Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 43, number 128, agosto 2011
On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative
[Sobre la idea misma de una alternativa robusta]
Carlos J. Moya
Universidad de Valencia

Abstract: According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions.
Keywords: Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Frankfurt cases, blameworthiness, Pereboom, Widerker

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