

ATTITUDES *DE DICTO* AND *DE SE*

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Speaking about what are sometimes called ‘propositional attitudes’ David Lewis was of the opinion (Lewis 1983, p. 139) that

When there is a propositional object, we are accustomed to speak of an attitude *de dicto*. Self-ascription of properties might suitably be called belief or knowledge *de se*. My thesis is that the *de se* subsumes the *de dicto* but not vice versa. A general account of belief or knowledge must therefore be an account of belief or knowledge *de se*.

Furthermore, he held (Lewis 1983, p. 152):

Beliefs are in the head; but I agree with Perry that beliefs *de re*, in general, are not. Beliefs *de re* are not really beliefs. They are states of affairs that obtain in virtue of the relations of the subject’s beliefs to the *res* in question.

And he held (Lewis 1983, p. 157):

Since belief *de se* is a special case of belief *de re*, a question arises. I said that belief *de se* was narrowly psychological, whereas belief *de re* is only partly psychological. . . Then is belief *de se* wholly psychological,

or is it not? —It is— In this exceptional case the non-psychological drops out.

I want to show, in this paper, that a good number of these claims are false. Beliefs are never in the head; ‘propositional attitudes’ are invariably propositional; *de re* beliefs are really beliefs; and there are no attitudes *de se*. So there is nothing which is narrowly psychological, and nothing non-psychological about belief *de re*. I start by introducing a calculus —the epsilon calculus— which shows formally that the *de re* subsumes the *de dicto*. But in fact there is a considerable body of informal opinion which already supports this conclusion, and which I look at on the way.

By the general definition of epsilon terms (c.f. Leisenring 1969),

$$(\exists x)Fx \equiv F\epsilon xFx.$$

Anaphoric cross reference to items in indefinite statements like ‘There is an F’ is thus secured simply by identifying the individual term in that statement —here ‘ ϵxFx ’, which may be read ‘that F’ —and then repeating it at further occurrences.

The semantics of epsilon terms is given by choice functions. But people sometimes have difficulty understanding the epsilon account in connection with this because they take epsilon terms, as a consequence, to symbolize indefinite descriptions. Thus it may seem that, say,

A man is in the room,

might be

$$R\epsilon xMx,$$

whereas it is

$$M\epsilon x(Mx.Rx).R\epsilon x(Mx.Rx),$$

because of its normal, quantifier expression. That, for instance, enables two distinct epsilon terms to be formed when two men are introduced, as with

A man is in the room. A man is in the garden.

In such a case, subsequent reference to the first man can be made using ‘ $\epsilon x(Mx.Rx)$ ’, while reference to the second man can be made using ‘ $\epsilon x(Mx.Gx)$ ’. In cases where the predicate is the same, we commonly have natural language expressions like

A man is in the room. Another man is in the room.

So here the distinctness of the two men is indicated by use of ‘another’, and the required epsilon terms would be ‘ $\epsilon x(Mx.Rx)$ ’, and ‘ $\epsilon x(Mx.Rx.\neg(x=\epsilon y(My.Ry)))$ ’.

One further very important feature of the use of epsilon terms, which is sometimes found puzzling, is the fact that what are sometimes called ‘A-type’ pronouns can also be symbolized, such as the ‘he’ in the following:

A man is in the room. Oh; he’s not a man; he’s a woman.

For this becomes

$(\exists x)(Mx.Rx).\neg M\epsilon x(Mx.Rx).W\epsilon x(Mx.Rx).$

This facility enables one to distinguish, amongst other things, the inconsistent ‘There is a man who is not a man’, from the consistent ‘That man is not a man’, which shows that epsilon terms symbolize reference in the sense of Donnellan, i.e. in a possibly non-attributive way. This capacity is particularly important in connection with anaphora in attitudinal contexts, since we can have, for instance,

