

REASONING ABOUT NON-ACTUAL POSSIBILITIES.
PROBLEMS WITH THE DOUVEN-PUTNAM
MODEL-THEORETIC ARGUMENT AGAINST
METAPHYSICAL REALISM*

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SUMMARY: Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven's construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam's argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling.

In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view of correspondence truth. The view entails that when no feature selects just one of all the possible *interpretations* of language (the relations of reference between the terms and the world) the existence of an interpretation suffices to make true a (consistent) theory. The sensible realist is not committed to this extreme conception of correspondence truth.

KEY WORDS: truth, correspondence, semantic naturalism, reference

RESUMEN: Igor Douven ha presentado y defendido una reconstrucción del argumento teórico-modelista de Putnam contra el realismo metafísico. Esta versión tiene ciertas virtudes exegéticas, pues hace inteligible algunos presupuestos putnamianos que sus críticos han considerado injustificados o sorprendentes.

En este artículo proporciono una defensa indirecta del realismo metafísico, mostrando por qué debe también rechazarse el argumento antirrealista bajo esta nueva forma. Los problemas principales del argumento Douven-Putnam

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proceden de atribuir al realista una concepción distorsionada de la idea de verdad como correspondencia. Conforme a esa concepción, la ausencia de factores que seleccionen una única *interpretación* del lenguaje de entre las muchas posibles (una relación de referencia entre los términos y el mundo) conlleva que la existencia de alguna interpretación ya es suficiente para hacer verdadera a una teoría que sea consistente. El realista sensato no está obligado a aceptar esa tesis.

PALABRAS CLAVE: verdad, correspondencia, naturalismo semántico, referencia

In a recent paper Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's well known model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism.¹ Douven does not present his reconstruction as a hypothesis about what Putnam "really had in mind", but as a reading of the model-theoretic argument that "makes much better sense [of it] than [...] the more common way of interpreting it." (1999, p. 480). In fact, there are two notable virtues of Douven's construal that give a certain force to this claim of his. First, he provides a rationale for a crucial assumption in Putnam's argument (made to reject a possible objection) which most of his opponents have considered question-begging: the "just more theory move". Second, Douven makes it clear why Putnam thinks that the scope of his argument is restricted to those realists who assume a naturalistic theory of reference.

In order to accomplish these only partially exegetical aims, Douven ends up with a reconstructed argument that could be seen as relatively novel or, at least, as bringing significant precisions and clarifications to the different forms of it Putnam has provided. Taking account of that departure from Putnam's explicit formulations of the model-theoretic argument and, in any case, following Douven in his recommendation to set aside questions of historical accuracy, I will refer to his reconstruction of Putnam's model-theoretic argument as the *Douven-Putnam* argument. My main purpose in this article is to provide an

¹ Douven 1999. Putnam have given different versions of the argument in several of his works; for instance, Putnam 1981, chapter 2 and Appendix; Putnam 1989; Putnam 1983.

indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing where the Douven-Putnam argument fails. The criticisms I present will serve—I hope—to deepen our understanding of the realist’s view.

1. *The Metaphysical Realist’s Stance*

Metaphysical realism is a view on the relation between truth and evidence. A minimal version of the view should sustain that the truth of a theory cannot be definitionally equated with its being epistemically ideal. But a realist who holds this view might have other grounds to think that an ideal theory must be true (Douven 1999, p. 479). The metaphysical thesis that is the target of the Douven-Putnam argument is stronger. Douven calls it *Methodological Fallibilism*: every empirical theory (even an epistemically ideal theory) may fall short of truth. Furthermore, the notion of truth involved is that of *Correspondence Truth*; this other thesis, Correspondence Truth, is also part of the metaphysical realist’s baggage.

The Douven-Putnam argument aims to reject Methodological Fallibilism by a *reductio*. Central to the argument (as in Putnam’s version) is an specifically model-theoretic theorem:

- (1) For any consistent empirical theory x and any world, there is a *satisfaction relation*, SAT, that provides an interpretation of x such that x is true-on-SAT, or TRUE(SAT).²

The fact that a theory T is true under some interpretation (in the sense of being TRUE(SAT) for some SAT) does not imply, according to the realist, that T is true. Among all these possible interpretations only one (leaving aside problems related to vagueness) is the proper interpretation, the *intended* interpretation for the non-logical terms of T. All other correspondence relations are irrelevant. Some naturalistic relation

² This result holds with two implicit assumptions: x has at least one infinite model (a reasonable assumption about “real” empirical theories); the world is infinite (also a reasonable assumption if we think of it as *our* world). *Cfr.* Douven 1999, p. 481.

between language and reality determines which is the intended correspondence, the genuine reference of our words, and ultimately the truth or falsity of our sentences. This relation would be described by a semantic theory like, for instance, the *causal theory of reference* (CTR), endorsed by many realists.

