Early in his career, Freud thought he had hold of a big idea. He announced it on the evening of April 21, 1896, in a paper on hysteria that he presented to the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna (Freud 1897). The idea was that neurosis is caused in every case by a real, traumatic event, suffered by the patient as a child; that in particular this event is the sexual violation of the child by an adult, typically a father or some other close member of the family. Freud used various words to describe this violation: he called it a rape, an abuse, an attack, an assault, a seduction. The paper met with stony silence.

By May of the following year he was already revising this theory in his letters to Fliess, though he was not to acknowledge the revision publicly for another ten years. To Fliess he wrote that “the psychical structures which, in hysteria, are affected by repression are not in reality memories [...] but impulses [...]” (Freud 1897, p. 247). Writing of this period, Freud later says: “I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they were only fantasies which my patients had made up” (Freud 1925, p. 34). Thus not abandoning
his belief that in hysteria, sexual experiences are the main culprit, Freud now located it within the patient’s own unconscious self. Her illness comes about through a mixing of memory and desire, and desire with fear and guilt. Freud referred to his early idea as “the seduction” theory, a choice of words that trades on a moral ambiguity in the idea of seduction: someone who is seduced is not violated, since in the end, at least, she is willing, and may even have been in some ways responsible for her own fate.

This change of mind has often been hailed by his supporters as the courage to relinquish a favorite view when the evidence was found wanting, by his critics as a craven betrayal of a truth he feared would ruin him. In either case, the change has quite rightly been recognized as the founding moment of psychoanalysis; for here was Freud’s turn to a view of the mind as internally conflicted, riven by desire that meets with opposition not from other persons but from other desires of one’s own. It would be wrong to say that from this point on, Freud saw the mind as self-enclosed, since other persons continued in crucial ways to enter the story he told. But the drama he captured for our imaginations is a drama played out primarily on the inner stage of the mind.

It is interesting to speculate how psychoanalysis might have developed (sic) had Freud held onto the seduction hypothesis, modifying it to include among the events predisposing the mind to illness not only premature and unwanted sexual experiences, but anxiety-producing, unintelligible experiences of any kind. This is the direction Freud should have taken, the direction in which to some extent he strikes out in his late Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety. The road would still surely have taken him via the Oedipal Complex, infantile sexuality, unconscious phantasy, and so on, but it would have led him to a rather different view of the mind itself, and of its relations to the external world; for
in abandoning the seduction hypothesis Freud also abandoned Janet’s idea of dissociation as the mind’s response to psychic trauma, developing in its place the quite different concept of repression.

Partly through recent work on perception and memory, the idea of dissociation is slowly resurfacing among psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Both dissociation and repression presume a mind divided, but the division is differently conceived, so also the agent of the division, the nature of integration, the unconscious, and the vicissitudes to which thinking is subject, among them, irrationality. My point is not to choose between dissociation and repression but to say that a picture of the mind needs both. I begin in Part I with a well-known philosophical treatment of irrationality, which brings out some key features of repression. In Part II, I turn to dissociation and to some of its implications for our thinking about thinking. And in Part III, I suggest that a familiar idea of rationality does justice neither to irrationality nor to rationality.

I. Repression and the vertical mind

A state of mind is irrational in what is sometimes called an internal sense if it is inconsistent or undesirable in the agent’s own terms, by criteria or in light of facts he or she implicitly acknowledges. Freud’s patient The Rat Man (Freud 1909) acted on the belief that his midnight escapades were witnessed by his father, a belief that was internally irrational since the man knew his father was dead. By contrast, if I falsely think that the ravage in my garden was caused by lions, yet have good reason for thinking so, I am mistaken or deceived, but my belief is not internally irrational. Nor is a belief which strikes us as bizarre—for example that the world was formed from worms and
cheese— but which makes sense in the context of the believer himself.

