such feelings, then this form of social contextualism is sound; if there are some then it is unsound. Are there, then, any such feelings?

First we must get clear as to just what the question is. The question is not whether all emotions are necessarily or essentially accompanied by distinctive feelings of a certain sort unique to them, a distinctive feeling of one sort uniquely associated with an emotion of one kind and a distinctive feeling of another sort uniquely associated with an emotion of another kind. Behaviorists and social contextualists are right in denying that all emotions are thus accompanied by distinctive feelings. There is, for example, so far as I can see, no distinctive feeling accompanying and unique to jealousy. Instead, I may come to recognize that I am jealous of someone through recognizing that I have behaved jealously toward him in an overt way, through recognizing that I have been displeased upon hearing him praised, or through recognizing that I have been inwardly inclined or disposed to behave jealously toward him. Nor is the question even the question of whether any emotions are necessarily or essentially accompanied by the distinctive feelings of a certain sort unique to them, so that they cannot exist or occur unless accompanied by these feelings. The question, instead, is whether there are any emotions which are at least sometimes accompanied by distinctive feelings unique to them, so that I can recognize that I am subject to an emotion of a certain sort through recognizing that I have a distinctive feeling of a
certain sort unique to emotions of that sort. Here especially I must stress that you can assess the accuracy of what I say in answer to this question only by reflecting carefully on your own experience of the emotions I mention.

I believe that there are some such emotions. Examples, I think, are depression and elation. I may come to recognize that I am depressed or that I am elated simply through recognizing that I feel depressed or that I feel elated. In these cases a distinctive feeling of depression or of elation is simply given me as a datum, and I recognize it in itself to be a feeling of depression or of elation. It is true that such feelings are also usually, and perhaps even always, accompanied by certain felt inward inclinations or disposition to behave in a depressed or elated way. But in certain cases at least I can recognize the feeling of depression or of elation independently, without first or also recognizing these felt inclinations or dispositions to behavior. Depression, however, I have held to be an emotion which is not essentially intentional, and elation too I believe to be an emotion which is not necessarily intentional. But what about essentially intentional emotions? Are there any which are thus sometimes accompanied by distinctive feelings unique to them so that I can recognize that I am subject to the emotion simply through recognizing that I have a distinctive feeling of the kind unique to the emotion? I believe that the answer is again affirmative. Anger I take to be a necessarily intentional emotion of this kind. I cannot be angry unless I am angry at someone or over something, and usually, if not always, when I am angry I am subject to certain felt inward inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways. But though I cannot be angry without being angry at someone or over something, I can nevertheless sometimes recognize that I am angry through immediately recognizing that I feel angry, without first or also recognizing that I have certain inward inclinations to behave in certain ways.

I believe also that some at least of these distinctive feel-
ings are simple, and cannot be analyzed or described through mentioning their component parts or elements. Since they are simple, they have no component parts. They can be described only through saying that they are more or less like other distinctive feelings or through mentioning the circumstances and the significance of their existence or occurrence — through mentioning, that is, their causes, their accompaniments, their contexts, and their consequences. But a description of their circumstances and significance is a description of what may be termed their “extrinsic” nature, not of what may be termed their “intrinsic” nature. It is a description of the relations in which they stand to other phenomena, not of their nature as immediately felt or experienced. Nor do we describe their nature as immediately felt or experienced when we say that they are more or less like certain other feelings. But the fact that we cannot describe their intrinsic nature does not mean that we cannot refer to them in speech. That is precisely what I am doing now. Nor does it mean that they have no names. “Elation”, for example, in one of its uses (which may be termed its “private” use), I believe to be the name of none such simple feeling. Nor does it mean that they are inexpressible. Someone who is elated may express his elation either by saying simply “I am elated” or else through his facial expression or bodily behavior or action. Nor does it mean that they are incommunicable. Someone who hears the elated person say “I am elated” or who observes his facial expression or bodily behavior or action may have a more or less adequate idea of the intrinsic nature of the simple feeling he is expressing. This, however, does not mean that the other person can know the precise determinate quality of the simple feeling the elated person is expressing. Although he may have good reason to believe that it is more or less like the sort of simple feeling he expresses when he says “I am elated” or behaves or acts as the elated person is behaving or acting, he cannot know that it is precisely like it. It may nevertheless be precise.
ly like it. If so, and if, when he hears or sees the elated person express his elation, he ascribes to the elated person a feeling of precisely the same sort as the kind of feeling he has when he expresses his elation, then he has an adequate idea of the feeling the elated person is expressing. But since he cannot know the precise nature of the feeling the elated person is expressing, he cannot know that his idea of it is adequate to it.

