Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 33, number 99, diciembre 2001
Sobre la lógica de las lagunas en el derecho
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José Juan Moreso
Universidad Pompeu Fabra
josejuan.moreso@dret.upf.es
Pablo E. Navarro
CONICET/Universidad de Buenos Aires
pnavarro@arnet.com.ar
María Cristina Redondo
CONICET/Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
pnavarro@arnet.com.ar

Abstract: In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show -with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic- that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence.
Keywords: legal gaps, bivalence, conclusive reasons, truth-logic

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