There is a man in the room, but Celia believes he is a woman,

which is

$(\exists x)(Mx.Rx).BcW\epsilon x(Mx.Rx).$

2

Now what makes *de dicto* attitudes still *de re* is a certain set of transformations available logically, using the epsilon calculus. But that just reflects a general fact about concepts which has been recognised since the work of Wittgenstein. For any attitude involves a concept, which has to be learnt, in a public way, and crucially by reference to standard samples, i.e. clear exemplars in the actual world. Noonan (Noonan 1995) shows externalism has to be supported, in at least this way, and Clark (Clark 1997, p59f) explicates the more general notion of ‘being there’ in terms of ‘leaning on the environment’. But use of the epsilon calculus reveals there is even a proof of the fact, making entirely rigorous the historically discursive discussion. Even today, the possibility of *de re* beliefs, let alone their necessary ubiquity, is not a generally accepted fact. But in a large number of published papers I have demonstrated their necessity —and how it is principally lack of knowledge of the epsilon calculus which has hindered their clear understanding and full acceptance. Frege’s belief that attitudes were always referentially opaque arose from this lack, as we shall see, and now is to be replaced with the knowledge that attitudes are all referentially transparent. For a general survey article on the epsilon calculus in this connection see, for instance, Slater 1991.

But the reason why even *de dicto* attitudes are still straightforwardly *de re* is very quickly stated: it is on account of the externalism enshrined in Routley’s Formula (see Routley et al 1973):

$O(\exists x)Px \supset (\exists x)OPx,$

where ‘O’ is any operator expression such as the impersonal ‘it is necessary that’, or the psychological ‘a thinks that’ etc. Along with Routley et al, I have defended these truths, together with similar implications like

$$O(x)Px \supset (\exists x)OPx, \text{ and } OPb \supset (\exists x)OPx,$$

in many places (see especially Slater 1992(a)). The last implication arises because of a point close to Burge’s (Burge 1979): the ‘b’ there is in the language of the reporter, not the agent with the attitude. The corresponding implications arise in the other two cases once it is remembered that, as before,

$$(\exists x)Px \equiv P\epsilon xPx,$$

which means that also,

$$(x)Px \equiv P\epsilon x\neg Px.$$

Substitutions for the quantifiers on the left hand side of the implications above, therefore, give forms like ‘OPb’, which yield the right hand sides. The epsilon term ‘ ϵxPx ’ in the first equivalence refers to the prime example which is P —what Hilbert called ‘the first P’, and what is, more generally, the standard sample, or paradigm case of P needed in the Wittgensteinian argument (Fogelin 1976, p. 112f, see also Flew 1966, Chs 1, 6, and Black 1958).

What one must remember is what Wittgenstein had to say about ‘standard objects’. The standard meter in Paris was one of his examples. By an act of decision, this object was determined to serve as the paradigm of meterhood, and we could imagine samples of colour being kept, hermetically sealed in Paris —the standard sepia, for example. The use of other predicative terms likewise depends on there being samples which serve as standards. And if the application of predicates rests on the prior acceptance of standard samples, then recognising of *some other* object that it is a

meter long is recognising that there is a relation between this object and the relevant paradigm —giving the ‘family resemblance’ theory of universals.

But, as mentioned before, Wittgenstein’s point about paradigms is now even provable, using the refined logic of predicates as set out in Hilbert’s epsilon calculus. For even in the predicate calculus it can be proven that

$$(\exists x)((\exists y)Py \supset Px)$$

and in the epsilon calculus the instantiation is available to that thing which is P if anything is:

$$(\exists y)Py \supset P\epsilon xPx.$$

Copi (Copi 1973, p. 110) illustrates the process of instantiation in the case of Aristedes, sometimes called ‘the just’. We have

If anyone is just, Aristedes is,

and contrariwise

If Aristedes is corruptible, everyone is.

It immediately follows that such paradigm objects are what hold the concept fast —in all possible worlds, and all human minds. Thus if someone does not recognise that paradigms of justice are just, then they do not have the concept of justice and can make no proper judgements which employ it. Having the concept of justice involves operating appropriately with respect to certain things in the world; one could not be born with the concept inside one’s head, prior to any intellectual contact with the world. And that goes for all concepts, since the predicate calculus thesis is a quite general thesis.