If the preceding considerations be sound, then moderate methodological social contextualism is unsound. It, the other forms of social contextualism, radical and methodological behaviorism, and the position that all emotions are essentially intentional are all inadequate treatments of emotion. They are all over-simplifications because they fail to take into account and therefore fail to apply to various of the rather complex variety of phenomena covered by the term “emotion” in its various standard ordinary uses. They could each be transformed into an adequate theory in only one of two ways: (1) through limiting their applications to emotions of various restricted kinds, or else (2) through narrowing the use of the word “emotion” so that it applies only to the phenomena accounted for by the theory one accepts. If the first alternative were adopted one would be presenting an account only of emotions of certain sorts, and not of emotions of all sorts. And the second alternative would obviously be a question-begging device likely to be accepted only by someone who accepts the theory for which the particular restriction on the use of “emotion” is proposed. It is unlikely in the extreme that philosophers who do not accept the theory in question would accept the proposed restriction on the use of “emotion”, and even more unlikely that non-philosophers, who never even become apprised of the theory in question, would accommodatingly narrow their use of “emotion”. There

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For a more detailed discussion of these and similar issues, see my “Immediacy, Privacy, and Ineffability”, in *Philosophy and Phenomenol Research*, XXV, 1965, pp. 500-15.
does remain, however, the possibility that I have used "emotion" to broadly in criticizing certain of these theories. Thus someone might argue that jealousy and depression, for example, are not emotions. Whether they are or not can be determined only by attending to the various standard ordinary uses of "emotion". Any definition of "emotion" that might be presented to show that I have used the word too broadly would have to do justice to these various uses of the word if it is to be acceptable. I have not, of course, presented such a definition myself. This is because I do not know how to give such a definition — I do not know what such a definition would be. If I did know I should not hesitate to present it.
La palabra “emoción” se usa de maneras más variadas de las que ciertos pensadores parecen reconocer. Para que una teoría de la emoción resulte adecuada deberá hacer justicia a todos los usos ordinarios establecidos del vocablo y no sólo a una parte de ellos. Otra manera de proceder daría lugar a una simplificación excesiva e inaceptable. Ejemplos de tales teorías simplificadoras de la emoción son: (1) el conductismo, que sostiene que toda emoción puede explicarse en términos puramente de conducta; (2) el anticonductismo que niega la posibilidad de tal tipo de explicación para cualquier emoción; (3) la postura que sostiene que todas las emociones son esencialmente intencionales; (4) lo que llamaré “contextualismo social”.

1. Conductismo y anticonductismo. Mi tesis es que ambas posturas resultan equivocadas. Me refiero aquí al conductismo radical que identifica toda emoción con determinada conducta corporal y verbal y no al conductismo metodológico que sólo mantiene que la vía más científica para estudiar las emociones y otros “fenómenos mentales” consiste en restringirse a la observación de la conducta sin cuestionarse nada acerca de la existencia y naturaleza de los fenómenos internos.

Mostrar que es imposible dar una explicación conductista satisfactoria de un fenómeno mental equivale a mostrar que el conductismo es falso, pero no implica que el anticonductismo sea una tesis verdadera. Ambas tesis pretenden dar cuenta de todos los fenómenos mentales. Trataré de demostrar que las dos teorías son falsas. Con este fin intentaré mostrar dos cosas: (1) que algunas palabras que denotan emociones son usadas en algunos casos para referirse a acontecimientos internos, otras para referirse a hechos y estados externos, públicos, y otras veces para referirse a ambos tipos de acontecimientos; (2) que algunas veces hay efectivamente fenómenos internos nombrados por palabras que denotan emociones los cuales no puede identificarse con los fenómenos externos que las mismas palabras nombran. Mi demostración no tomará la forma de un argumento deductivo tal que, si se aceptara la verdad de sus premisas, tendría que aceptarse forzosamente la verdad de su conclusión.

