Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 44, number 132, diciembre 2012
La prueba de Putnam contra el escepticismo radical: dos reinterpretaciones basadas en el autoconocimiento
[Putnam’s Proof against Radical Skepticism: Two Reinterpretations Grounded in Self-Knowledge]
Manuel Pérez Otero
Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Barcelona/LOGOS
perez.otero@ub.edu

Abstract: I present and defend two reinterpretations of Putnam’s proof that we are not brains in a vat. Both of them make explicit the role played in it by self-knowledge of our own thoughts and the role played by content externalism. The first one takes externalism as implying that a brain in a vat cannot have the relevant content (involving concepts about brains and vats). The other version only extracts from externalism a weaker thesis that a bodily subject and a brain in a vat cannot share the relevant content.
Keywords: brains in a vat, Falvey and Owens, content externalism, petitio principii, epistemic justification

Abstract in Spanish | PDF en Spanish (190 Kb)