Several things must be said in support of these general points, however, since questions like the following, of course, arise: What if the individual term ‘b’ in the above

attitude construction is vacuous, i.e. refers to a fiction? This is a doubt expressed by Noonan (Noonan 1995, pp. 304–305), and it worried Burge (Burge 1977), but it is readily answered by showing that fictional terms still refer —refer, that is, still to ordinary objects. What is fictional is the false description or improper name given to some actually existent object —such as ‘unicorn’ of a rhinoceros, and ‘Santa Claus’ of one’s father —but there is always such an object— the latent content of our dreams.

An empirical study of the way we take fictions shows that they are misapprehensions of reality in this way (Slater 1987). But the point may now also be established more rigorously. One starts by realising that proper individual terms, following Mill, are not necessarily connotative. Hence there is no requirement that, for example, the teacher of Plato did teach Plato. This point is closely related to Donnellan’s point against Russell (showing that reference need not be attributive), but the epsilon formulation best proves it, since

$$\neg T(\varepsilon x T x p)$$

is quite possible, where ‘ $\varepsilon x T x p$ ’ is ‘the teacher of Plato’. But that being so there is no reason to deny that *the teacher of Plato* must exist, since he, she or it being fictional then merely consists in that object not living up to its name, i.e. there being no single teacher of Plato. In other words, while the descriptive

$$(\exists x) T x p,$$

is contingent, still the referential

$$(\exists x)(x = \varepsilon y T y p),$$

is demonstrable —in the epsilon calculus. And ‘ $\neg(\exists x) T x p$ ’, is equivalent to ‘ $\neg T(\varepsilon x T x p)p$ ’, by the above equivalences. Thus it becomes clear that while there might have been

no single teacher of Plato, still the teacher of Plato would have existed, just as, in Mill's example, Dartmouth exists though it is no longer at the mouth of the Dart, and, in Frege's example, The Morning Star exists, even though it is not a star. 'The Morning Star' is just a name, which in fact is not descriptive, and whether anything with that name exists is purely a matter of choice, even if whether that object has the property inscribed in that name is a substantial matter of its comparison with other things.

No similar result is obtainable in the formal logic we have been used to, coming down from Russell and Whitehead. For there the quasi-referential

$$(\exists x)(x = \iota y T y p)$$

is contingent, making the 'object' inseparable from its properties. But you and I could not believe of the same thing, one of us that it had a certain property, the other that it did not, if the objects of our beliefs were defined in terms of their properties in this way. We would be arguing at cross purposes, one about an object which did have that property, the other about an object which lacked it (c.f. Slater 1992, p. 220). The truth is that the very same object one thinks has a certain property, unfortunately, may not have that property, since appearances are sometimes deceptive. So the objects on our minds must be separable from any conception of them we possess.

3

But even if there are *de re* beliefs, there are those who believe they cannot be sufficiently explanatory. Thus Dennett says (Dennett 1989, p. 199):

The believer in *de re* belief must decide whether or not the concept at issue is supposed to play a marked role in behavioural explanations. . . . One view of *de re* belief

would not suppose that anything at all about Tom's likely behaviour follows from the truth of

(50) Tom believes of the man shaking hands with him that he is a heavily armed mass murderer.

This view acquiesces in what might be called the psychological opacity of semantic transparency (we may not know at all what our beliefs are about), and while I can see no obstacle to defining such a variety of propositional attitude, I can see no use for such a concept, since nothing of interest would seem to follow from a true attribution of such a belief.

(See also Fodor 1991, p. 489.) Now even alone, such beliefs as (50) do have interesting consequences, but it certainly does not follow, given just (50), that Tom will react on the spot towards the man shaking hands with him, say with alarm, even if he has normal desires for self-preservation. But it is easy to identify *combinations* of beliefs which will most likely lead to that sort of behaviour. For while (50), i.e. the *de re* belief

$BtM\epsilon xSx,$

might induce little alarm alone, taken with, say

Tom knows the man shaking hands with him is shaking hands with him,

i.e.

$KtS\epsilon xSx,$

we can derive, first the *de re* belief

$Bt(M\epsilon xSx.S\epsilon xSx),$

and then the *de dicto* one

$Bt(\exists x)(Sx.Mx),$

i.e.

Tom believes there is a man shaking hands with him who is a heavily armed mass murderer.