Al usar palabras que denotan emociones para referirse a fenómenos internos o privados, aquello a lo que se refieren son emociones “sentidas” o “experimentadas”. Cuando se dice que una emoción es “interior” o “privada”, lo que se quiere decir es que resulta
imposible en principio para una tercera persona tener acceso directo o conocimiento de ella tal como los tiene la persona que la experimenta. Las emociones experimentadas pueden, sin embargo, tener también expresiones o manifestaciones públicas, esto es, tales que otra persona distinta a quien las experimente pueda tener también acceso directo y conocimiento de ellas. Estas manifestaciones públicas de las emociones sentidas están algunas veces tan íntimamente ligadas con aquéllas, que las palabras que se usan para denotar a las primeras también se usan para denotar a las segundas. Así, por ejemplo, la palabra “cólera” se usa para referirse tanto a la emoción sentida como a la manifestación pública de ella. Esto no quiere decir que se identifique el sentimiento con su expresión externa. En estos casos el nombre de la emoción se refiere a la emoción “total” consistente tanto en el sentimiento interior como en la manifestación externa.

El hecho de que las emociones no puedan ser identificadas sólo con sus expresiones externas, resulta más evidente si se considera que es posible fingir (con éxito) tener ciertos sentimientos internos que en realidad no tenemos, o no tener ciertos sentimientos que de hecho tenemos. Hay que notar que aunque puedo actuar coléricamente sin sentirme o estar colérico, no puedo sentirme colérico sin esforzarme o estarlo sin sentirlo. Sentirse colérico es estar colérico. Sería difícil comprender esto si mi cólera fuera simplemente idéntica a mi conducta corporal o verbal. Resulta, pues, difícil de aceptar que el conductismo dé cuenta de todas las emociones.

Consideremos el anticonductismo. Éste también resulta falso dado que es posible que se tengan ciertas emociones (las cuales puedan ser identificadas verbalmente) sin que se sientan, o sin saber que se tienen. Por ejemplo, puedo estar envidioso de alguien sin sentirlo y, por lo tanto, sin saberlo, esto es, puedo estar comportándome envidiosamente sin darme cuenta de ello. Mi envidia en este caso, consistiría simplemente en mi conducta envidiosa.

2. Intencionalidad de las emociones. Con respecto a este punto hay dos posturas extremas: (1) la que sostiene que todas las emociones son intencionales, esto es, que están dirigidas necesariamente a un objeto de conciencia; (2) la que sostiene que ninguna emoción es intencional. Trataré de mostrar que ambas posturas son incorrectas. Algunas emociones son siempre intencionales, otras no. Ejemplo del primer tipo de emoción es, por ejemplo, pensar o afligirse. El sentimiento de depresión, en cambio, sería una emoción a veces intencional, a veces no. Decir que una emoción no es intencional no equivale a afirmar que no tiene causa; toda emoción, intencional o no, tiene su causa.
Los predicados “justificada”, “injustificada”, “apropiada”, “inapropiada”, no son aplicables a las emociones no intencionales. A estas últimas pueden aplicárseles, en cambio, los predicados “afortunada” (por ejemplo a la de la euforia) o “desafortunada” (por ejemplo a la de la depresión).

3. Contextualismo social. Hay tres variantes de esta postura; una es una modificación del conductismo radical, las otras dos del metodológico.

(i) El contextualismo social radical rechaza al conductismo radical por considerarlo simplificador. Sostiene que las emociones pueden identificarse con determinada conducta corporal y verbal sólo en tanto que éstas existen en contextos sociales de diversos tipos. La misma conducta corporal o verbal puede identificarse con distintas emociones en distintos contextos sociales. Una emoción está en función de dos factores: (a) determinada conducta corporal o verbal, (b) un contexto social determinado. Considerar la distinción entre las emociones en tanto que sentidas interiormente y sus manifestaciones públicas, parece suficiente, creo yo, para rechazar no sólo el conductismo radical sino también el contextualismo social radical. Tanto el factor (a) como el (b) son factores públicos y no privados. Por lo tanto esta postura resulta también inadecuada por su incapacidad para abarcar las emociones sentidas.

