Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 41, number 123, diciembre 2009
Identidad y discriminación en el contenido no conceptual
[Identity and Discrimination in Non-Conceptual Content]
Justina Díaz Legaspe
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
CONICET

justinadiazlegaspe@yahoo.com.ar

Abstract: In The Varieties of Reference, Evans claims that perceptual content has a non-conceptual nature. Concretely, the informational links between subject and object allow singular thought by permitting the localization of the object in an egocentric space. Anchored in some cases in these links, singular thoughts contain adequate Ideas of the object that depend on a certain classification of it. Nothing in the perceptual content corresponds to this conceptual cut of the object in thought. I will therefore underline the need to introduce the idea of a non-conceptual representation of thing that will cut, in that content, an anchoring point for the informational representation.
Keywords: sortals, generality constraint, perception, Evans, proto-objets

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