Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 46, number 138, diciembre 2014
Creencia de primera persona, conciencia y la paradoja de Eroom
[First-Person Belief, Consciousness, and Eroom´s Paradox]
Javier Vidal
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Concepción

fravida@udec.cl

Abstract: This paper aims to show that there exists a necessary, non-contingent, relation between having a first-person belief and believing consciously: a first-person belief is necessarily conscious. From this, two major consequences can be drawn. First, a theory of consciousness claiming that a mental state is conscious when it is accompanied by a higher-order thought or belief about the state itself should be discarded. Second, an account can be given of Eroom’s paradox —the nonsense of asserting or believing something of the form “p and I believe unconsciously that p”—.
Keywords: first-person reference, quasi-indexical, higher-order thought, unconscious belief, unity of consciousness

Abstract in Spanish | PDF en Spanish (177 Kb)