Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volume 43, number 127, abril 2011
Respuesta a “¿Por qué una palabra significa lo que significa?” de Axel Barceló
[Reply to “Why Does a Word Mean What It Does?” by Axel Barceló]
Sílvio Mota Pinto
Departamento de Filosofía
UAM-Iztapalapa

pint@xanum.uam.mx

Abstract: Two answers to the question about the nature of linguistic understanding —the community view and the interpretive stance—, which I discuss in my book Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, are criticized by Axel Barceló in his short commentary. Here, I address his objections by showing that, within the community view, distinguishing between a deviant understanding and no understanding at all is possible, and that the interpretive stance does not require previous knowledge of the speaker’s communicative intentions in order to explain how an interpreter could determine the meaning of his words.
Keywords: linguistic understanding, Kripke-Wittgenstein, community view, interpretive stance, semantic externalism

Abstract in Spanish | PDF en Spanish (73 Kb)