https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/issue/feedCrítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía2024-12-02T00:00:00+00:00Santiago Echeverrisantiago.echeverri@filosoficas.unam.mxOpen Journal Systems<p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</em> is a quarterly journal published by the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). It appears in the months of April, August, and December.</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;">Founded in 1967 by Alejandro Rossi, Fernando Salmerón and Luis Villoro, <em>Crítica</em> was the first journal dedicated to analytic philosophy in Latin America.</p>https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1570Stewart Duncan, Materialism from Hobbes to Locke2024-11-08T01:09:56+00:00Benjamin Hillbhill28@uwo.caRobert Staintonrstainto@uwo.ca<p>Stewart Duncan, <em>Materialism from Hobbes to Locke</em>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, 248pp., ISBN: 9780197613009</p>2024-11-07T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicohttps://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1582José Medina, The Epistemology of Protest. Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance2024-11-25T16:59:19+00:00Miriam Jerademiriam.jerade@uai.cl<p>José Medina, <em>The Epistemology of Protest. Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance</em>, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 2023, 436pp. ISBN 9780197660904</p>2024-11-25T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicohttps://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1575Un recorrido analítico sobre la culpa del sobreviviente2024-11-14T19:39:57+00:00Juliana Mejía Quintanajulimequi@gmail.com<p>Carlos Muñoz-Serna, y Carlos G. Patarroyo Gutiérrez, <em>Culpa sin trasgresión. Un análisis filosófico de la culpa del sobreviviente</em>, Lambda, Ciudad de México, 2023, 152pp., ISBN-10: 6075971564, ISBN-13: 978-6075971568</p>2024-11-14T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicohttps://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1568Two Senses of ‘Essence’ and a Straw Man2024-11-08T00:38:20+00:00Teresa Robertson Ishiiteresa@ucsb.edu<p>In this paper, I distinguish two senses of the word ‘essence’ both of which figure prominently in recent analytic metaphysics. To disambiguate, I adopt the terminology of ‘modal essence’ (for <em>how </em>a thing metaphysically <em>must be</em>) and ‘whatness essence’ (for <em>what </em>a thing <em>is</em>). With the help of this terminology, I address Kit Fine’s charge that modal metaphysics in the framework of Saul Kripke’s <em>Naming and Necessity </em>proffers an incorrect conceptual analysis of whatness essence. I show that the charge is baseless, and thus that there is no justification for Fine’s verdict that the Kripkean conception of metaphysics should be given up.</p>2024-11-07T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicohttps://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1571Robustness, Exploitable Relations and History: Assessing Varitel Semantics as a Hybrid Theory of Representation2024-11-09T02:34:11+00:00Nicolás Sebastián Sáncheznssanchez.unc@gmail.com<p>A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced <em>varitel semantics </em>as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features —namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory’s answers to both challenges, arguing that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea’s theory of representation.</p>2024-11-08T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México