(For specific formal details see Slater 1993(a), Slater 1994 Ch 6). And that *de dicto* (and also *de se*) belief will surely engender an immediate response, since the presence of the hand shaker is now an internally expressed part of the belief. The missing ingredient, which links the seemingly idle (50) with more determinate action, is simply some identificatory knowledge, by description, of the object of acquaintance —what Dennett called ‘knowing what our belief is about’.

Fodor might call the *de dicto* belief above an ‘opaque belief’ (see Fodor, *loc. cit.*) and Audi would say such a belief was ‘internalist’, with the associated notion of content being narrow (Audi, 1995, p. 58). But while it engenders action it is still *de re*, for the reasons before, and therefore it is referentially transparent, and the content is still broad —supporting Stalnaker’s similar, externalist conclusion (Stalnaker 1991, see also, of course, Noonan, 1995, p. 294, and Burge 1979, *passim*).

I conclude, therefore, against Stich, McGinn and others, indeed, against the breadth of the Cartesian tradition, that all *de dicto* beliefs are *de re*, which extends our minds throughout the full brain-environment complex in which behaviour takes place. Believing there is a man shaking hands with one is not just having a relationship to a certain concept, it is believing that concept applies in the world. And likewise for all mental attitudes, since minding things is what the mind is all about.

4

Now if the *de se* subsumed the *de dicto*, as Lewis maintained, then, since the *de dicto* is all *de re* the ‘narrow-

ly psychological' would have a 'non-psychological' component. But that is a contradiction in terms. Hence the *de se* cannot subsume the *de dicto*. But, in fact we must reach an even stronger conclusion: there are no attitudes *de se* at all, which will mean beliefs are never in the head. That will enable us to re-define psychology (within philosophy, that is, the re-definition is not needed outside it) so that there is nothing at all 'narrowly psychological', and nothing about attitudes *de re* which is 'non-psychological'.

The difficulty with the notion of the *de se* centres on a feature of its definition: it involves 'self-ascription' —self-ascription of properties, according to Lewis. But this is a special sense of the term, for if John Perry believed that John Perry was making a mess, he could, in a quite straightforward sense, be said to be self-ascribing the property of making a mess. But that is not the sense of 'self-ascription' needed in connection with the *de se*.

Perry, of course, was concerned with a certain 'messy shopper', who was leaving a trail of sugar on the supermarket floor. After some while he realised the trail was coming from his own trolley (Perry 1983, p. 83):

My beliefs changed, did they not, in that I came to have a new one, namely, *that I am making a mess?* But things are not that simple. The reason they are not is the importance of the word 'I' in my expression of what I came to believe. When we replace it with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behaviour, and so, it seems, no longer an attribution of the same belief. It seems to be an *essential* indexical.

He goes on later to say (Perry 1988, p. 85):

Suppose I had said, in the manner of de Gaulle, 'I came to believe that John Perry is making a mess'. I would no longer have explained why I stopped and looked in

my own trolley. To explain that I would have to add, ‘and I believe that I am John Perry’, bringing in the indexical again. After all, suppose I had really given my explanation in the manner of de Gaulle, and said ‘I came to believe that de Gaulle is making a mess’. That would not have explained my stopping at all. But it really would have explained it every bit as much as ‘I came to believe John Perry is making a mess’. For if I added ‘and I believe I am de Gaulle’ the explanations would be on a par.

But never mind, for the moment, what Perry says, what about what he believes? If we take the quotation marks off Perry’s sentences, and put them into reported speech, we get a quite different picture. For if, instead of the above, he simply came to believe that John Perry was making a mess, then it is irrelevant whether he remembered his own name, or called himself ‘de Gaulle’. For the ‘John Perry’ we have just used in the expression for his beliefs is in the language of us reporters, so it, inescapably refers to him. Whatever word or gesture Perry used is not reported, merely what its referent was.

Perry later explains the *de se* in these terms (Perry 1988, p. 99, c.f. Lewis 1983, p. 138):

Anyone can believe of John Perry that he is making a mess. And anyone can be in a belief state classified by the sentence ‘I am making a mess’. But only I can have that belief by being in that state.

So ‘self-ascription’ in the required sense involves the explicit use of certain words —indexicals like ‘I’. It is not just a matter of believing something of someone but of expressing that belief in a certain way. The distinction will allow us to see that, as far as any *belief* is concerned, it is not *de se*: there are no *de se* beliefs. If there is anything *de se* it is a matter of an attitude *plus* something else.

