Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 40, number 119, agosto 2008
The Role of Reasons and Sentiments in Tugendhat’s Moral Philosophy
[El papel de las razones y de los sentimientos en la filosofía moral de Tugendhat]
Adriano Naves de Brito
Department of Philosophy
Unisinos University

brito@unisinos.br

Abstract: In this paper I discuss Tugendhat’s moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat’s moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit.
Keywords: autonomy, structure of morality, moral justification, moral sentiments

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