Internal irrationality is puzzling because it presses hard on the holistic nature of the mental. Since any belief or desire that has a propositional character is partly constituted by its holistic relations with other mental events in the person’s mind, relations that are both causal and logical in nature, these holistic relations exercise rational constraints on what a person can intelligibly be said to believe and intend. We can begin to spell out these rational constraints in saying that any creature who has the concept of belief must also have the concept of evidence: she knows that when she makes a claim about the world, or says she believes something to be true, it is relevant to ask her what her evidence is. She implicitly accepts a normative principle to the effect that, in general, one should hold those beliefs that on the whole have the best support. There are familiar exceptions. But someone who typically claimed to have a belief that she acknowledged was inconsistent with her other beliefs, a belief that flew in the face of what she considered to be the available evidence, would make us doubt that she had the concept of belief; it would make us doubt her sanity, even her status as a person.

A similar normative principle —Davidson calls it the principle of continence (Davidson 1980)— helps define the concept of intention. Someone who has formed not merely a wish or a desire but the intention to go to Mexico has presumably considered other desires and beliefs to which this desire is relevant. She has taken into account the relevant facts available to her, for example about how long it will take her to get there; she has implicitly said to herself something like, ‘All things considered, going to Mexico now is what I want to do’. The principle of continence tells us, in effect, that in forming an intention one should take all relevant considerations into account.
It might look as if first there are beliefs and intentions, then over and above them the normative principles. But the point is rather that these principles help define what we mean by belief and intention in the first place (Davidson 1982). Only ‘foolish’ consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds; for the consistency that these normative principles define is a condition for having a mind at all. Irrationality is a failure, not an absence, of rationality; and the principle of total evidence, the principle of continence, are conceptual tools for clarifying this failure: self-deception is a state of holding incompatible beliefs on the part of someone capable of recognizing, however dimly, that they are incompatible. If she simply fails to see the evidence that goes against her, or has no idea what it is to be conflicted because some evidence goes one way and some another, then she is like Mary, deceived by John; she is not self-deceived. And similarly for incontinence, or weakness of the will.

Freud also recognized the need for something like these normative principles in describing irrationality. His first topographical model had drawn a line between Consciousness and the system Unconscious, the latter consisting primarily of the repressed. He had envisioned internal or intra-psychic conflict as taking place between these two systems, one ‘self’ knowing but not wanting to know, the other genuinely ignorant, with ‘the censor’ located more-or-less on the side of consciousness. But he came to see that such a model pictures neither the fact that the agency doing the repressing is typically itself unconscious (if not explicitly repressed), nor that the unconscious knows more than it says. So mid-way in his career, Freud introduced a second topographical theory in which the structures ‘id’, ‘ego’ and ‘super-ego’, cut across the conscious/unconscious divide (Freud 1923). Much of the ego (‘das Ich’) is re-
pressed; but the ego is also that center of mental agency which acknowledges and attempts to reconcile conflicting beliefs and desires, and which in doing so sometimes represses. Freud’s ‘ego’ is that agent who — because he or she implicitly acknowledges such principles of rationality as we have posited — can be said to repress and to ‘split’.

This change recognizes the conceptual difficulties about irrationality to which I’ve been pointing. Yet as Sartre rightly argues (Sartre 1956), in positing an unconscious ‘repressing’ ego, Freud reinstates the unity of deceived and deceiver now on the side of the unconscious, and it is just this unity which drives the paradoxes. Both self-deception and repression, then, pose the problem of constructing a model of the mind that acknowledges a certain degree of internal irrationality without jeopardizing the mind’s intelligibility overall.

Davidson’s philosophical solution to the problems of irrationality, in the form either of self-deception or weakness of the will, is congenial to repression as Freud often speaks of it. Davidson defends the following three claims, all of which he thinks can be found in Freud:

**First**, the mind contains a number of semi-independent structures, these structures being characterized by mental attributes like thoughts, desires, and memories.

**Second**, parts of the mind are in important respects like people, not only in having (or consisting of) beliefs, wants and other psychological traits, but in that these factors can combine, as in intentional action, to cause further events in the mind or outside it.

**Third**, some of the dispositions, attitudes, and events that characterize the various substructures in the mind must be viewed on the model of physical dispositions and forces when they affect, or are affected by, other substructures in the mind (Davidson 1982, pp. 290 and 291).
It is this last, Davidson says, which justifies Freud’s use of metaphors from hydraulics and mechanics to describe certain kinds of psychological phenomena.

