Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 44, number 131, agosto 2012
Autorreferencia, autoconciencia y la paradoja de Moore
[Self-Reference, Self-Consciousness, and Moore’s Paradox]
Javier Vidal
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Concepción (Chile)

fravidal@udec.cl

Abstract: Moore’s paradox is that kind of absurdity of, among other things, the assertion of a sentence having the form of “p but I do not believe that p”. I put forward an explanation of the paradox in terms of the use of the personal pronoun “I”. Moreover, I resort to a model of the competent use to which I will refer as a model of the self-conscious self-reference. Then, I show that the explanation set forth is independent of other recent explanations based on the conscious nature of both the assertion and the belief. But, besides, I conclude that there is good reason for thinking that neither the assertion nor the belief are of a conscious nature.
Keywords: first person, consciousness, assertion, belief, Rosenthal, Shoemaker

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