Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 44, number 130, abril 2012
El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta
[The Case against Moral Luck. Reconstruction and Reply]
Sergi Rosell
Philosophy Department
University of Sheffield

s.rosell@sheffield.ac.uk

Abstract: After a detailed reconstruction of the global case against moral luck in all its kinds, which distinguishes two main argumentative strategies, the moderate strategy and the radical strategy; a twofold counter-argument is presented. It is argued that (i) whereas the former turns out to be insufficient, (ii) the latter becomes impractical and eventually incoherent. The fundamental aim is to show that a final argument against moral luck necessarily depends on the impossible notion of unconditional desert —or true desert understood, in a especially strong sense, as the strict function of (or strictly proportional to) the agent’s control.
Keywords: true desert, moral responsibility, control, blame, counterfactual histories

Abstract in Spanish | PDF en Spanish (197 Kb)