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Paul Guyer (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*,
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The Cambridge Companion to Kant seems designed with two ends in view. The first is to give an idea of the strongest contemporary work on Kant; the second is to provide an introduction for the student. Most papers are clearly enough written to serve the second aim, but a number of the papers whose primary concern is to help the student do not require much critical comment. In what follows, I will have more to say about the papers which imply strong philosophical claims of their own.

The volume is edited by Paul Guyer, and shows his influence. He has sought out contributors whose views on Kant are compatible with his own approach, an approach informed by Strawson's attempt to distinguish elements in Kant consistent with a respectable empiricism from unfortunate metaphysical excess. This is not to say that there is no discussion of Kant's transcendental idealism here, nor that there is nothing here which goes beyond a Strawsonian perspective. But no one who read Henry Allison's review

of Guyer's *Kant and the Claims of Reason* will be surprised that there is nothing here by Allison; nor do we find anything by Robert Butts, whose extraordinary *Kant and the Double-Government Methodology* was the first work in English to provide an extensive discussion of Kant's views on enthusiasm (Schwaermerei).

Guyer's Introduction is almost a paper in itself. It is a useful and economical overview of Kant's work but it contains some problematical assertions. It is incorrect, for example, to claim that the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* offers a theoretical proof of the reality of freedom; this claim is based on Guyer's failure to notice the Kantian distinction between "thinking" something as noumenally real and knowing that noumenal reality.

The first essay in the volume is Frederick Beiser's "Kant's Intellectual Development, 1746–1781". Beiser, whose *Fate of Reason* (1987) did an enormous amount to make English-speaking readers aware of Kant's relation to his philosophical contemporaries, provides a very useful overview of the precritical period. Beiser might perhaps be taxed with overlooking (pp. 31–32) the implicit Newtonianism of the "Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces", a position which, as Benno Erdmann pointed out in *Martin Knutzen* (1876), Kant shared with his Pietist teacher Knutzen. Like Guyer, Beiser (p. 34) regards the *Nova dilucidatio* as a Leibnizian work —his reason is that Kant accepts Leibniz's notion that the predicate in a true judgment is contained in the notion of its subject. One ought not, however, overlook Kant's ironical remarks in this work about the universal characteristic. These are small matters, however, in relation to an impressive work of synthesis on Beiser's part; and in his overview of the succeeding periods of Kant's thought (the 1760's and 70's) this reviewer can find nothing important to object to.

The second chapter of the volume is Charles Parsons' "The Transcendental Aesthetic". This is a densely argued and very interesting paper. Parsons' aim is to consider Kant's thesis that space and time are a priori forms of intuition, and the grounds for that thesis. Parsons begins by discussing the notion of intuition. He asks whether Kant is right to claim that the relation of singular representations to their objects must depend on intuition; "It seems", he says on p. 64, "that a representation might be singular but single out its object by means of concepts". Kant disagrees: "Not the concepts themselves, but only their use", Parsons quotes Kant as saying, can be singular. Parsons does not say so, but Kant's denial that individuals can be singled out by concepts alone is bound up with his rejection of Leibniz's doctrine that knowledge is purely intellectual, as Frege's development of the singular quantifier, on the other hand, was bound up with his project of reviving Leibnizian rationalism in the foundations of arithmetic and substituting a theory of concepts for the Kantian doctrine of judgment. On p. 66, Parsons points out that on Kant's view one should not be able to single out any portion of a judgment that represents in a wholly nonconceptual way. He seems to think that this assertion is in tension with Kant's claim that the referential character of judgments depends on their involving intuition. It is not, however. On the contrary, if Kant holds that no portion of a judgment represents in a wholly nonconceptual way, he does so by virtue of the same principle that leads him to hold that judgments can only refer to particulars insofar as they involve intuitions. The principle in question is that of the interdependency of concepts and intuitions in cognition of objects —the principle "intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions are empty".

