Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 30, number 89, agosto 1998
Comprensión del sentido y normas de racionalidad. Una defensa de Peter Winch
[Understanding Meaning and Rationality Standards. A Defense of Peter Winch]
Julián Marrades Millet
Departamento de Metafísica y Teoría del Conocimiento
Universidad de Valencia

Abstract: This paper presents some central notions of the philosophy of social science of Peter Winch (basically the notions of meaningful behavior, following a rule, and being a reason for something, as well as their interconnections) and attempts to underline their current relevance for a theory of intercultural understanding able to cope with the challenges posed by naturalism and relativism. In order to achieve this, I discuss certain interpretations of Winch’s ideas advanced by some of his critics (McIntyre, Hollis, Lukes, Habermas, Laudan) in the context of recent debates on relativism and rationality.
[Traducción: Héctor Islas]
Keywords: meaningful behavior, rule, naturalism, relativism

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