As an example of an action that is internally irrational Davidson cites another incident from Freud’s case history of the Rat Man. A man walking in a park stumbles on a branch. Thinking it may be dangerous to others, he removes the stick and throws it in a hedge beside the path. On his way home, however, it occurs to him that the branch may be dangerously projecting from the hedge, so he returns to the park and replaces the branch in the road. Both actions are rational in and of themselves, for in each case the man acts in light of a reason, a belief-desire complex which is necessary to explain the action. If he had not had these reasons he would not have done what he did; so the reason in each case is also a cause.

The irrationality consists not in doing either of these actions, nor even both, but in the fact that in returning to the park to replace the stick the man ignores his own principle of doing that which he thinks best, all things considered. He has a motive for ignoring it, namely that he wants—perhaps for very strong unconscious reasons—to restore the branch to its original position. In this sense he has a reason for restoring the branch, and incidentally for ignoring his own judgment, which presumably he knowingly does. But it can’t be a reason for ignoring it intentionally, since the principle of continence helps define what it is to act intentionally, to act on reasons.

Davidson’s solution is based on the premise that while typically the mental causes that explain an action are also the agent’s reasons for doing it, sometimes a gap opens between these two explanatory schemes. When it does, cause and reason fail to coincide in a way that admits irrationality. Davidson asks us to consider first a case in which the cause and the effect occur in different minds.
wishing to have you enter my garden, I grow a beautiful flower there. You crave a look at my flower and enter my garden. My desire caused your craving and action, but my desire was not a reason for your craving, nor a reason on which you acted (Davidson 1982, p. 300).

This is a straightforward instance of intentional behavior on the part of two persons, an instance whose interest lies in the fact that A provides B with a reason for acting in such a way that A’s end is achieved, even though B does not do what she does with A’s end in mind. B acts for a reason, but it is not A’s reason, which moves B merely as a cause.

Though there is of course neither paradox nor necessarily any irrationality in the two-person case, nevertheless it makes clear, Davidson continues, that “mental phenomena may cause other mental phenomena without being reasons for them [. . .] and still keep their character as mental, provided cause and effect are adequately segregated” (p. 300); and so the two-person case suggests a strategy for dealing with irrationality in the solitary mind. The strategy is to posit mental causes that are reasons, but not in relation to the effects they cause. When such non-rational mental causation is at work, the single mind may to some extent resemble a duality of minds, or a mind that is, as we familiarly say, divided within itself. The boundary Davidson postulates is not available to introspection; nor is it to be thought of necessarily as a line between conscious and unconscious mental states. The boundary is rather a conceptual aid to a description of irrationalities.

It is hard to know just how to construe this proposal. What acts causally on what? Is it acting on the wish to ignore what reason counsels that has the splitting effect? Or does the wish itself do it? In either case, does the cause act on the mind, creating a split-off sub-set of the man’s
beliefs and desires? Or does it act on the principle of continence, exiling it to a second mind that is already there, as it were? What other mental phenomena get exiled along with it? And for how long does the exile last? Perhaps these questions press Davidson too literally. But we can say this: unless the man loses his mind altogether, the principle of continence is not forever exiled to the ‘second’ mind, only temporarily; or perhaps only where this particular conflict is concerned. Furthermore, many other of the man’s thoughts must go with it. For the success of the exile depends on its leading him to look away from, or ignore, not only the principle of total evidence, but also the evidence itself that goes contrary to his desire, together with all those beliefs, desires, and memories, that are closely caught up in the conflict. As Freud describes the Rat Man case, the incident of the stick in the road is merely the surface of a much more pervasive conflict involving the man’s relations to the two people in the world he most cares about, and to his own work. The ‘splitting’ severs him not only from himself but also from the world.

