Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 39, number 115, abril 2007
La distinción doxástico-subdoxástico
[The Doxastic-Subdoxastic Distinction]
Liza Skidelsky
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas

lskidelsky@filo.uba.ar

Abstract: In this paper I discuss the criteria that have been postulated for a principled distinction between doxastic states and subdoxastic states, namely: accesibility to consciousness (Stich 1978), inferential integration (Stich 1978), and conceptualization (Davies 1986, 1989). The discussion set off from the analysis of the arguments put forward by Davies (1989). My claim is that although there would be an intuitive distinction among certain kinds of mental states, according to two plausible readings of what Davies himself proposes as a principled criterion, such criteria do not seem to establish it.
Keywords: information-processing states, intentional states, non-conceptual content, personal-subpersonal distinction

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