Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 43, number 127, abril 2011
Petitio Principii, Ad Ignorantiam y fundamentación del conocimiento
[Petitio Principii, Ad Ignorantiam and the Foundations of Knowledge]
Javier Vilanova Arias
Departamento de Lógica
Facultad de Filosofía
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

vilanova@filos.ucm.es

Abstract: In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious.
Keywords: argumentation, argument circularity, begging the question, epistemic justification

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