Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 47, number 140, agosto 2015
A Defense of the Contrastive Theory of Causation
[Una defensa de la teoría contrastiva de la causación]
Esteban Céspedes
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso
estebancespedes@aol.com

Abstract: An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.
Keywords: contrastivism, counterfactual conditional, general causation, singular causation, causal claim

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