Before taking up Freudian repression, let me note the following about Davidson’s picture. It challenges our assumptions about the unity of the mind, suggesting that bodily identity does not settle the question of mental identity: one bodily creature with one brain may house a mind whose singleness is in question. But Davidson leaves in place our notion of the mental as consisting of thoughts of a propositional character, governed overall by the constraints of rationality. And so, in some of his writings, does Freud. Many of his views on repression rest on the assumption that repression affects thoughts that are fully formed, the content of which is sufficiently replete to be speakable, in principle, if not in fact. Uncertainty and confusion of thought are largely the products of the distorting effects of conflict,
drive, and defense. Get rid of the defenses and the thoughts that were there all along can surface.

In this picture, repression is a kind of horizontal line, splitting a ‘deep’, vertical mind that contains fully formed thoughts all the way down. At the bottom are thoughts that have been denied and disowned; somewhere ‘in the middle’ is the repressing agent or force, the censor; and at the top, thoughts that are conscious or pre-conscious. Were the repressed thoughts at one point owned? Were they, prior to repression, the thoughts of somebody, an agent, a ‘self’? Were they in that sense first-personal in character? Freud does not ask these questions explicitly. But the concept of the ego, ‘das Ich’, as encompassing both the repressor and the repressed, seems to answer in the affirmative.

II. Dissociation and the horizontal mind

Janet viewed memory as the central organizing apparatus of the mind. His work with hysterics led him to think that memory has two different ways of functioning: it can function automatically, in a way that is shared both by human beings and by other animals, and it can function in a narrative way, integrating new experience into existing mental schema. In the normal case, these two forms of memory cooperate so that we do not see their separate tracks. But because the ease with which narrative memory works depends on the condition of the person at the time of the experience, and on the nature of the experience itself, these tracks may diverge. Familiar experiences are automatically assimilated without much conscious attention, while frightening or very novel experiences that do not easily fit any existing mental schema may be remembered with particular vividness, or may not be remembered at all in a narrative way. If an existing meaning scheme is entirely unable to accommodate the experience, it may be stored
differently, and be unavailable to consciousness under ordinary conditions; it becomes dissociated from conscious awareness and from voluntary control. When this occurs, fragments of these unintegrated experiences may later surface as isolated recollections or as behavioral enactments. Janet writes:

It is only for convenience that we speak of it as a ‘traumatic memory’. The subject is often incapable of making the necessary narrative which we call memory regarding the event; and yet he remains confronted by a difficult situation in which he has not been able to play a satisfactory part, one to which his adaptation had been imperfect, so that he continues to make efforts at adaptation (Van Der Kolk 1991, pp. 427 and 428).

In distinguishing narrative from automatic memory, Janet often used the following case to illustrate both. His 23-year-old patient Irene had been traumatized by the death of her mother. For several years, Irene had been caring for her mother conscientiously, continuing at the same time to work in order to provide money for her mother’s illness and for her alcoholic father. When the mother finally died, Irene had hardly slept for the preceding sixty consecutive nights. She was brought to the clinic at Salpetrière with severe hysterical disturbances, hallucinations, and amnesia.

A couple of weeks after the mother’s death, Irene’s aunt brought her to the clinic. She said that Irene’s response to her mother’s death had been very strange. At first she refused to go to the funeral, laughing inappropriately when she did. Furthermore she apparently had no recollection of her mother’s death. Janet tried to get her to recount the night of the mother’s death, but to no avail. Irene later said to Janet:

If you insist on it, I will tell you. ‘My mother is dead’. They tell me that it is so all day long, and I simply agree with
them to get them off my back. But if you want my opinion, I don’t believe it (Van Der Kolk 1991, p. 429).

Yet in a sense Irene seemed to remember perfectly well. When she looked at an empty bed, her body assumed a bizarre posture. She stared at the bed, seemed not to hear what was said to her, and began to engage in a sort of ritual: She brought a glass of water to the mouth of an imaginary person, cleared the mouth, urged the person to open her mouth, saying, “But open your mouth, drink something, answer me”. She climbed on the bed in order to rearrange the body, then she cried: “The corpse has fallen to on the ground and my father who is drunk, who vomits on the bed, cannot even help me.” The scene, which presumably reproduced the mother’s actual death, lasted several hours. It ended with a convulsion and sleep.