Putnam claims that the CTR cannot be of any help here to the realist, because it is just another piece of theory that can be added to T, and thus is subject to the application of the previous model-theoretic considerations (this is the “just more theory move”). A number of opponents to the model-theoretic argument have countered that by resorting to that move Putnam assumes the falsity of CTR.³ It is not CTR that is supposed to single out the reference, but the natural facts described by CTR. So, to dismiss CTR as just more theory is more than merely pointing out that the intended interpretation of CTR is questioned too; it is to assume those facts do not hold.

In agreement with these critics, Douven recognizes that, in a way, Putnam does assume the negation of CTR. But he claims the assumption is not illegitimate because “is made in a subargument of the full model-theoretic argument, and is discharged at the end of that subargument” (p. 487). Therefore, the full argument does not strictly depend on the premise that CTR is false. To highlight this role assigned to the negation of CTR the Douven-Putnam argument is represented in a natural deduction style where the hypothesis that CTR is false starts a “necessitated subproof” which we enter (i.e. we *enter* in a possible world in which CTR does not hold).⁴ I am going to reproduce below what I take to be the core of Douven-Putnam argument. The technicalities of the natural deduction system used by Douven are not necessary to appraise the force of Douven-Putnam’s reasoning. Consequently, the version of the Douven-Putnam argument I will present is a simpler and more informal variation

³ *Cfr.*, for instance, Brueckner 1984, pp. 137–138; Devitt 1983, pp. 298–299; García-Carpintero 1996, p. 308; Hale and Wright 1997, pp. 427–457, 440–441; Lewis 1984, pp. 224–225; Van Cleve 1992, p. 349.

⁴ *Cfr.* Douven 1999, pp. 488–489.

of it which side-steps that system. For this reason, it may be not so clear in my construal how the argument relies (but not illegitimately) on the negation of CTR. This does not matter greatly since I am not concerned so much with emphasizing that point, as with representing the Douven-Putnam argument in a summarized form that facilitates the isolation and identification of the premises that, *pace* Douven, the realist should not be disposed to endorse.

Two more comments are in order before presenting the Douven-Putnam argument as I see it. First, the argument involves not CTR but a weaker version of it: “In what follows, we read CTR as asserting that reference is fixed by causality *or by any other naturalistic constraint*” (Douven 1999, p. 488). I prefer to call this thesis *weak CTR* to distinguish it from the original CTR; we will see later how the differences between the two thesis may be relevant to the discussion.

The second remark is to explicitly mention another important presupposition also attributed to the realist by Douven-Putnam: *Semantic Naturalism*, conceived as the view that semantic theories, including therefore weak CTR, are empirical, “and are thus to be accepted or rejected on the basis of exactly the same criteria that govern theory choice in what we more traditionally think of as the natural sciences” (p. 479).

2. *The Douven-Putnam Argument*

The argument aims to derive a contradiction from these three premises: Methodological Fallibilism, Correspondence Truth and Semantic Naturalism. Notice that Methodological Fallibilism and Correspondence Truth are the premises that characterize metaphysical realism. Here we have the reasoning in its bones:

Step 1: There are possible worlds in which Weak CTR is not true. In other words, Possibly: \neg True (Weak CTR)

Douven derives this Step from Methodological Fallibilism and Semantic Naturalism: Semantic Naturalism would imply that

weak CTR is an empirical theory, and thus, by Methodological Fallibilism, might be false.

Step 2: Let w be such a possible world. So (*) In w weak CTR is not true. That is, $\neg\text{True}$ (Weak CTR) holds at w .⁵

Step 3: For any possible world v , it is true at v that (**) if there is not some feature distinguishing among all the correspondence relations the putative unique intended one, then a theory is true exactly if it is TRUE(SAT) on some correspondence relation SAT.

