Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 30, number 90, diciembre 1998
Realismo, relativismo e irrealismo
[Realism, Relativism, and Irrealism]
Guillermo Hurtado
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to argue against Hilary Putnam's internal realism (or rather, against one of the versions of this doctrine). Two arguments are offered against it. The first one is that if internal realism is seen as a genuine metaphysical doctrine about the way in which conceptual schemes constitute the world, it ultimately presupposes an incoherent conception of mind independent reality as having no objects, properties or facts. The second argument is that if internal realism attempts to give an answer to the challenge of Nelson Goodman's irrealism, it has to postulate the existence of some kind of mind independent facts. Therefore internal realism cannot distinguish itself from irrealism without violating its own principles. The conclusion of this paper is that although the question of what is mind independent reality remains an open question, this should not be a reason for us to abandon Realism, i.e., the common-sense view that not everything there is depends on us.

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