Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volumen 50, número 148, abril 2018
Moderate Epistemic Akrasia
[Akrasia epistémica moderada]
Nicolás Lo Guercio
Universidad de Buenos Aires
CONICET

nicolasloguercio@gmail.com

Resumen: Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Palabras clave: suspension of judgment, higher-order evidence, doxastic rationality, propositional rationality, epistemic basing relation

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