Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 33, number 99, diciembre 2001
El descontento de la filosofía tradicional de la ciencia con el concepto de representación. Réplica a Sergio Martínez
[The Dissatisfaction of Traditional Philosophy of Science with the Concept of Representation. Reply to Sergio Martínez]
Andoni Ibarra
Unidad de Filosofía de la Ciencia
Universidad del País Vasco/CSIC

ylpibuna@sf.ehu.es
Thomas Mormann
Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia
Universidad del País Vasco

ylxmomot@sf.ehu.es

Abstract: In this reply to Martínez's discussion of our paper "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" (UTC) we argue that his criticism is informed by the uncritical acceptance of some traditional dichotomies and a rather distorted interpretation of the history of philosophy. We point out that UTC should not be characterized as a formalist approach. The distinction between "formalist" and "historicist" accounts in philosophy of science is obsolete. Hence, formal and informal means are useful for the explication of the concept of representation to be considered as a key concept of UTC. Moreover, we argue that the arguments from history of philosophy Martínez launches against our account are ill-founded.
Keywords: representation, formalist account and historicist account

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