Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volumen 49, número 146, agosto 2017
Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo
[There Are Many Things that I Know about Myself (Consciously and Unconsciously) without Knowing that I Know Them]
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Resumen: In a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.
Palabras clave: consciousness, de se representation, higher-order thought theories, unconscious belief, first-person reference

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