Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 45, number 134, agosto 2013
First Person Authority and Knowledge of One’s Own Actions
[Autoridad de la primera persona y conocimiento de las propias acciones]
Martin F. Fricke
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas y Centro Peninsular en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

martin_fricke@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract: What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran.
Keywords: self-knowledge, transparency, belief, Richard Moran, Carlos Moya

Abstract in Spanish | PDF in English (107 Kb)