For, with the belief separated from its expression, as above, did Perry ‘come to’ this belief? Was it one he previously lacked, and then came to acquire? Certainly Perry did not initially say ‘I am making a mess’, and only said this later, and sincere utterance expresses a belief. But when there was no utterance that does not mean there was no belief. Any belief simply remained unexpressed at that time —in those words, at least.

Now Perry believed there was a certain messy shopper

$$\text{Bp}(\exists x)(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=x),$$

which by the epsilon transformation is

$$\text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=\varepsilon x(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=x)).$$

But, in fact Perry was the messy shopper

$$\text{p}=\varepsilon x(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=x),$$

and so, together these mean that Perry did have a belief about Perry, by substitution of identicals:

$$\text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=p).$$

The Fregean tradition has not been happy with such substitutions, but as has been shown elsewhere (see Slater 1993(b) in particular) this is because there is *another* object Perry has beliefs about: not *the messy shopper* ($\varepsilon x(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=x)$), but *who he believed was the messy shopper* ($\varepsilon x \text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=x)$). For we know from

$$\text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=\varepsilon x(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=x)),$$

that

$$(\exists x)\text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=x),$$

and so, by the epsilon transformation again,

$$\text{Bp}(y)(\text{My} \equiv y=\varepsilon x \text{Bp}(z)(\text{Mz} \equiv z=x)).$$

But clearly, who Perry originally believes is the messy shopper is not Perry, i.e. we do not have, with respect to the original belief, that

$$\epsilon x Bp(z)(Mz \equiv z=x)=p,$$

and so we cannot substitute on the basis of *this* identity, for it is false.

Substitution on the basis of the true identity before, however, is not hindered, now, because of the discrimination between the two cases, which means that, all along Perry does believe of Perry that he is the messy shopper. So that is not a belief he comes to when he suddenly realises ‘It’s me!’.

But what is it that is him *then*? It is, surely, who he (then) believes is the messy shopper. So what happens when he announces ‘I am making a mess’ is not his believing

$$(z)(Mz \equiv z=p),$$

(for that has been true all along) but, instead, a certain external fact about him falls into place, namely the identity, with respect to his new beliefs, that

$$\epsilon x Bp(y)(My \equiv y=x) = p.$$

To put the matter more generally, while the content of Perry’s beliefs about the shopper contain a uniqueness clause, that does not guarantee there is a unique object they are about:

$$Bp(\exists x)(y)(My \equiv y=x),$$

does not entail

$$(\exists x)(y)(BpMy \equiv y=x).$$

Certainly, since, as before,

$$p = \epsilon x(y)(My \equiv y=x),$$

then the former kind of belief entails

$$Bp(y)(My \equiv y=p),$$

and so, as before,

$$(\exists x)Bp(y)(My \equiv y=x),$$

and

$$Bp(y)(My \equiv y=\varepsilon_x Bp(z)(Mz \equiv z=x)).$$

But, without an external uniqueness clause, there is no guarantee that

$$\varepsilon_x Bp(y)(My \equiv y=x) = \varepsilon_x(y)(My \equiv y=x) (=p),$$

i.e. that who Perry believes is the messy shopper is the true messy shopper (i.e. is Perry). When Perry says he comes to a certain belief, what is true, instead, is that something comes to be true about his belief. For if the external uniqueness condition comes to hold, with the result that the above identity falls into place, that itself is not a belief statement, but merely a statement saying that the corresponding belief, at the later time, has a clear, single object. The later use of 'I' shows that an identification has been made, although the same form of belief is expressed.

5

But there is no singular aspect of self-knowledge illustrated in the above case, merely an aspect of object identification quite generally. For an entirely parallel analysis could be given even if the messy shopper turned out to be not Perry. Indeed, the general point about what comes being not a new belief, but a new identity can be demonstrated very readily, also, in the case of Richard's Steamroller (Richard 1988). There, it will be remembered, the speaker is on the telephone to a woman, while out of the window he can

see a woman in a telephone box, who is in the path of an advancing steamroller. Now, clearly, the sentences

(1) She is in danger,

(2) You are in danger,

express the same proposition if 'you' refers to the woman spoken to on the telephone, and 'she' refers to the woman seen in a telephone box, and the two women are in fact the same. But assent to one sentence does not guarantee assent to the other. In Richard's case the speaker in question does not know that the woman he is speaking to is in the telephone box, and so, while witnessing the approach of the steamroller, he may well utter (1) without uttering (2).

