Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 23, number 67, abril 1991
El logicismo russelliano: su significado
filosófico
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Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra
Instituto S. Vilaseca
McMaster University
Abstract: After a brief presentation of Russell' s logicism, I attempt a global explanation
of its philosophical significance. I reject the existence of
two different kinds of logicism (Putnam) with the argument that Russell
was trying to justify the existing mathematics and, at the same
time, to escape from a mere formal calculus. For the same reason,
the logicist definitions cannot be regarded as new axioms to be added
to Peano's postulates (Reichenbach): according to Russell it is
necessary to show that there is a constant meaning satisfying those
postulates. The lack of a clear definition of logic in Russell (and
Frege) is a consequence of his whole philosophy, therefore we must
not look for it in the concept of necessity (Griffin), nor must we interpret
this lack as a gap in the system (GrattanGuinness). Russell's
starting point was Moore's notion of truth as something indefinable
and intuitive according to which we immediately recognize the true
propositions. The problem of logicism is rather the deep tension between
the ontological preeminence of relations (structures) and their
terms (fields).
[F.R.C.]
Keywords:
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