Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 36, number 106, abril 2004
Color y qualia. Ni representacionismo ni fenomenismo
[Color and Qualia. Neither Representationalism nor Phenomenalism]
Andoni Ibarra
Unidad de Estudios sobre la Ciencia y la Tecnología
CSIC-Universidad del País Vasco

ylpibuna@sf.ehu.es
Ekai Txapartegi
Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia
Universidad del País Vasco

ylbtxzue@sf.ehu.es

Abstract: The debate between representationalists and phenomenalists on the reality of qualia has stagnated. The present article argues for a solution that is neither representationalist nor phenomenalist. Unlike the representationalists, we hold that not all perceptual content is reducible to its representational content. Against the phenomenalists, we claim that all perceptual content is intentional content. We therefore discard the existence of qualia, at least in their standard guise. Finally, we show that our intermediate proposal has not been explored because until now all non-representational content has been erroneously understood to be non-intentional content.
Keywords: qualia, color, functionalism, representational content

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