Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 48, number 143, agosto 2016
A Reply to Céspedes’ Defense of Causal Contrastivism
[Una respuesta a la defensa de Céspedes del contrastivismo causal ]
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Department of Philosophy and Intellectual History
Aarhus University

filasp@cas.au.dk

Abstract: In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.
Keywords: contrastive account of causation, counterfactual conditional, general causation, singular causation, explanation

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