Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 35, number 103, abril 2003
La prioridad de la sustancia en la primera metafísica de Aristóteles
[The Priority of Substance in Aristotle's First Metaphysical Theory]
Fabian G. Mié
CONICET
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

fgmie@ffyh.unc.edu.ar

Abstract: Some differences between Aristotle's two metaphysical models (the one in Categories and the one in Metaphysics VII-IX) concurs with the development of an appropriate foundation of some operative concepts. One of them is the concept of 'priority' within the notion of primary substance. After a vague formalization of the different meanings of 'priority' I try to demonstrate that this lack of foundation is related to the limits of Aristotle's first essentialism as well as to a problem ruling the object-attribute-relationship. I explain the problem concerning the foundation of the 'inherence' as depending on the survival of Plato's explanatory model of the universal-particular-relationship, that is as a problem arising from the justification of sortal terms in their identificatory function. Finally I propose that the transition from the first ontological model to the second one is accomplished when Aristotle clarifies the conditions of the possibility to identify objects.
Keywords: Aristotle, metaphysics substance, priority

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