Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 48, number 143, agosto 2016
Respuestas disposicionalistas al problema wittgensteiniano-kripkeano sobre el significado y el seguimiento de reglas
[Dispositional Responses to the Wittgensteinian-Kripkean Problem about Meaning and Rule-Following]
Manuel Pérez Otero
Departamento de Filosofía
Facultad de Filosofía
Universidad de Barcelona

perez.otero@ub.edu

Abstract: Kripke formulates four objections to a simple dispositional solution to the Wittgenstenian rule-following puzzle. I present here two partially dispositional proposals, which are different from the simple view discussed by Kripke, and argue that they are not affected by his four objections to it. One of the two proposals may be attributed, although precautiously, to Wittgenstein himself. The other one, which I prefer, invokes a teleological notion of disposition. The two proposals rely on the concept of simplicity, or —alternatively— the concept of natural similarity. Some Kripkean criticisms of the use of such concepts to solve the rule-following problem are rejected.
Keywords: teleology, simplicity, normativity, intentionality, rational justification

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