Finally, after several months of treatment, Irene slowly started to tell the story of her mother’s death. She began: “Don’t remind me of those terrible things. It was a horrible thing that happened in our apartment that night in July. My mother was dead, my father completely drunk, doing only horrible things to me.” What had been a traumatic memory became a narrative memory, a story now told, with all the appropriate feeling, to another person.

Janet noticed two differences between traumatic and narrative memory. The first is that traumatic memory works by being acted out, and acted out in a stereotyped way, indifferent to changing circumstances. Narrative memory, on the other hand, is a social act; it takes place in language; it is addressed to a particular person, and responsive to the circumstances of the narration. The second difference is that traumatic memory is evoked under particular conditions: situations that are similar to those in which the traumatic event occurred automatically bring it to mind.
Freud’s early work was directly influenced by Janet. In *Studies in Hysteria*, Freud and Breuer wrote that hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences (Freud 1895). Breuer’s theoretical chapter in this work follows Janet’s line completely, insisting that a tendency to dissociation or splitting is present in every hysteria, and holding that trauma-induced hysteria is dependent on a particular mental state, which Breuer called ‘hypnoid’, hence Breuer’s term, hypnoid hysteria. Breuer thus posited no active psychological force to account for the separation of the pathogenic memory from the main body of memories, feelings, beliefs, and so on, which the patient acknowledged as hers.

For a brief period, Freud supported this view. But as I indicated above, he early developed the idea he was never to abandon, that the “reminiscences” from which hysterics suffer are not truly reminiscences but unconscious fantasies, and that hysterical amnesias and enactments result not from a failure to integrate new events into existing mental structures but from the active repression of conflicted sexual and aggressive wishes.

Current research is confirming some of Janet’s ideas. “[M]emory is an active and constructive process and that remembering depends on existing mental schemas, an active organization of past reactions or past experiences which must always be operating in any well-adapted organic response” (Van Der Kolk 1991, p. 439). The research concludes that there are indeed two kinds of memory, sometimes now called declarative versus procedural memory (the latter containing knowledge of how to do things that does not require propositional thought), sometimes explicit versus implicit memory (Kihlstrom 1987). The first kind is narrative in form: One remembers things one has done as things she has done, things that happened to her as things that happened to her, at a particular place and time.
What is remembered, and how, depends on how easily the event is assimilable to the ways the person already has of understanding it: an event that is easily assimilable is more likely to be stored as a first-person event in an ongoing narrative. Ironically, this means that the more integratable experiences are the more subject to distortion, for they are the ones that are modified by new experiences and by the circumstances in which a story is remembered and told. The less assimilable experiences are the ones that may be ‘remembered’ in a timeless way, as if they happened at no particular time, and to no one in particular. The agent does not think of these experiences as ‘hers’—things that happened to her, and at a particular time and place.

In the ordinary case these two forms of memory work together, but during trauma, as Janet said, they may come apart. What is split off from each other in that case are not sets of fully articulated thoughts, all of them first-person in character, but rather two memory systems, only one of which contains narratable, first-person thoughts.

The concept of dissociation arose out of work with traumatized patients. But it rests on some ideas that may be generalizable beyond pathology.

First, about thinking: Propositional thoughts may constitute only the last stage in the thinking process and only one kind of thought. I have been talking about the fragmented thoughts that are a consequence of traumatizing anxiety. But there are other non-propositional phenomena as well that lay claim to the mental. Freud called our attention to one species: dreams. Another includes the familiar experience of muddling around in the process writing an essay or poem, or giving voice to a novel feeling or perception. It seems inaccurate to say about such experiences either that the emerging thoughts were there all along, or that what was there before was no thought at all.
Second, about the role of anxiety in thinking: Thoughts may be unformulated because one has not attended to them, or because the persons who were needed to help give them words were not available, or could not or would not speak them publicly themselves. But they may also be unformulated as a consequence of defense. It is for this reason that Freud could use the concept of repression to refer sometimes to dissociation.