On p. 68, Parsons criticizes Kant's argument for the view that we must have an intuition of space itself if we

are to represent particular spatial relations. The argument, he rightly says, is aimed at Leibniz's relationism. "Leibniz would be committed to holding that space consists of certain relations obtaining between things whose existence is prior both to that of space and to these relations. However, it seems open to the relationist to say that objects and their spatial relations are interdependent and mutually conditioning." The alternative proposed by Parsons is closer to the views of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche than of Leibniz. On this view, space could be given conceptually at the same time as the objects which possess spatial relations; it would not have to be presupposed as given to intuition independently of those objects. Kant, however, would have rejected any view according to which spatial relations could be understood as depending metaphysically on the logical properties of things, even if those properties also depended on spatial relations. The supposition that spatial relations do depend on the logical properties of things, on Kant's view, makes it impossible to understand how we can individuate the objects of experience. Here, as elsewhere, Parsons is tempted to "logicize" Kant. It is interesting that he also wishes to "empiricize" him, or to suppose that sensible intuition gives us fully constituted objects (p. 66). The conjunction of these two tendencies in Parsons' paper supports Kant's claim that rationalism and empiricism are allied.

On p. 84, Parsons asks how we know that things in themselves are not spatial. Parsons seeks for the grounds of Kant's view, considering proposals made by Guyer and others, but he misses Kant's basic reason, which is a simple one: Kant accepts Leibniz's view that things in themselves, or things qua objects of a complete concept, are ontologically independent of each other; but spatial objects are not ontologically independent of each other, since any object in space is determined in relation to other objects in space.

That this is the reason for Kant's claim appears from the *Amphibolies*, from Kant's discussions of spatial orientation in the *Prolegomena* and the essay on regions in space, and many other places.

Parsons (p. 88ff) considers the proposal that "things in themselves" are just things taken in abstraction from our mode of representation, and that the reason we cannot say anything about them is that we cannot know about things so taken. He observes, however, that Gerold Prauss, who advanced a similar interpretation, admitted that Kant sometimes speaks as if things in themselves were another system of objects in addition to appearances. In the view of this reviewer, it is right to conceive the distinction between appearances and things in themselves as an epistemic one—it is a distinction between objects of experience and mere objects of thinking. This epistemic distinction derives from rationalism. In rationalism, the senses give us mere appearances, and only intellect gives us knowledge. Kant seeks to use the epistemic distinction of the rationalists while transforming its consequences for knowledge: on Kant's view, experience gives us knowledge while mere thought cannot. But the epistemic distinction between sensing and thinking generates, in rationalist metaphysics, a metaphysical distinction between the realm of thought, or the real, and the realm of sense, or the apparent. And Kant's reversal of the relative epistemic authority of experience and thinking is meant to preserve, while reinterpreting, this metaphysical distinction. The noumenal world must be saved for morality, and indeed as the thinkable basis of the world of appearances. The attempt to save transcendental idealism from metaphysical excess by treating it simply as an epistemology rests on a misconception, for transcendental idealism is not just an epistemology but a metaphysics, and Kant's concern with the problem of empirical knowledge is motivated by his concern with the metaphysics of morals.

In “Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions” (Chapter Three), J. Michael Young offers a discussion of the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories. Young says that his aim is to explain rather than defend the Metaphysical Deduction, whose goals he defines as establishing a table of categories and showing that they are pure concepts of the understanding. On p. 107, he asks why Kant thinks that singular judgments deserve to be treated as a separate “moment” under the heading of quantity. Young asks why singular judgments, considered as ‘cognition in general’, have to be distinguished from universal ones despite the fact that in syllogisms they can be treated, Kant says, as equivalent to universal judgments. We have seen the reason in our discussion of Parsons’ paper: a judgment is a cognition in general through its relation to intuition, which gives the mind a relation to sensible particulars.

In fact, Young should understand Kant’s doctrine on this point quite well, given his acute characterization of Kant’s general aim: on p. 116, he explains that Kant is arguing in the Metaphysical Deduction against the Leibnizian theory of cognition, according to which sensibility has no independent role to play in knowledge and true judgments are those which follow from a complete concept of a thing, and are discoverable from it, in principle, through analysis. Kant contested this view in his insistence that judgment is irreducibly synthetic.

