Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 35, number 103, abril 2003
¿Saber sin verdad? Objeciones a un argumento de Villoro
[Knowledge without Truth? Objections to an Argument from Villoro]
Guillermo Hurtado
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

gmhp@servidor.unam.mx

Abstract: One of the main arguments of Creer, saber, conocer against the inclusion of the notion of truth in the definition of knowledge is examined. It is claimed that the argument fails, among other reasons, because it grants the sceptic a false premise about the conditions of applicability of the verb "to know".
Keywords: knowledge, truth, Luis Villoro

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