Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

Thought and Reasoning in Non-Human Animals

2026-05-09T13:28:40+00:00

Thought and Reasoning in Non-Human Animals

Is Language Necessary for Acquiring Conceptual Capabilities?

2026-05-09T13:37:57+00:00

Normative conceptual holists have argued that conceptual capabilities can only be acquired through language. The a priori nature of their argument means that, if it is correct, not only is it a mistake for scientists to attribute conceptual capabilities to nonlinguistic animals, but also a mistake to think that empirical results have any bearing on such a claim. I argue that the absurd conclusion that concept acquisition is impossible can be derived from the claims that motivate this argument. Normative conceptual holists can avoid this result, but only by giving up the claim that linguistic and conceptual capabilities are necessarily linked. It follows that it is an open and empirical question whether nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities.

La agencia intencional no humana a la luz de razones: una crítica a Robert Brandom

2026-05-09T13:52:51+00:00

The article examines the notion of intentional agency proposed by Robert Brandom in his work Making It Explicit (1994). This is a differentialist notion, since only linguistic creatures capable of producing and understanding reasons qualify as intentional agents. To question this conception, the paper reconstructs Brandom’s argument as a transcendental one, which posits the necessary conditions for intentional agency. On this basis, it presents empirical evidence and alternative theories that undermine certain aspects of his argument. Finally, it suggests that Brandom’s account can be situated within a pluralist and continuist framework regarding intentional agency.

Desmantelando el sesgo linguacéntrico: la comunicación primate es multimodal

2026-05-09T14:12:00+00:00

I call linguacentric bias a variety of anthropocentric bias that consists of approaching comparative studies of animal communication based on a formal and idealized characterization of language and human communication. This model has unjustifiably widened the gap between the two. I propose to identify its distorting effects in terms of its commitment to a unimodal characterization of communicative signals. After arguing for a pragmatic-interactive approach to the most basic forms of human communication and intentional communication in nonhuman primates, I propose that the first step in dismantling other components of the linguacentric bias is to investigate primate communication within a multimodal paradigm.

The Study of Inference in Philosophy and Comparative Psychology

2026-05-09T14:24:17+00:00

I compare the study of inference in some philosophical and psychological traditions, and I make three general points. First, I suggest that in both human and non-human animals, inference is a means by which subjects aim to achieve an accurate and coherent representation of the world. Second, I contend that philosophical work on rational dispositions and empirical research on reasoning helps to outline an unreflective notion of taking the premises to support the conclusion. Third, I claim that paying attention to the distinction between logic and reasoning is important to fine-tune the standards for the observation of deductive reasoning in empirical research.

Occurrent Thought and A Priori Reason in Chimpanzees

2026-05-09T14:36:26+00:00

Drawing on recent findings in cognitive neuroscience on aha-experiences in humans, I develop and defend the occurrent-thought hypothesis, which holds that chimpanzees evolved the ability for aha-experiences/occurrent thoughts to make their unconscious inferential reasoning abilities more effective. I argue that the occurrent-thought hypothesis provides a better explanation than the inference-only hypothesis for a range of facts about chimpanzees’ inferential reasoning abilities. I recommend more direct empirical tests of the hypothesis and describe three experimental protocols. I end by drawing out the philosophical implications of the hypothesis for the evolution of a priori reason in humans and chimpanzees.

El caso perdue: la metacognición en los animales no humanos desde el punto de vista de los sentimientos metacognitivos

2026-05-09T14:47:43+00:00

The traditional philosophical approach to metacognition, which requires metarepresentations and reflective capacities, tends to deny the possibility of metacognition in non-human animals. However, a growing body of research in comparative psychology shows that some primate species, such as rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees, exhibit behaviors consistent with metacognitive processes. This paper examines studies within the information-seeking paradigm, with particular attention to the so-called Perdue Case, in which chimpanzees use tools strategically under conditions of uncertainty. I argue that this behavior constitutes a clear instance of procedural metacognition. In particular, I claim that chimpanzees not only inhibit responses, but also actively select epistemic strategies—such as using tools—guided by metacognitive feelings. I conclude that the procedural model of metacognition, conceived as a continuum ranging from basic monitoring to the strategic use of tools, overcomes the limitations of purely associative and metarepresentational explanations.

Social Norms in Bonobo Societies: Applying the Normative Pluralism Framework to Behavioral Evidence

2026-05-09T14:57:48+00:00

According to the normative pluralistic approach (Westra and Andrews 2022; Westra et al. 2024), social norms are understood as normative regularities defined by two components: patterns of behavioral conformity and forms of social maintenance. I argue that bonobos exhibit social norms in at least three domains: inequity aversion, reactions to interruptions of social activities, and female coalition formation. For each domain, I identify both components of normative regularities. I conclude that current evidence supports the view that bonobos display genuine forms of social normativity that structure and regulate their societies.

Accountability without Equality in Social Relations with Thinking Animals

2026-05-09T15:05:32+00:00

This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition with some animals who are clearly not self-conscious in that sense. On the other hand, not all conscious animals are capable of accountability or recognition. Thus we must focus on a capacity intermediate between mere conscious awareness and self-consciousness in order to explain accountability and recognition.