But Kant is not as far from Leibniz as one might think, Young holds. Leibniz thought that the structure of reality could be discovered from the structure of the categorical judgment; Kant denies this, but still seeks to discover the structure of reality from judgments more broadly understood. Young’s account of Kant’s relation to Leibniz is open to doubt. Leibniz does, it is true, make great use of the notion of categorical judgment in his account of knowledge;

but Young overlooks the fact that such judgment, for Leibniz, is simply a making explicit of something which is best grasped nondiscursively or intuitively, and thus not as a judgment at all. In arguing that knowledge is irreducibly a synthesis and thus irreducibly discursive, Kant is opposing this view. But this paper is a very careful and probing piece of work.

Chapter Four is Guyer's own paper, "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories". This is a long and difficult but valuable presentation of some of Guyer's chief claims about the Deduction, on which he has published a great deal (notably *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*). After quoting from the Introduction to the Transcendental Deduction, Guyer then says:

This passage begins with the premise that there *are a priori* concepts, and maintains that a transcendental deduction is required only to establish that these *a priori* concepts do apply *to objects*. Logically speaking, this question would be at least adequately answered by a proof that there are *some* objects that can be considered to be independent of our representations. . . to which these *a priori* concepts of subjective origin nevertheless necessarily apply.

Yet as Kant continues, it soon becomes clear that he intends to prove more than that certain concepts, our *a priori* knowledge of which can be assumed, apply to *some* objects that are in some sense distinct from our mere representations of them.

This passage well expresses Guyer's attitude to the Deduction. He thinks of the validity of the categories as quite independent of the experience of objects; the categories are concepts which we know *a priori*, and we apply them to experience. This conception of the relation between the categories and experience suffers from two difficulties. The first is that according to Kant the *a priori* character of the categories is based on their necessity for the possibility of

experience. It is therefore problematical to say that we have an *a priori* knowledge of the categories which ‘can be assumed’ prior to our establishing their relation to objects of experience. The second difficulty with Guyer’s view is that just as the validity of the categories is not independent of their relation to experience, experience is not something independent of the categories, either. The point is intimately related to the principle, noted above, of the interdependency of concepts and intuitions in knowledge.

Guyer wishes that Kant had held that we can only know objects insofar as they *accord* with the categories — meaning by this, that we can only know those objects which happen to accord with the categories, or to behave in a way conformable to the categories. The categories are here being conceived as something like conceptual criteria to be applied to an independently existing experience. Such a version of Kantianism was proposed by Strawson in *The Bounds of Sense*. Guyer’s problem is to explain why Kant departed from this model. He does so by arguing that Kant confused the claim that necessarily, objects we perceive conform to the categories (because of restrictions on human cognition) with the claim that objects we perceive necessarily (by virtue of the nature of those objects) conform to the categories (p. 140). Guyer seems to think that showing that self-consciousness qua thoroughgoing unity of apperception requires a knowledge of objects under the categories shows that we actually have a knowledge of objects under the categories. But it does not show this, for it leaves open the question of whether we really possess such a unity. Kant does not claim to have established that we do, and the mere possession of subjective awareness, even of a subjective awareness which involves an apparent unity of apperception and experience of objects, does not show that we possess experience. This must be assumed —as must our possession of knowledge of objects. Guyer (p. 137) is

surprised by Kant's assuming the latter, presumably because he thinks Kant is trying to show that we possess empirical knowledge. But this is to confuse the question of fact with the question of right. Kant assumes, as Hume did, that we possess experience or empirical knowledge. The question is whether this knowledge is rationally justifiable. Hume admitted the success of Newtonian science, and is therefore, in Kant's view, guilty of inconsistency in doubting whether we have science or objective knowledge grounded in objective necessities, for the success of Newtonian science shows that we have such knowledge, this is something that Kant assumes, though he does wish to show "how it is possible" or to justify such knowledge against Humean and other criticism of its possibility. On p. 137, Guyer shows that he thinks of the unity of apperception itself as the object of a Cartesian certainty: "the justification of the claim that the transcendental unity of apperception is an *a priori* certainty of the numerical identity of the self. . . is unclear". Kant never claims that the transcendental unity of apperception is such a certainty. It is a condition of the possibility of experience, but he does not claim to prove that we have experience, nor does he claim that our possession of experience is immediately certain. In supposing that Kant regards apperception as an immediate certainty, and that he wishes to prove that we have knowledge of objects, Guyer shows that he has not grasped the transcendental or juridical character of Kant's investigation, and that he confuses it with a psychological or phenomenological argument, or a discussion of the logical structure of awareness, in the manner of Strawson.