(ii) El contextualismo social metodológico extremo manifiesta que todas las emociones pueden ser ascritas justificadamente en base a los factores (a) y (b) antes mencionados. Esta doctrina no toma postura con respecto al status ontológico de las emociones en tanto que sentidas o privadas. Pero, ¿qué es lo que ascribimos a los otros o a nosotros mismos cuando, sobre la base de los factores (a) y (b), ascribimos emociones? Hay tres posibles respuestas a esta pregunta, ninguna de las cuales parece poder salvar a esta doctrina:

1) No ascribimos nada.
2) Ascribimos el factor (a) en el contexto del factor (b).
3) Al menos en algunos casos ascribimos emociones sentidas, internas y privadas.

La primera respuesta resulta inaceptable pues es difícil comprender cómo podemos estar ascribiendo algo a alguien cuando en realidad no ascribimos nada a nadie. En el caso de la segunda respuesta, se pueden hacer las mismas objeciones que se hicieron al contextualismo social radical. En el caso en que se diera la tercera respuesta tendríamos entonces que se acepta que la conducta observable no es la única base que nos permite ascribir emociones, cuando
se asocian emociones a la primera persona no suele hacerse esto sobre la base de la conducta observable. Pero esto va directamente en contra de lo que esta postura pretende establecer. El contextualismo social metodológico extremo resulta pues inaceptable.

(iii) El contextualismo social metodológico moderado también sostiene que sólo podemos ascribir emociones a los otros sobre la base de los factores (a) y (b). Sin embargo, acepta que en algunos casos puede uno ascribirse una emoción a sí mismo sobre la base de que uno se siente de determinada manera. Lo que resulta aquí problemático es la forma en que explican cómo llegamos a reconocer que nos sentimos, por ejemplo, deprimidos. Lo reconocemos, dicen, porque sentimos que estamos interiormente inclinados o dispuestos a actuar en forma depresiva. Esta tesis se acompañó de aquélla según la cual no hay sentimientos distintivos que estén asociados de manera inseparable y única con determinadas emociones. Lo que puede decidir sobre la verdad o falsedad de esta postura es el hecho de que existan o no efectivamente tales sentimientos distintivos de determinadas emociones. Veamos pues si hay o no algunas emociones que al menos algunas veces se acompañen de sentimientos distintivos exclusivos a ellas, de manera que pueda uno reconocer que está sujeto a una emoción determinada al reconocer que se tiene un sentimiento distintivo que es exclusivo a sentimientos de tal tipo. Mi opinión es que sí las hay. Consideremos, por ejemplo, las emociones de euforia y de depresión; los sentimientos propios a estas emociones pueden reconocerse independientemente de nada más; no es necesario reconocer primero que tengo una disposición interior a actuar de manera eufórica o deprimida. Reconozco que estoy eufórico o deprimido simplemente al reconocer que me siento eufórico o deprimido. En estos casos se me da como un dato un sentimiento distintivo de depresión o de euforia. Lo mismo se podría decir con respecto a otras emociones que sí son intencionales, tales como la cólera.

Si las consideraciones anteriores son correctas, entonces el contextualismo metodológico moderado es inaceptable.

Hemos visto que todas las posturas aquí consideradas constituyen simplificaciones excesivas ya que no toman en cuenta toda la compleja variedad de fenómenos a los que se aplica la palabra "emoción" en sus diversos usos ordinarios. Cada una de estas posturas podría transformarse en una teoría adecuada sólo mediante una de las siguientes maneras: (1) limitando la aplicación de la teoría a un grupo limitado de emociones; (2) restringiendo el uso de la palabra "emoción" de manera que sólo se aplicara a los fenómenos de la que la teoría efectivamente explica. La primera alternativa
daría lugar a una teoría acerca de emociones de un solo tipo, no de todos los tipos. La segunda, constituiría un artificio para evadir la cuestión.