Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 29, number 86, agosto 1997
De la racionalidad a la razonabilidad: ¿es posible una fundamentación epistemológica de una moral “política”?
Eduardo Rivera
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Abstract: The main argument of this paper tries to justify some duties of respect and tolerance common in liberal societies. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, it shows that a rational person (in a broad sense) will take seriously into account the Rawlsian "burdens of judgment”. The second step tries to prove that taking the burdens of judgment seriously leads a rational person to a fallibilist position regarding moral doctrines (in the sense of assuming that the own comprehensive moral view can be wrong). The third (and crucial) step of the argument aims to derive a tolerant attitude toward other (incompatible) conceptions of the good from the fallibilist position. And, finally, some limits of this attitude based on the same fallibilist position are considered and discussed.

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