The next paper is Michael Friedman's excellent "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science". This paper supplies answers to Guyer's difficulties about what Kant means by the necessity of the categories, by showing what it means for Kant to claim that experience depends on

judgments a priori, and that knowledge contains an element of necessity: Friedman does this through a beautiful discussion of the status of the law of gravity, in which he shows that it is derived, with deductive necessity, from the application of the Newtonian laws of mechanics to the empirical data contained in Kepler's laws. This reviewer finds little to qualify in Friedman's discussion of causal necessity except his tendency to regard causal necessity as attaching to laws rather than causal connections or events (see e.g. p. 164). Certainly causal laws do "have a character of necessity", which they derive from their relation to the categories. But this necessity cannot be understood simply as a necessity attaching to propositions; the objective necessity of causal judgments is grounded in the real necessity linking cause and effect. (See Kant's manner of speaking in the passages cited by Friedman on pp. 171, 172, and 190–A198/B243–244 and A227–228/B279–280, A159/B198, *Critique of Judgment* Ak. V: 183, respectively.)

The next chapter is Gary Hatfield's essay "Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy". Hatfield makes many useful distinctions and provides a very thorough survey of texts relevant to his topic, including above all the *Anthropology*, the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science*, and the Paralogisms. The only objection this reviewer would make is that Hatfield may be too ready to interpret Kant's remarks about entities posited by transcendental logic as empirical remarks (p. 210), and perhaps occasionally to assimilate pure apperception to inner sense (pp. 201–202, 211).

In "Reason and the Practice of Science", Thomas E. Wartenberg proposes to revise the usual, merely methodological understanding of the regulative use of ideas in science; according to Kant, he reminds us, reason does not merely follow nature in seeking unity but thinks itself

entitled to demand such unity. Wartenberg's insistence on the active character of scientific reasoning, and of the active role of reason in science, is well taken, but his formulations sometimes suggest a view of the authority of reason over nature and the knowledge character of the ideas (pp. 233, 235) that goes beyond what Kant himself would admit.

Karl Ameriks' "The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology" is a very valuable piece of work, which undertakes to determine Kant's relation to traditional ontology through a reading of notes from the metaphysics lectures of the 1780's and 90's. Ameriks concludes on the basis of the lecture series that Kant did not, in the critical period, abandon rationalist ontology, though he held that it could not be a subject of knowledge. Ameriks himself expresses surprise at the extent to which Kant continued to take such ontology seriously. Perhaps he is more surprised than he should be, given Kant's discussion of such matters in the Fourth Antinomy, the conclusion to the Analytic of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. Such speculation does not violate the limits on knowledge established by transcendental idealism, as Ameriks supposes (p. 269), since it involves no claims to knowledge but only a 'thinking' of the transcendent in the service of the metaphysics of morals and the purposiveness of theoretical reason.

Ameriks focuses his treatment on Kant's discussion of the problem of the relation between substances, and in particular his views on the three classical alternative accounts distinguished by Bilfinger: preestablished harmony, occasionalism, and physical influx. In discussing notes from the 1770's, he is puzzled (p. 265) by Kant's characterization of his own view:

What does the Kantian view have to offer positively? The crucial points are that, unlike the vulgar view, it involves

'laws'... and, unlike the mere 'agreement' views, these are 'universal laws of nature', not mere 'universal determinations' of a transcendent being. These are points that fit in well with the eventual Critical view, but one can still ask why a direct influence of mundane beings upon each other, without any involvement of a third factor (a being upon whom the laws are based), is being wholly ruled out. Even if one allows Kant's idea that *necessary* beings must be isolated, because any interdependence would have to be comprehensible *a priori* and this would undercut the self-sufficiency necessary to *their* substantiality, it would still seem that nonnecessary beings could have a direct, contingent, and actual interdependence that one would have no reason to expect to be comprehensible *a priori*.

