Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 42, number 125, agosto 2010
Aptness and Safety: How Are They Related?
[Aptitud y seguridad: ¿cómo se relacionan?]
Miguel Ángel Fernández
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

mafv@filosoficas.unam.mx

Abstract: In A Virtue Epistemology, Ernest Sosa defines the notions of safety and aptness of beliefs and uses them to characterize two kinds of knowledge, animal and reflective. This paper tries to bring out what I take as an incoherence in Sosa’s views concerning how safety and aptness relate to knowledge and to each other. I discuss an apparent counterexample Sosa gives to his final view that aptness suffices for animal knowledge and argue that in fact the principle on which Sosa responds to the counterexample does not permit the response he offers. The principle in question is problematic for Sosa’s epistemology in a deeper way: it doesn’t seem to cohere with Sosa’s view that only aptness, not safety, is required for animal knowledge.
Keywords: animal knowledge, Ernest Sosa, reflective knowledge, skepticism, virtue epistemology

Abstract in Spanish | PDF in English (135 Kb)