Assuming, with Douven, that the variable x ranges “over all and only (actual and potential) consistent empirical theories” (p. 488), this step can be formalized thus:

Necessarily: [there is no such feature that complies with the metaphysical realist’s standards \rightarrow
 $\forall x (\exists \text{SAT} [\text{TRUE}(\text{SAT})(x)] \leftrightarrow \text{True}(x))$]

Thesis (**) is Douven’s premise (2) (p. 482). According to Douven (2) follows from Correspondence Truth and, since it would be a conceptual truth (from the perspective of the realist), it can be formalized in the form of step 3 (pp. 483, 489).

Step 4: The antecedent of (**) is equivalent to the assumption of weak CTR’s falsity. Thus, $[\neg \text{True}(\text{weak CTR}) \leftrightarrow$

⁵ In fact, for the Douven-Putnam argument to work (specifically, to bestow some minimal plausibility on step 3) the two first steps have to be understood in a particularly strong way. Possible world w in which the sentence ‘True (weak CTR)’ is evaluated should be taken not just as providing the *circumstances of evaluation* of this and the subsequent sentences. It also plays the role of *circumstances of use* for them. That is, regarding the application of Semantic Naturalism and Methodological Fallibilism to weak CTR, the idea is not that *our* sentence ‘True (weak CTR)’ (the sentence with the meaning it has in the actual world) would be false relative to w , but that such a sentence, *as used in w* —by speakers similar to us— (with the meaning it has in w) would be false relative to w . Putting it in terms of the two-dimensional semantics, as represented by Stalnaker 1978: Step 1 says approximately that the *diagonal* proposition associated to ‘True (weak CTR)’ is (non-trivially) contingent. (Every diagonal proposition is contingent for trivial reasons: it is false in possible worlds where the corresponding sentence is used to express, for instance, a contradiction.)

there is no feature that complies with the metaphysical realist's standards] is a tautology. (p. 489)

Step 5: Necessarily: $[\neg \text{True (weak CTR)} \rightarrow \forall x (\exists \text{SAT}[\text{TRUE}(\text{SAT})(x)] \leftrightarrow \text{True}(x))]$

This step follows from step 3 and step 4.

Step 6: It is true at w that $\exists \text{SAT}[\text{TRUE}(\text{SAT})(\text{weak CTR})]$

This follows from the model-theoretic theorem (1), previously mentioned (conjointly with the assumptions that weak CTR is a consistent empirical theory that has at least one infinite model and w is infinite).

Step 7: In w , weak CTR is true.

This last step follows from (*) —in step 2—, step 5 and step 6. But it contradicts (*).

3. *Discussion and Objections*

It is time to enumerate some objections available to the metaphysical realist. The third and the fourth objections are the most important, since they challenge Douven's most controversial assumptions. Thus they are the objections on which I mostly want to ground my rejection of the Douven-Putnam argument.

First objection: It is not clear how the conjunction of Methodological Fallibilism and Semantic Naturalism provides an adequate basis for step 1.

The sense of "empirical" used in Semantic Naturalism seems to be just that the criteria for acceptance or rejection of an empirical thesis are the criteria usually employed in natural sciences (p. 479). In that sense, the realist can readily grant that certain theoretical scientific identifications, such as 'water is H_2O ' or 'temperature is mean kinetic energy', are empirical. Accordingly, there is (at least) a sense in which these thesis *might be false* (as Methodological Fallibilism dictates), even to

the eyes of the Kripkean causal theorist that think of them as necessary truths: those theoretical scientific identifications are known only a posteriori; empirical evidence might make it rational to reject them; furthermore, we have no more than a defeasible, fallible ground to believe that they are true (i.e. to believe that they are true in the actual world). The characteristic point of the Kripkean realist about these and other similar statements made up with *rigid* designators (e.g. ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’) is that *if* they are true, then they are necessarily true.⁶

Now, according to Douven’s apparent reading of Methodological Fallibilism (the reading underlying step 1), this thesis asserts not the methodologically fallible character of all empirical theses, but their *contingent* character, the supposed fact that for every empirical theory T, there is a possible world in which T does not hold. The realist should not agree on this if Methodological Fallibilism is understood in this way; theoretical scientific identifications and identity statements can constitute counterexamples.