Ameriks proposes that "The hidden premise here appears to be a principle that goes back at least to the time of the Herder lectures, namely that 'no substance can contain the ground of the accident in the other, if it does not at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the existence of the other' ". That is why causal laws must have their ground in God. This suggestion is acute and very helpful; Ameriks might have added that the principle in question derives from the Third Meditation.

I would suggest that the reason Kant insists that the interaction of mundane beings are regulated through laws is that insistence on this point is the foundation of modern philosophy. For it is integral to the criticism of Aristotelian physics by thinkers from Galileo through Malebranche, Newton, and Leibniz, a criticism which Kant certainly agrees with. The supposition that the causal relation between substances depends simply on the existence and natures of those substances themselves is rejected by these thinkers, and by Kant, because that supposition, which is expressed in the doctrine of substantial forms, makes it impossible to understand motion in accordance with mathematical laws. The rejection of the causal autonomy of ma-

terial substances by Galileo in the *Two Chief World Systems* is intimately bound up with the rejection both of the geocentrism of Aristotle's *Physics* and of the Aristotelian doctrine of the epistemological priority of the senses, in physics, to the mathematical ideas of the intellect.

Chapter Nine, by Onora O'Neill, is entitled "Vindicating reason"; its aim is to consider whether and how Kant justifies the authority of reason, and to consider whether his critique of reason is vulnerable to skepticism about reason flowing from Humean naturalism or from doubts about "the Enlightenment project" raised by Horkheimer and others. O'Neill contrasts Kant's conception of reason with an account she traces to Descartes and the rationalists, "which sees principles of reason as formal principles of logic and method" (p. 281). Kant, on the other hand, insists that principles of reason and of logic are distinct. Logic was discovered and completed by Aristotle, reason still proceeds by a "merely random groping" that has yet to find the "secure path of a science". The terms of O'Neill's contrast of Kant with the rationalists may perhaps be questioned on the grounds that the principles of Cartesian method have more to do with the practice of meditation and mathematical analysis, and with the virtue of resolution or "générosité", than with formal principles of logic and method. O'Neill characterizes the failure of rationalist metaphysics as the failure of "foundationalism" (p. 290), and Kant's building project as an alternative to it. Kant's vindication of reason, O'Neill says, "is indeed open-ended; the discipline of reason is not a proof but a practice" (p. 303). O'Neill's characterization of Kant's procedure for vindicating reason seems to suggest that he is something like a contemporary coherentist or pragmatist, with a Quinean tinge. "The Kantian approach to the vindication of reason is fundamentally a modest affair. . . the heroic challenges of rationalist demands to ground rea-

son are rejected, as are their difficulties. All that is vindicated is a precept of thinking and doing without relying on any fundamental principle which either presupposes some arbitrary ‘authority’ or cannot be followed by others” (p. 305). But does Kant really reject the rationalist attempts to ground reason (or their difficulties)? Surely he takes these challenges (and difficulties) as clues to the correct grounding of reason in criticism and the practical.

Chapter Ten is J.B. Schneewind’s “Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. His paper is very useful for its account of the intellectual origins and founding ideas of Kant’s moral thought. Thus he emphasizes, for example (pp. 310–311), the important point that Kant rejects a grounding of morality in benevolence —as early as 1764— partly because it poses a threat to autonomy, by fostering servility in the receivers of benefits. There are a number of points on which Schneewind ventures beyond the evidence (e.g., in apparently supposing that Kant thought the categorical imperative a sufficient basis of collective decision-making, as he does on p. 325, or in asserting unconditionally that Kant holds we are autonomous, as he does on p. 309) or misses important evidence (e.g. Kant’s assertion that it is a duty to cultivate love of duty), but Schneewind provides a handy and learned, if sometimes understandably simplified, survey of Kant’s main predecessors.

