Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía

Otra vuelta por la lógica no monótona: una definición modal de la no monotonía y una propuesta de semimonotonía

Damián Olivarez Stagnaro — 2026-08-05

In this article we address a problem that concerns the theoretical core of approaches to non-monotonic logic (NML): the absence of a formal definition of non-monotonicity and the lack of in-depth critical analysis of the property of monotonicity in standard logic. From a metalogical and philosophical perspective, we propose a formal characterization of non-monotonicity as the absence of a guarantee of consequence preservation, expressed by means of modal operators. This characterization avoids the difficulties associated with the direct negation of monotonicity. The introduction of semi-monotonicity as a new property for NML systems—grounded in algebraic filters—makes it possible to capture the phenomenon of stability exhibited by pragmatic rational agents, who preserve knowledge across most extensions of their knowledge bases.

Précis de Perception and Its Content: Toward The Propositional Attitude View

Daniel E. Kalpokas — 2026-08-05

Abstract

Contradicción y contenido perceptual: desafíos para el modelo proposicional

María Sol Yuan — 2026-08-05

Perception and Its Content by Daniel Kalpokas argues that perceptual experience is a propositional attitude with conceptual, propositional, and worlddependent content. The account is hybrid: it includes a Fregean component— providing modes of presentation and intentional structure—and a Russellian component— anchoring content in objects and properties. I argue that, despite this formulation, Kalpokas’s view can be understood as primarily committed to a Fregean type of content. This commitment raises three challenges: clarifying how the two components interact, avoiding the over-individuation problem, and accounting for perceptual experiences with contradictory content, such as the waterfall illusion.

Conceptualismo y realismo ingenuo. La propuesta de Daniel Kalpokas

Ignacio Ávila Cañamares — 2026-08-05

In this paper I examine some aspects of Daniel Kalpokas’s philosophical view on perception. I begin by drawing a contrast between Kalpokas’s and the naïve realists’s understanding of the epistemic role of perception in our judgements and beliefs. I then argue that there is a significant tension between Kalpokas’s critique of naïve realism and his own conciliatory proposal. I further claim that this proposal ultimately falls into a form of naïve realism regarding perceptual justification. I conclude with a brief phenomenological discussion.

La teoría proposicional y la percepción como logro cognitivo

Francisco Pereira Gandarillas — 2026-08-05

Kalpokas argues that our perceptual experiences possess a unique kind of propositional content—conceptual and world-dependent—capable of justifying beliefs without falling into the myth of the given. I will discuss three constitutive theses of his theory. First, that conscious reference to objects is always conceptual and requires the representation of states of affairs. Second, that amodal completeness is also conceptual and requires background knowledge. Third, that concepts penetrate experiences and their contents. I will present exegetical, theoretical, and empirical considerations aimed at questioning and limiting the scope of these theses, and I will suggest that Kalpokas makes a precipitous shift from an epistemological proposal to a metaphysical one concerning the kinds of contents admissible in our experiences.

Respuestas a Yuan, Ávila Cañamares y Pereira Gandarillas

Daniel E. Kalpokas — 2026-08-05

Abstract