Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 44, number 130, abril 2012
Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration
[Conocimiento lingüístico e integración cognitiva]
Edison Barrios
Department of Philosophy
Syracuse University

barrios.edison@gmail.com

Abstract: According to the Propositional Attitude view (PAV), a speaker is competent in her language by virtue of holding propositional attitudes towards the contents of her internal grammar. This paper develops an objection to PAV, called the “Integration Challenge”. This argument, originally suggested by Stich (1978) and Evans (1981), comprises two premises: (1) propositional attitudes are characterized by their inferential integration with other doxastic states, and (2) the cognitive states that store grammatical information are not inferentially integrated. I consider and reject replies to this argument made by Dwyer and Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham, (1987) and Knowles (2000).
Keywords: philosophy of linguistics, linguistic competence, personal/subpersonal distinction, doxastic/subdoxastic distinction, propositional attitudes

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