Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 36, number 108, diciembre 2004
Reply to Ezcurdia and Gómez-Torrente
[Respuesta a Ezcurdia y Gómez-Torrente]
Scott Soames
School of Philosophy
University of Southern California

soames@usc.edu

Abstract: Contra Ezcurdia, it is argued that my thesis —that substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in attitude ascriptions preserves truth values of propositions semantically expressed, although it often changes truth values of propositions asserted— is compatible with the fact that belief ascriptions play important explanatory roles. Contra Gómez-Torrente, it is argued that although single-word natural kind terms are rigid in Kripke's original sense, natural kind predicates containing them are neither rigid nor obstinately essential —in the sense of applying to the same individuals in every possible world-state, whether those individuals exist at the world-state or not.
Keywords: names, natural kind terms, belief ascriptions, essentialist predicates

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