Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 43, number 127, abril 2011
¿Por qué una palabra significa lo que significa? Comentarios a Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos de Sílvio Mota Pinto
[Why Does a Word Mean What It Does? Comments on Sílvio Mota Pinto’s Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos]
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

abarcelo@filosoficas.unam.mx

Abstract: In this brief commentary, I argue that Mota Pinto’s theory of interpretation (2009) predicts meanings where there are none. I also criticize his presentation of the communal perspective on meaning, drawing a distinction between two different kinds of semantic facts: a word meaning what it does rather than meaning something else, and such word meaning what it does rather than not meaning anything at all.
Keywords: contrastivism, facts, interpretation, understanding, Wittgenstein

Abstract in Spanish | PDF en Spanish (70 Kb)