I don’t want to press this point too far, because a semantic theory, such as weak CTR, does not seem to have the traits of necessary a posteriori truths. Maybe a metaphysical realist should be disposed to accept that there are possible worlds where weak CTR is not true and thus accept step 1 (even if it does not follow from Methodological Fallibilism and Semantic Naturalism). On this issue, the difference between CTR and weak CTR may be relevant: the putative contingency of weak CTR (which is the thesis the Douven-Putnam argument has to concern itself with —due to its later role in step 4) is far more disputable than the supposed contingency of CTR. In any case, let us stop the discussion here and consider another objection.⁷

⁶ *Cfr.* Kripke 1980, pp. 109, 103–104 and 140–142. See also Putnam 1973, pp. 707–710, a work from his realist period.

⁷ In step 1 we can see why the Douven-Putnam argument would only be effective against realists who accept a *naturalistic* theory of reference (a claim that, as Douven notes (1999, pp. 484–485), has puzzled Lewis (1984, pp. 232–233) and Hale and Wright (1997, pp. 440 and 453)): Semantic Naturalism is

Second objection: Step 4 is dubious.

This second objection is closely related to the comments above on the differences between weak CTR and CTR. Just CTR cannot be tautologically identified with the metaphysical realist thesis that some feature selects the unique intended reference-determining relation from among all the correspondence relations. The identification is more plausible if, as Douven does, we understand that the thesis involved is weak CTR, not CTR. But, even in this case, to assume that the biconditional is tautologically true may be risky.

The objection has little importance by itself, in any case. What is crucial in step 4 is the assumption that the following statement is true at any possible world:

¬True (weak CTR) \rightarrow there is no feature that complies with the metaphysical realist's standards.

The assumption is required to derive the problematic step 5 from the also problematic step 3. Maybe this assumption can be granted. So, let us undertake the discussion of these two other crucial steps.

Third objection: Thesis (**) in step 3 is not justified.

That thesis is Douven's claim (2) (p. 482), and Douven seems to be aware it is controversial:

One may still doubt whether the realist is committed to (2). But I shall grant Putnam that (2) is a consequence of CT [Correspondence Truth]. Strictly speaking, then, my claim is a conditional one, namely, that good sense can be made of his argument provided (2) follows from CT [Correspondence Truth] and is thus legitimate as a premise in an argument against realism. (Douven 1999, p. 483).

For ease of exposition, let us refer by *model-theoretic satisfiability* to the property expressed by the open sentence needed to conclude that the realist's preferred theory of reference is empirical, with the consequence Methodological Fallibilism extracts from that.

$\exists \text{SAT} [\text{TRUE}(\text{SAT})(x)]$. Here Douven(-Putnam)'s reasoning in favor of (2) goes like this. The metaphysical realist supports Methodological Fallibilism, Correspondence Truth and weak CTR. The truth of weak CTR makes false the antecedent of (**). Now, what should the realist think about the concept of truth when he is entertaining the possibility of being wrong about weak CTR? What should he think when he is seriously entertaining the hypothesis that, in the actual world, weak CTR turns out to be false and the antecedent of (**) is true because no other feature selects just one of all the correspondence relations? According to Douven, the minimal revision of his whole conception obliges the realist to stick to Correspondence Truth, and Correspondence Truth implies that in the absence of some constraint on the class of correspondence relations any correspondence relation suffices to make true a (consistent) theory; that is, Correspondence Truth would have as a consequence that truth coincides with model-theoretic satisfiability.

But I think that Douven's reasoning is misguided, and (**) does not follow from the conception of truth as correspondence to reality to which a realist is committed. The realist should not maintain this blind adherence to such an unqualified notion of correspondence truth. His whole position cannot contain Correspondence Truth as a separable, independently plausible doctrine, if this doctrine is understood as implying that, when no feature fixes the proper reference-correspondence relation, truth reduces to model-theoretic satisfiability. There is no motivation for the realist to maintain such an extremely liberal view of the links between the notion of truth and the notion of language-world correspondence. If Correspondence Truth indeed had that consequence, the wiser option for the realist would be to abandon Correspondence Truth just when, and insofar as, he also renounces weak CTR.

Some evidence for this claim comes precisely from the fact that the realist has knowledge of the model-theoretical result (1), mentioned above. It is perhaps an important merit of Putnam to have shown how a model-theoretic mathematical theorem puts certain limits on our pre-theoretical intuitions about corre-

spondence truth (thus giving a more exact form to some ideas already present in Quine 1969, pp. 26–68). But the realist aware of the theorem will drop any purely model-theoretic satisfiability view of truth. For this realist it is nonsense to embrace a Correspondence Truth doctrine that would make true so many theories on the assumption that no correspondence relation is selected as the intended one.

