Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 48, number 142, abril 2016
Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility
[Una reconsideración de la libertad y la responsabilidad en Frankfurt]
Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Abstract: According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.
Keywords: person, practical identity, irresistibility, spontaneity, first- and thirdperson

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