Chapter Eleven, “Politics, Freedom, and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy”, is contributed by Wolfgang Kersting. Kersting insists on some of the features of Kant’s political thought which may seem shocking nowadays: that, for example, right for Kant does not derive from need: “For Kant a community of right is not a community of solidarity among the needy, but a community for self-protection among those who have the power to act.” Further: “A state that employs the instruments of right for purposes of a pol-

itics of virtue and moral education, which punishes unpopular political and ethical convictions and seeks to form people and their thoughts with its laws, oversteps the boundaries of legitimate lawful regulation.” There are some oddities in his initial characterization of Kant’s predecessors—in particular, his account of natural right thought (p. 344) is much too rigid. He does not adequately attend to the continuities between Kant’s thought on property or the social contract (pp. 350–353 and 354 respectively) and that of Rousseau, and exaggerates the difference between Kant’s antiteleological grounding of property and, say, Locke’s views on property after the invention of money (pp. 349–350), and between Kant’s account of the basis of the social contract and Hobbes’ (pp. 352–353). He certainly errs in saying (p. 347) that Kant found prudence contemptible. He ignores the role of a noncoercive moral education in Kant’s political philosophy (p. 356). But there is much here that is worth having. Kersting provides interesting evidence from the Nachlass about the grounds for Kant’s rejection of communism (p. 348). There are good remarks about Kant’s rejection of the right to resistance and its relation to his doctrine of reform as the only proper path of change (p. 360). He concludes with a brief discussion of the doctrine of perpetual peace between states.

Chapter Twelve is Eva Schaper’s “Taste, Sublimity, and Genius: The Aesthetics of Nature and Art”. Schaper’s paper is clearly meant as an introductory survey, and I do not find much to say about it.

Chapter Thirteen is Allen Wood’s “Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion”. Wood says that “the mid-eighteenth century also witnessed the beginning of critical biblical theology” (p. 395); this seems a bit unfair to Spinoza’s *Theologico-Political Treatise* and indeed to Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. But Wood gives a very lively account of Kant’s attitude towards established religion, with em-

phasis on its anticlerical side (p. 396). He notices that the proof of the *The Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God* (1763) influences the doctrine of the Fourth Antinomy (p. 398). Wood asserts that Kant supplies no criticism of the argument from design beyond arguing that it depends on the invalid ontological proof; this overlooks Prolegomena §§57 and 58, where Kant discusses Hume's *Dialogues*. He notes that Kant sometimes says that the moral arguments are compatible not just with the belief that God and a future life exist but with the mere belief that they are possible. Morality is compatible with hopeful agnosticism (p. 405). He does not note that Kant also said that morality was compatible with atheism; in the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, he asserts that Spinoza was a good man but necessarily unhappy because of his lack of belief.

The final essay is George di Giovanni's "The First Twenty Years of Critique: The Spinoza Connection". Di Giovanni's language is often confusing, because he tends to use Jacobian rather than Kantian ways of describing Kant's views: on p. 421, for example, he claims that Kant thought the concepts of the understanding were "intuitively demonstrable" in contrast to those of reason. Moreover, his judgments about Kant's views are strongly colored by the perspectives of Kant's successors (*ibid.*). But di Giovanni provides a lively rehearsal of the Spinoza-Streit of the 1780's as background for a useful and informative discussion of Jacobian elements in Reinhold's initial interpretation of Kant in the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, which were so important for the reception of the Critique (see pp. 427–431). There are helpful remarks (p. 430) on the effect of Schulze's criticism of Reinhold on the reception of Kant. On p. 431ff, di Giovanni discusses Fichte's *Critique of All Revelation* and the ways in which Fichte's thought generally attempts to follow Jacobi's insistence on the primacy of faith, though Fichte himself could, according to

Jacobi, be understood as a Spinozist. As this summary suggests, di Giovanni's essay is not so much about Spinoza as about the relation between the reception of the Critique and the consequences of Jacobi's presentation of Spinoza. Its discussion of this relation is in large part parallel to that offered by Frederick Beiser in *The Fate of Reason*, but in di Giovanni's remarks on Reinhold's relation to Jacobi as well as some of his remarks about Fichte he departs from and makes interesting additions to Beiser's account of these thinkers.

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