Fourth objection: Step 3 and step 5 are not justified.

The third objection can also be applied to these two steps. Thus, in order to make this fourth objection an independent one I want to defend that even if (**) were a conceptual truth, derived from metaphysical realism, step 3 and step 5 would be illegitimate. Let us grant also, for simplicity, the part of step 4 needed to derive step 5 from step 3 (mentioned in our second objection).

We make the assumption that the third objection is wrong. Thus the realist endorses claim (**). This is not enough for the Douven-Putnam argument to work, because the realist still thinks the antecedent of (**) does not hold. The Douven-Putnam argument appeals to the fact that the (naturalistic) realist believes the antecedent of (**) is true in some possible world. So the argument depends on attributing to the realist not just (**), but *Necessarily: (**)* (which constitutes step 3).

Let us also assume that the realist takes (**) to be a conceptual truth, following from Correspondence Truth. Well, Douven claims that the conceptual nature of (**) —his thesis (2)— allows for its formalization in the form of *Necessarily: (**)*. That is wrong. A certain proposition p , even if it is necessary, cannot be equated with *Necessarily: p*. In general, a proposition p , having a specific modal or epistemological status (e.g. being necessary, or being logically true, or being knowable a priori) is not identical with a proposition that correctly ascribes to p the status it has. For instance, the second proposition could lack that status it ascribes to the first.⁸

⁸ In Pérez Otero 2001 I have described how the failure to appreciate this point is responsible for some of the criticisms Etchemendy has launched

But maybe for the case of (**) Douven's move should be granted: maybe anyone who regards (**) to be a conceptual truth is also committed to *Necessarily: (**)*. That is not so. In assuming (**) as a conceptual truth the realist contemplates the possibility of being wrong about the actual world (concerning the existence of a distinguishing feature that selects just one correspondence relation) and believes that, if that were the case, the concept of truth would coincide with the concept of model-theoretic satisfiability. But remember that the realist still believes that the antecedent of (**) is false. He still thinks there exists (in the actual world) a feature that selects exactly one among all the correspondence relations; therefore, he thinks that truth is not the same as model-theoretic satisfiability. Now, what happens when that realist considers possible worlds where the antecedent of (**) holds (there are such worlds if step 1 and step 4 are correct)? *Necessarily: (**)* would oblige him to claim that in those worlds every model-theoretically satisfiable sentence is true. But, it is coherent to maintain that, in the actual world, truth cannot be reduced to that other concept (model-theoretic satisfiability) but the reduction holds in those possible worlds where unfortunately no unique correspondence relation is selected? I suggest no. That would be to regard the difference between truth and model-theoretic satisfiability as being contingent. And this does not fit metaphysical realism.

It would be wise to think that in other possible worlds truth collapses into model-theoretic satisfiability *only if* it is also thought there is collapse in the actual world. But anyone holding that belief is not a realist. Although the fallibilist realist admits the possibility of being mistaken, he stills defends that, in the actual world, some feature singles out the proper correspondence relation and that therefore truth is not model-theoretic satisfiability. It would not be modesty on his part, but something nearer to inconsistency, to adopt the view that wherever (in every possible world where) nature does not select a unique reference-determining correspondence relation the ex-

against the model-theoretic standard account of the concept of logical consequence.

istence of any correspondence relation whatsoever suffices for truth. That goes against the realist motivation of keeping truth and model-theoretic satisfiability separate.

To summarize, the Douven-Putnam argument does not depend on the negation of weak CTR. It depends on the premise (a premise Douven claims the realist should assume) that in those possible worlds where weak CTR is not true (worlds whose existence follows, according to Douven, from the “empirical” character the naturalistic realist attributes to weak CTR) truth coincides with model-theoretic satisfiability. I have indicated several ways open to the realist to resist that argument.

4. *In Other Words*

There are other potential drawbacks in Douven’s claims on how to extend a certain philosophical view to non-actual possibilities. For instance, given Douven’s characterization of Methodological Fallibilism, the opponent of metaphysical realism who identifies the truth of a theory with its being epistemically ideal is misrepresented as endorsing the negation of Methodological Fallibilism. Should that anti-realist maintain that an ideal theory has to be true even in those possible worlds where it is not epistemically ideal? It seems not. I will continue the discussion a little further in this last section, as this will allow me to restate my criticism from another perspective.