Both repression and dissociation seem to leave us with a puzzle. How can someone repress a thought without acknowledging it, refuse to formulate a thought without formulating it? The puzzle about dissociation disappears if instead of thinking of knowledge and perception as all-or-nothing phenomena, we think of them as processes that have a number of stages, only the last of which is fully explicit thought (Neisser 1967). Anxiety may be aroused by apparent similarities between an earlier situation and a present one, itself only sketchily glimpsed, from which the anxiety turns attention away. If the earlier experience itself is not remembered in a narrative, propositional form, then the defense is not against thoughts of a propositional character, but against that anxiety, against making it explicit. We might say that the defense is against thinking itself (Stern 1985).

The trouble with splitting as a defense is that it makes for a kind of habitual, automatic behavior. It prevents one from taking in what is new, revising a prior picture of the world in light of the present. Freud was always impressed by the repetitive character of neurotic behavior, its tendency to reenact old, often traumatic scenarios, its lack of sensitivity to ways in which the present is different from the past. In one of his most frequently quoted passages, he writes:
We may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it (Freud 1914, p. 150).

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud posited a compulsion to repeat, a compulsion that reveals, he thought, some biological principle even more fundamental than the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. He called this more fundamental principle the death instinct, the drive not merely to keep stimuli at an even level, but to abolish them altogether. Few psychoanalysts accepted the death instinct even at the time Freud proposed it, though there was no denying some of the phenomena it was adduced to explain.

Without acknowledging he is doing so, Freud gives an alternative explanation in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (Freud 1926). There, he reverses his earlier position according to which anxiety is the form libido takes under repression. Both anxiety and repression were problematic on this account; for the idea that anxiety is the conversion of inhibited libido does not square with Freud’s conviction that anxiety is a response to danger. *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* solves the problem by viewing all anxiety, neurotic as well as normal, as the accompanying and more or less appropriate affect of a perception of danger, which has always an external component. Freud’s earlier view had distinguished normal from neurotic anxiety by saying that the first is invoked by an external, the second by an internal danger. Now he acknowledges that “an instinctual demand is [ . . . ] not dangerous in itself; it only becomes so inasmuch as it entails” (Freud 1926, p. 126). For example, the child has wishes or desires that were previously unconflicted; but he comes to fear that the penalty for gratifying them, perhaps even for having them, is something
dreadful. Anxiety is the affective response to a situation perceived as dangerous to the self, to one’s survival or self-esteem. And the prototypical danger situation for the child is separation from the persons on whom he depends and whom he loves.

Conflict continues to play a central role in the story of the troubled mind that Freud now tells, but conflict of a rather special sort. A conflict between my wish to do something in Mexico in October, and also to attend some occasion in San Francisco during the same period of time, is a conflict between fully articulable thoughts, and my capacity for deciding between them is presumably intact. The conflicts Freud has in mind are of a more pervasive sort that may never have been articulated, and that arouse intense anxiety, like a conflict, for example, between maintaining crucial affective bonds and owning up to what one sees when doing so threatens those bonds.

Working with the dissociation model of the divided mind, Arnold Modell writes: “transference repetition, unlike learning in general, is a response to the pressure of unassimilated experience. Experience may be unassimilated because of trauma, or because of the absence of something from the environment that was needed at a nodal point of development” (Modell 1990, p. 65). This needed something is typically someone, someone who could teach the child or the person to pay attention to her experience, and how to think about it. One of the analyst’s tasks is to minimize her patient’s anxieties so that she can both recognize them and discover that the world-view in which they made sense no longer exists.

Freud’s later view of repression agrees with Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud 1920) in holding that something in mental life is ‘beyond’, or takes precedence over pleasure and pain. That something is now seen to be anxiety, as the dissociation model of the split mind also suggests. Anxi-
ety takes precedence over pleasure and pain in the sense that anxiety can close down the very routes —perception, narrative thought, and reflection— along which desires are formed and satisfied. Whereas in the ordinary case the desire for pleasure and the wish to avoid pain call thinking into being, anxiety can scatter thinking’s forces. Anxiety is not, then, just a particular sort of pain but an affect that can have peculiar effects on the workings of the mind.

Let’s return to the divided mind as Davidson sees it. Recall that on his analysis, all the elements of practical reasoning are in place: fully articulate desires, beliefs about how to achieve them, and the weighing of the various factors. The irrationality of the man with the stick in the road enters his behavior at the point at which he ignores his own all-things-considered judgment. On the analysis I am suggesting, judgment may well have been precluded by anxiety; no judgment that weighed all the relevant considerations was made.

