Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 49, number 146, agosto 2017
Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin’s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules
[Obligar y definir. Sobre la teoría de las reglas de competencia de Eugenio Bulygin]
Gonzalo Villa Rosas
Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel

villarosasgonzalo@gmail.com

Abstract: This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal power-conferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.
Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, competence, practices, presupposition, practical and theoretical points of view of rules

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