But again, if the light comes to dawn, then the speaker may well exclaim 'It's you!', and what it is then reported to be the woman on the telephone is not the woman in the telephone box (for they have been the same all along). The identity is between the woman on the telephone and *who the speaker now believes is in the telephone box*—for who the speaker previously believed was in the telephone box was not the woman actually there.

Now, at the original time, the speaker may well assent to

I believe she is in danger,

which means

He believes the woman in the telephone box is in danger,
and also

He believes who he believes is in the telephone box is in danger.

But while he may not assent to

I believe you are in danger,

he still does believe the woman he is speaking to is in danger, and so does not come to believe *that*. Indeed, looking back he may well say

I believed you were in danger,

once the identity of the two women is made plain to him—and he is still speaking to the woman who was on the end of the telephone line. But he should also admit there was someone else he believed was in danger, i.e. that his earlier belief did not have a single, clear object.

If we now go back to the original case of Perry's, we see that, in a similar way, an observer of the supermarket, seeing Perry making his judgement about the sugar on the floor (maybe by means of a grimace), and seeing also the origin of the sugar, will report that Perry believes of John Perry (the follower of the sugar trail) that he is making a mess—even though who John Perry believes is making a mess is not John Perry. When John Perry comes to say 'I am making a mess' the belief expressed is the same as the one reported, but the corresponding identity statement (saying that who he subsequently believes is making a mess is John Perry) falls into place.

Now the fact that one expresses one's belief in one way rather than another—in words rather than a grimace—might well explain certain things. For not only beliefs, but also actions, like speaking, whether overtly, or to oneself, obviously have a causal place. But that means that, in so far as the notion of '*de se* belief' is invoked, it would seem to be a confusion. Certainly when a belief is expressed in a certain way we might get a distinct category of event (say 'realisations'), but that is not a sub-category of belief, indeed beliefs are, of course, not mental events, but mental states.

What remains 'narrow' therefore, in this case, is just a syntactic structure, which contains an essential indexical

'I'. For the content of the belief expressed using this is the same as the content which others may have, in their comparable beliefs. Hence there is no 'narrow content' only 'narrow form'. But a syntactic structure is hardly psychological, and in the direct case of human expression is entirely physiological, since it involves things like the activation of the vocal chords, indeed the full brain-mouth mechanism of speaking. So there is no difficulty in saying the full content of all beliefs is psychological, even while they are all *de re*. What we must concentrate on, instead, is the full causal impact of the physiological to understand so called 'beliefs *de se*'.

6

But there are, first of all, more issues to be wary of with respect to *de se* 'beliefs' than the distinction between syntax and semantics. Frege's idea that propositional attitudes are all referentially opaque also lies behind Perry's thinking, and makes it difficult for him to see what change in his beliefs has come about. He says (Perry 1988, p. 86):

I shall first consider how the problem appears to a traditional way of thinking about belief. The doctrines I describe were held by Frege, but I shall put them in a way that does not incorporate his terminology or the details of his view. This traditional way, which I call the 'doctrine of propositions', has three main tenets. The first is that belief is a relation between a subject and an object, the latter being denoted, in a canonical belief report, by a that-clause. . . The second and third concern such objects. The second is that they have a truth value in an absolute sense, as opposed to being true for a person or at a time.

It is this second tenet that Perry primarily disagrees with, since he thinks 'I am making a mess' does not identify

a proposition, being not true or false absolutely, but only as said by one person or another (Perry 1988, p. 87). But truth does not attach to sentences, only what is expressed by them (Prior, 1971, Ch 7), and what is expressed by ‘I am making a mess’ when said by Perry at a certain time is true absolutely. This is one of the consequences of the previous point about the distinction between direct and reported speech, and presents an important further aspect of it.

