Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 45, number 134, agosto 2013
El pluralismo moral de David Hume
[David Hume’s Moral Pluralism]
Agustín Arrieta
Universidad del País Vasco, UPV-EHU
agustin.arrieta@ehu.es
Agustín Vicente
Ikerbasque: Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao
agustin_vicente@ehu.es

Abstract: In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume’s idea that there are four sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.
Keywords: objectivist pluralism, relativism, artificial/natural morality, sources of value, aesthetic relativism

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