Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, Volumen 50, número 150, diciembre 2018
Respuesta a Sebastián: en defensa de la naturaleza consciente de las creencias de primera persona
[Reply to Sebastián: in Defense of the Conscious Nature of First-Person Beliefs]
Javier Vidal
DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.16

Universidad de Concepción (Chile)
fravidal@udec.cl

Resumen: In this journal, I argued for the conscious nature of first-person beliefs (2014). In a more recent paper, Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2017) tried to show that such an argument is unsound. Here I address his three core criticisms. Firstly, I maintain that my argument is valid if to know a first-person belief consists in believing one has it. Likewise, I defend that no damaging infinite regression of conscious higher-order beliefs is involved. Further, I argue that the notion of consciousness at stake is the relevant notion for discussion about the nature of consciousness and the unconscious. Finally, I examine the justification for the principle (SC*) in order to show that it does not beg the question.
Palabras clave: consciousness, accessibility, higher-order belief, unconscious belief, cognitive dynamics

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