But there is a third tenet in the Fregean view, which Perry does not argue against, yet which has a considerable bearing on the thinking which leads to belief in *de se* beliefs. It leads Perry to think of the self as a kind of intensional object, which guides the body, and which only the agent can have knowledge of; whereas, as we shall see, the only relevant object around is John Perry, i.e. the physical person, and the special causative element, in his case, is his use of an equally physical object, namely the word ‘I’ —with its customary, social meaning. Perry goes on from the above quotation:

The third [tenet of the doctrine of propositions] has to do with how we individuate them. It is necessary, for *that S* and *that S'* to be the same, that they have the same truth value. But it is not sufficient, for *that the sea is salty and that milk is white* are not the same proposition. It is necessary that they have the same truth condition, in the sense that they attribute to the same object the same relation. But this is also not sufficient, for *that Atlanta is the capital of Georgia* and *that Atlanta is the capital of the largest state east of the Mississippi* are not the same proposition. Carter, it seems, might believe the first but not the second.

Perry accepts this, but we must challenge it. For, through discriminating between referential and attributive forms of

speech, we shall find not only beliefs about Georgia but also beliefs about the self are not about intensional objects in the way the tradition thinks.

Now even Quine suspected there were two senses of, say,

Ralph believes the man with a brown hat is a spy,

namely the transparent sense, in which substitution of identicals is possible, and the opaque sense in which it is not. But Quine did not distinguish referential from attributive uses of definite descriptions like ‘the man with a brown hat’, and so he did not suspect that only the transparent sense involves a referring term, with the consequence that substitution of identicals may not be possible in the opaque case simply because there are no relevant identicals then. Thus if

Ortcutt is identical to the man with a brown hat,

i.e.

$$o = \varepsilon x(y)(By \equiv y=x),$$

then we have two designators, since the definite description is being used referringly, but if we merely have

Ortcutt is the man with a brown hat,

i.e.

$$(y)(By \equiv y=o),$$

then the definite description is being used descriptively. The latter remark certainly entails the former one, but there is no entailment in the other direction, since the latter remark is contingent while the former is necessary. As a result, while substitution of the co-referring designators is valid, the contingency in the attributive case means we get descriptive opacity in intensional contexts (Slater 1992(b)). For example, if we also have, say,

Ortcutt is the man called ‘Ortcutt’,

i.e.

$(y)(Oy \equiv y=o)$,

then even though we have the material relation

$(y)(Oy \equiv By)$,

there is no expectation that the two descriptions are inter-substitutable in intensional contexts. As a result, we may believe there is one sole man called ‘Ortcutt’ without believing there is one sole man with a brown hat; but if we believe anything about the man called ‘Ortcutt’ we *ipso facto* believe that very same thing about the man with a brown hat. In addition to the previous mix-up between two independent objects of belief, a mix-up between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is therefore also responsible for the Fregean view that substitution of identicals is not possible in intensional contexts.

Returning to Perry’s ‘doctrine of propositions’ we therefore see (against Perry, and Frege, but with Stalnaker, and Jeffrey) that sameness of truth condition is sufficient for identity of proposition —supposing the proposition is identified correctly, and specifically, in the above cases, so long as the referential and attributive senses of such expressions as ‘the capital of the largest state east of the Mississippi’ are distinguished. If Carter believes something of Georgia (g) he thereby believes something of the largest state east of the Mississippi ($\epsilon x(y)(\text{Sym} \supset y \leq x)$). But that does not require Carter believes Georgia is the largest such state. The identity proposition

$g = \epsilon x(y)(\text{Sym} \supset y \leq x)$

must be distinguished from the predicative proposition

$(y)(\text{Sym} \supset y \leq g)$.

In the central case of the messy shopper, therefore, we must distinguish the referential belief that Perry is identical with the messy shopper, i.e.

$$p = \varepsilon x(y)(My \equiv y=x),$$

from the attributive belief that Perry is the messy shopper, i.e.

$$(y)(My \equiv y=p).$$

The former is equivalent to the vacuous belief that $p = p$, and so is certainly held, but the latter is about a contingency, and so is a belief which Perry might well lack. Believing he is the messy shopper involves having an attributive belief of this latter kind, and we have seen that, as soon as Perry believes there is a single messy shopper then he has this belief —since he is, in fact, the messy shopper.

