Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica <p>Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, is published by the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). Crítica appears quarterly in the months of April, August and December.</p> Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México en-US Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 0011-1503 <p><a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/4.0/88x31.png" alt="Licencia de Creative Commons"></a><br>Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by <a href="https://www.unam.mx" rel="cc:attributionURL">Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México</a> is licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/" rel="license">Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License</a>.<br>Creado a partir de la obra en <a href="http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica" rel="dct:source">http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica</a>.</p> Stewart Duncan, Materialism from Hobbes to Locke https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1570 <p>Stewart Duncan, <em>Materialism from Hobbes to Locke</em>, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, 248pp., ISBN: 9780197613009</p> Benjamin Hill Robert Stainton Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-11-07 2024-11-07 56 168 77 80 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1570 José Medina, The Epistemology of Protest. Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1582 <p>José Medina, <em>The Epistemology of Protest. Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance</em>, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 2023, 436pp. ISBN 9780197660904</p> Miriam Jerade Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-11-25 2024-11-25 56 168 81 87 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1582 Un recorrido analítico sobre la culpa del sobreviviente https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1575 <p>Carlos Muñoz-Serna, y Carlos G. Patarroyo Gutiérrez, <em>Culpa sin trasgresión. Un análisis filosófico de la culpa del sobreviviente</em>, Lambda, Ciudad de México, 2023, 152pp., ISBN-10: 6075971564, ISBN-13: 978-6075971568</p> Juliana Mejía Quintana Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-11-14 2024-11-14 56 168 57 75 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1575 Two Senses of ‘Essence’ and a Straw Man https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1568 <p>In this paper, I distinguish two senses of the word ‘essence’ both of which figure prominently in recent analytic metaphysics. To disambiguate, I adopt the terminology of ‘modal essence’ (for <em>how </em>a thing metaphysically <em>must be</em>) and ‘whatness essence’ (for <em>what </em>a thing <em>is</em>). With the help of this terminology, I address Kit Fine’s charge that modal metaphysics in the framework of Saul Kripke’s <em>Naming and Necessity </em>proffers an incorrect conceptual analysis of whatness essence. I show that the charge is baseless, and thus that there is no justification for Fine’s verdict that the Kripkean conception of metaphysics should be given up.</p> Teresa Robertson Ishii Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-11-07 2024-11-07 56 168 3 27 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1568 Robustness, Exploitable Relations and History: Assessing Varitel Semantics as a Hybrid Theory of Representation https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1571 <p>A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The&nbsp;content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced <em>varitel semantics </em>as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features —namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory’s answers to both challenges, arguing that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea’s theory of representation.</p> Nicolás Sebastián Sánchez Copyright (c) 2024 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2024-11-08 2024-11-08 56 168 29 55 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1571