The main remark in the above paragraph is close to one made by Chambers 2000. Chambers claims that the Putnamian anti-realist thesis that an ideal empirical theory T must be true (against Methodological Fallibilism)

is formally (*de re/de dicto*) ambiguous between the expressions

(i) Necessarily: (If we construct an ideal theory, T, then T is true);

and

(ii) If we construct an ideal theory, T, then necessarily: (T is true). (Chambers 2000, p. 195).

and he deems (ii) to be an implausible thesis.

It is the implausibility of (ii) that would prevent us from thinking that the anti-realist takes the ideal theory as a counterexample to Methodological Fallibilism. Nevertheless, we can probably overcome this obstacle, on Douven's behalf. The way out is to assume a doubly modalized —metaphysical-*cum*-epistemic— reading of Methodological Fallibilism (along the lines indicated in our note 5). The necessity involved in Douven's characterization of Methodological Fallibilism concerns different possible circumstances of evaluation and also different possible circumstances of use regarding every empirical theory; Methodological Fallibilism should be understood then in approximately this way: for every empirical theory T, the diagonal proposition associated with T (or associated with the assertion that T is true) is (non-trivially) contingent. That is: for every empirical theory T, there are relevant possible circumstances of use of T where (some of) the proposition(s) expressed by T turn(s) out to be false; and, of course, in every relevant context of use for T, this theory is assumed to keep its prominent epistemic feature: being epistemically ideal.

Whatever Douven's understanding of Methodological Fallibilism may be, thesis (ii) is clearly false (assuming the usual —non two-dimensional— reading of the modal operator). Chambers appeals to this fact to offer a short response to Putnam's model-theoretic argument: it has to be unsound because it entails (ii). To justify this claim, Chambers attributes to Putnam three other theses: (4'), its necessitation (4), and the thesis that (4') is a priori true (which —according to Chambers— is sufficient to derive (4)):

- (4') If a theory, T*, has a model, M, such that T* is true-on-M, then T* is *true*.
- (4) Necessarily: (If a theory, T*, has a model, M, such that T* is true-on-M, then T* is *true*). (*Cfr.* Chambers 2000, p. 195)

I have already noted the rejection common today of the transition from apriority to necessity. Leaving aside this issue,

Chambers is wrong on the role of (4') in Putnam's thought. I agree with some other critics (Haukioja 2001, p. 700; Kroon 2001, p. 706) in thinking that Putnam is not committed to (4'). Haukioja, particularly, points out that both Putnam and the metaphysical realist want to reject (4'); Chambers would misunderstand Putnam because

[t]he model-theoretic argument has the form of a *reductio*. Putnam is not assuming premiss (4') to be true and using that in a direct argument against MR [metaphysical realism]. Rather, he is claiming that there is no way available to the metaphysical realist, *consistent with MR*, to deny (4'). Hence, Putnam can employ (4') in a *reductio* against MR without being committed to its truth himself. (Haukioja 2001, p. 700)

It seems to me that Haukioja is basically right in his criticism of Chambers (I do not find the counterreplies in Chambers 2001 convincing). But I disagree on some details. It is dubious whether Putnam charges the metaphysical realist with such a strong thesis as (4'). Going back to Douven's reconstruction of Putnam's argument (our main concern in this article), the Douven-Putnam argument has the virtue (previously indicated, under a different formulation) of raising a problem for the realist by charging him with a notoriously weaker thesis than (4'); I am referring to (4'')

(4'') If there is not some feature distinguishing among all the correspondence relations the putative unique intended one, then (If a theory, T^* , has a model, M , such that T^* is true-on- M , then T^* is *true*).

In accordance with what we have seen, Douven-Putnam defends that the realist's commitment to (4'') is a priori and he is thereby committed to its necessitation: *Necessarily*: (4''). Then, the Douven-Putnam argument shows, effectively, how mere acceptance of *Necessarily*: (4'') —combined with some other premises: Methodological Fallibilism and Semantic Naturalism— is sufficient to lead to a contradiction. (In doing so, we

noted, the Douven-Putnam version exhibits other of its merits: it would clarify the role of Semantic Naturalism in Putnam's original argument.)

Against this background, I can restate briefly my objections to Douven-Putnam: the mere thesis that the metaphysical realist accepts (4'')—weaker than the one Haukioja attributes to Putnam—is unjustified. Furthermore, even if this thesis were right, it does not imply that the realist should accept *Necessarily*: (4'').

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