But, on its own, such a belief will not engender the full reaction to the situation, since, much as we saw with Dennett, it would need to be united with some further, identificatory knowledge before an appropriate *de dicto* belief could be formed. And that is where Perry's knowledge that he is saying 'I am making a mess' comes in.

But it is not sufficient to have the *de re* belief

$$M\varepsilon x(y)(Iy \equiv y=x),$$

in which 'Iy' means that y says the given thing, since this follows merely from above attributive belief, via the *de re* belief that Mp, i.e. the belief that

$$M\varepsilon x(y)(My \equiv y=x).$$

For all three objects in these beliefs are the same. The required *de dicto* belief which motivates action is

$$M\iota x(y)(Iy \equiv y=x),$$

i.e.

$(\exists x)((y)(Iy \equiv y=x).Mx),$

and this does not follow from the earlier *de dicto* belief

$M\iota x(y)(My \equiv y=x),$

i.e.

$(\exists x)((y)(My \equiv y=x).Mx),$

since, even though the identity relation between the messy shopper and the speaker of the appropriate words is necessary (if true), still the predicative relation between being the messy shopper and speaking the appropriate words, i.e.

$(y)(My \equiv Iy),$

is contingent. As before, therefore, Perry does not ‘come to believe’ he is making a mess, but we can now identify one crucial belief he does come to, and which plays a large part in the causal process, namely the belief that whoever is saying ‘I am making a mess’ is making a mess. It is acquiring a belief in the last, *de dicto* proposition which centrally explains the changes in Perry’s behaviour. But the identity of this proposition is hidden from Perry because of his attachment to certain Fregean views.

Perry is led, though the Fregean misconception, to think of the self as a special kind of internal agent, whereas it is the social functioning of the word ‘I’ which is doing the relevant work. It is thus not an accident that Perry mentioned what he said in addition to what he believed. It is the words which he subsequently said which do the trick, and bring the matter home. If he knows he is using them, then, if he is well trained he will be using them with their customary social meaning, and then the meaning of the essential indexical ‘I’, i.e. the physiologically habituated association between ‘I’ (as used by him) and himself, will force the shame and guilt response.

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RESUMEN

Al hablar de lo que a veces llamamos “actitudes proposicionales”, David Lewis opinaba (*Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1, O.U.P., 1983, p. 139):

Cuando hay un objeto proposicional, acostumbramos hablar de una actitud *de dicto*. A la autoatribución de propiedades podría llamársele adecuadamente creencia o conocimiento de *de se*. Mi tesis es la de que el *de se* subsume en el *de dicto* pero no viceversa. Una explicación general de creencia o conocimiento debe, por lo tanto, ser una explicación de creencia o conocimiento *de se*.

Además, sostenía (Lewis 1983, p. 152):

Las creencias están en la cabeza; sin embargo concuerdo con Perry en que las creencias *de re*, en general, no lo están. Las creencias *de re* no son realmente creencias. Son situaciones que obtienen en virtud de las relaciones de las creencias del sujeto los *res* en cuestión.

Y sostenía (Lewis 1983, p. 157):

Dado que la creencia *de se* es un caso especial de creencia *de re*, una pregunta surge. Dije que una creencia *de se* era psicológicamente limitada, mientras que la creencia *de re* es sólo en parte psicológica... Por lo tanto, ¿es o no es la creencia *de se* completamente psicológica? —Lo es— En este caso extremo lo no-psicológico desaparece.

Muestro, en este artículo, que gran parte de estas afirmaciones son falsas. Las creencias nunca están en la cabeza; las “actitudes proposicionales” son invariablemente proposicionales; las creencias *de re* son realmente creencias; y no hay actitudes *de se*. Por lo tanto, no hay nada que sea limitadamente psicológico, y nada no-psicológico sobre la creencia *de re*. Comienzo por mostrar formalmente que la *de re* subsume a la *de dicto*. En efecto, hay una considerable corriente de opinión informal que ya apoya esta conclusión; pero ahora el tema es posible utilizando el cálculo epsilon.

[Traducción: Claudia Chávez A.]