In the following passage from a late essay, Freud writes:

He [the child] replies to the conflict with two contrary reactions, both of which are valid and effective. On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms he rejects reality [... ] on the other hand, in the same breath he recognizes the danger of reality, takes over the fear of that danger as a pathological symptom and tries subsequently to divest himself of the fear [... ]. But everything has to be paid for in one way or another, and this success is achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on [... ]. (Freud 1940 (1938), pp. 275 and 276).

Notice that, on Freud’s own account, the rift is not merely within the ego, but, as I remarked earlier, between the ego and the world. The rift has the effect of turning one’s attention away from large areas of reality, and of leaving what I am calling unformulated thought outside the domain of the ego.
The concepts of both repression and dissociation require us to ask: What is it that is split? In what sense was it unified, or integrated, before the split? What is integration? And where, in all this, is the self, or the concept of the self? The repression model envisions the divided mind as a deep vertical structure, in which all the divisions are subject to the constraints of rationality. On the dissociation model the divided mind is split along a horizontal line. On one side are mental states that are first-personal and narratable, and memories that are recoverable under ordinary conditions. On the other side are mental states that lack these characteristics. The capacity for thinking is itself impaired, and the ego is not so much split as stunted. My argument, then, is that in those cases for which something like the dissociation model is appropriate, what is beside oneself is not analogous to a second person. The dissociated mental contents have not yet come into the person’s domain; they include thoughts that are not first-personal.

III. Rationality

Neither the failures of thinking, nor thinking at its best, can be entirely captured by the canons of rationality. A psychopath or an autistic person might be perfectly able to construct and to heed a piece of practical reasoning, for example, and even accept a kind of Kantian argument that he should not do to another what he would not want done to himself, yet be incapable of imagining the feelings of another (Deigh 1996). If that is so, his capacity for moral thinking is impaired. Janet’s patient, Irene, is an extreme case of not acknowledging something one in some sense knows. But there are similar cases close at hand: the person at the beginning of mourning, or just realizing the enormity of a mistake he has made, ‘knows something in his head’ that he has not fully taken in. These cases hint at an ideal
of thinking that again leaves behind reason as we often construe it.

This suggestion is implicit in Davidson’s own work, though it emerges there only by the way. In the last two paragraphs of “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, Davidson remarks that causes that are not reasons for what they cause is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for irrationality. There are of course trivial cases of non-rational mental causation, as when the thought of forks reminds me of spoons. But a non-trivial case of non-rational mental causation

is a form of self-criticism and reform that we tend to hold in high esteem, and that has often been thought to be the very essence of rationality and the source of freedom [...] What I have in mind is a special kind of second-order desire or value, and the actions it can touch off. This happens when a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and he acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change —the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations (Davidson 1982, p. 305).

Here is how I see the sort of actions that might call for this description. Suppose that I want to stop smoking, but find it very difficult. The difficulty comes because this desire is alien: there is little else I can draw on in the way of already formed beliefs and desires to put my new desire straightway into effect. Berating myself every time I fail in my resolve is only apt to make me want to smoke more. Yet there are things I can do, and do intentionally, to make my alien desire effective. Suppose, for example, that I have wanted for a while to go white-water canoeing. It might now occur to me that such a trip might reduce the chance, perhaps even the desire, to smoke. So I decide to arrange such a trip, hoping to use it as occasion to change my ways. Or if I would like to stop getting into wrangles
over trivial matters, I might try diverting the conversation when I see a wrangle in the offing.

Recall the gardener, who seeks to lead his neighbor voluntarily into his garden by giving her a goal which will coincidentally achieve his own. His hope is that once she is in the garden and has come to know the gardener, sometimes her reasons will be his reasons in that he and she will have come to share many goals in common. Towards this end he may have taken the trouble to learn that it is gardens and not, for example, antique cars that appeal to her, daffodils and not roses. So like the gardener, the smoker or the wrangler may need to become a good detective, noting when the motives he wishes to change take hold and how he might put other circumstances into play. One plays the gardener to oneself by appealing to a desire \( x \), the enacting of which will set a causal chain in motion that may eventuate in the satisfaction of a desire \( y \) that he is not able to achieve directly. If successful, the agent will have done something he wanted to do; and his wanting was relevant to his success. But to say simply that he stopped smoking because he wanted to wouldn’t do justice to the complexity of the causal story, which includes intermediate and devious goals, and things that more or less happened to him along the way.

We might summarize the difference between the irrationally incontinent and the rationally continent persons in this way: Emma, who falls into incontinence, and Isabel, who manages to avoid it, are at the same fork in the woods. Emma, however, takes a familiar path marked out by habits of various kinds, towards an end which will incidentally (or not so incidentally) yield a familiar self-dismay. Isabel, minding and remembering that dismay, finds incentives to lead her in a different direction, one which may begin to put new habits into play.
Only if we construe habit as more mindless than it is, and intention as less a matter of habit and of practice, should Isabel’s behavior puzzle us. Dewey remarks that we tend to think of bad habits and dispositions as forces outside ourselves. We tell ourselves, truly, that the habit was not deliberately formed. “And how can anything be deeply ourselves which developed accidentally, without set intention?” But all habits, Dewey continues, are “demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will. They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities” (Dewey 1944, pp. 24 and 25).

Viewing action as set in motion by desire, the paradigm of practical reasoning takes desire itself as a given. Often, however, desire grows slowly from the things one does, not necessarily out of desire at all, or in any case not for just those doings. Desire by definition is a state of want, yet for what may not be clear. Habits are the material of desire; desire rises to the surface on a sea of practice. The so-called first order desires are just those fully formed desires which, unopposed by older desires more deeply ingrained in our behavior, come with the means for acting on them attached.

Dewey goes on to say: “If we could form a correct idea without a new habit, then possibly we could carry it out irrespective of habit. But a wish gets a definite form only in connection with an idea, and an idea gets consistency and shape only when it has a habit in back of it” (p. 30). This passage contains yet another idea which helps clarify the puzzles inherent in self-transcendence, namely that how much content an idea has is a relative matter, depending on the extent to which an idea has been worked into the fabric of the mind.

In sum: Desires the sort of thing that can be reasons are enmeshed in an ever changing network which includes dis-
positions, habits of responding, perceiving, and behaving. The beliefs and desires we single out as emblematic mental states are abstractions from a mental field that includes habits built up over a long time, acts of attention that are not guided by but that help to mold intention, patterns of salience that constrain and pre-date our full emergence as thinking creatures, thought associations of a relatively mechanical character, and so on. This mental field includes mental states that are sometimes causes but not reasons, yet causes that can shape the sorts of effective reasons one forms.

There are continua, then, between one’s less than fully deliberate will and what is one’s will in the fullest sense, between habit and intention, between thoughts that are thoroughly incorporated into the network we call the self and thoughts just entering it at the edge. Taking either our past or our future in hand may require attending to any of these strands in the constantly shifting web.

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RESUMEN

La autora analiza la solución que da Davidson a las paradojas de la irracionalidad en conexión con dos representaciones psicoanalíticas diferentes de la mente dividida. En la primera, la más conocida, la represión es un tipo de línea horizontal que divide una mente vertical “profunda” constituida de arriba abajo por pensamientos expresables. En la segunda, la mente aparece separada por disociación en grupos de memoria y pensamientos, algunos de los cuales nunca han sido completamente expresados. Cavell sostiene que la filosofía de la mente requiere ambos modelos y que la descripción davidsoniana de la mente dividida se ajusta sólo al primero; también afirma que la explicación de algunos fenómenos irracionales y de otros racionales requiere plantear fenómenos mentales que son causas pero no razones, como el mismo Davidson afirma al final de “Paradoxes of Irrationality”. Cavell sugiere la existencia de un continuo a lo largo del cual se sitúan algunos pensamientos que ya han sido completamente integrados en la red de la mente y otros más fragmentados que quedan “en los límites de la mente”.

[Traducción: Laura E. Manríquez]