Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica <p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</em> is a quarterly journal published by the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). It appears in the months of April, August, and December.</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;">Founded in 1967 by Alejandro Rossi, Fernando Salmerón and Luis Villoro, <em>Crítica</em> was the first journal dedicated to analytic philosophy in Latin America.</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;"> </p> <p style="font-weight: 400;"><em>Crítica</em> is currently classified in Quartile 2 (Q2) of the Scimago Journal Rank (SJR).</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;">In 2024, <em>Crítica </em>received 83 regular submissions and accepted 16, with an acceptance rate of 15%.</p> en-US <p><a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-nd/4.0/88x31.png" alt="Licencia de Creative Commons" /></a><br /><em>Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía</em> by <a href="https://www.unam.mx" rel="cc:attributionURL">Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México</a> is licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/" rel="license">Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License</a>.<br />Creado a partir de la obra en <a href="http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica" rel="dct:source">http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica</a>.</p> santiago.echeverri@filosoficas.unam.mx (Santiago Echeverri) chavez@filosoficas.unam.mx (Claudia Chávez Aguilar) Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 +0000 OJS 3.3.0.8 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Superafirmabilidad, justificación, y los retos de una verdad antirrealista https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1691 <p>Superassertibility (SA) aims to be an anti-realist notion of truth in discourses such as the comic, the moral, and the social, where truth depends on subjects’ judgments. Its success lies in that an increased justification can be stable: an assertion would remain justified despite the emergence of new information. Yet, SA faces difficulties in achieving such stability due to a restricted anti-realist conception of access to evidence. I propose to reinterpret stability through epistemic trust: a normative and practical commitment underlying any act of assertion. When someone asserts p, they not only recognize the evidence but also rationally assume that justification will persist unless legitimate counterevidence arises.</p> Guillermo Torices Degollado Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1691 Tue, 02 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Lagunas expresivas en la demostración euclidiana https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1695 <p>Some proofs presented by Euclid in his <em>Elements </em>can be called <em>polymodal </em>(Seoane 2022). This characterization is based on an <em>expressive </em>feature: such proofs combine two communication formats, a <em>detailed </em>format and a <em>summary </em>format. Don Fallis draws attention to different classes of “gaps” in mathematical proof; one of them consists of “enthymematic gaps” (Fallis 2003). Its definition seems to point to the same phenomenon captured (in the case in question) by the idea of a <em>summary format </em>of the Euclidean polymodal proof. However, basic methodological differences with Fallis lead me to propose, in order to capture this case, an alternative notion, which I call “<em>summary expressive gap (without structural cost)</em>”.</p> José Seoane Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1695 Thu, 04 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 A Naturalistic Analysis of Content Ascriptions https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1692 <p>I articulate and defend an analysis of true content ascriptions proposed by Devitt, according to which they predicate worldly semantic properties instead of involving relations to abstract propositions. I develop the metaphysical case against treating contents as abstract propositions, addressing possible replies to Devitt’s argument based on the causal-explanatory roles of contents and offering further considerations. I explain how the Devittian analysis of content ascriptions can account for the validity of certain inferences often thought to require a propositional analysis. Finally, I argue that it also circumvents linguistic problems faced by the standard propositional analysis of ascriptions and offers a plausible alternative for capturing their logical form and meaning.</p> Esteban Withrington Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1692 Tue, 02 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Explanatory Proofs and Grounding in Mathematics: A Reply to Maarefi https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1694 <p>Do explanatory proofs of theorems in mathematics derive their explanatory power by virtue of providing information about the grounds of the theorems they explain? I have argued that they do not (Lange 2019), and I have offered my own account of what makes certain mathematical proofs but not others able to explain why some theorem holds (Lange 2017). Recently, Maarefi (2025) has critiqued both these arguments and that account in support of a grounding-based conception of explanatory proofs. Here I respond to some of his critiques.</p> Marc Lange Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1694 Tue, 02 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Nota del editor https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1699 <p>Abstract</p> Santiago Echeverri Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1699 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Précis of Contingent A Priori Truths. Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1700 <p>Abstract</p> Marco Ruffino Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1700 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Measures without Measurement: A Critique of Ruffino’s Institutional Approach to the Contingent A Priori https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1702 <p>This paper presents three objections to Marco Ruffino’s account of &nbsp;contingent <em>a priori </em>truths. First, I argue that Ruffino’s “Philonous’ Objection” neglects what is widely considered the mark of perception—namely, perceptual constancies, which allow stable representations despite variable sensory input. Second, I show that Ruffino’s institutional approach to the contingent <em>a priori </em>faces challenges under both relational (ratio-based) and monadic (property-ascribing) interpretations of measurement statements: the former diminishes the need for stipulation, while the latter risks conflating stipulative acts with empirical measurement outcomes. Third, I contend that Ruffino’s account risks an unwarranted commitment to social constructivism about brute physical facts.</p> Emiliano Boccardi Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1702 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Contingent A Priori Truths, Illocutionary Acts, and De Re Knowledge https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1703 <p>In this paper, I analyze Ruffino’s proposal that we should evaluate contingent <em>a priori </em>truths resulting from initial baptisms (i.e., propositions that are uttered to introduce of a new word to a community’s vocabulary) as illocutionary acts. I argue that, even if we concede such an interpretation as the correct way to understand the phenomenon, it is not sufficient to support the claim that there are cases of contingent <em>a priori </em>truths that provide the speaker with <em>de re </em>knowledge about objects that are not themselves conventional in some way.</p> Thainá Coltro Demartini Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1703 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Ruffino on the Contingent A Priori https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1704 <p>This is a rejoinder of sorts to Marco Ruffino’s critique in his book <em>Contingent A Priori Truths </em>(Springer, Switzerland, 2022) of my own criticism of Saul Kripke’s case for the contingent <em>a priori. </em>A distinction is drawn between knowledge concerning the meter stick <em>S </em>that its length is such-and-such and knowledge concerning <em>S</em>’s length that it is such-and-such.</p> Nathan Salmon Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1704 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Contingent A Priori Truths as Original Declarations. Some Comments on Marco Ruffino https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1705 <p>In his book <em>Contingent A Priori Truths, </em>Marco Ruffino proposes to understand Kripke’s examples of the contingent <em>a priori </em>in terms of utterances with a declarative illocutionary force. I think that Marco’s approach is very original and insightful, and he provides us with many detailed and thoughtful considerations in its support. Although I agree with the general picture, there are some aspects that remain a bit obscure to me, which will be the focus of this commentary, namely, <em>the nature of the truth-makers </em>of the allegedly (contingently) <em>a priori </em>true original declarations, and <em>the transmission of </em>a priori <em>knowledge </em>from baptizers to later uses.</p> Eleonora Orlando Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1705 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 The Limits of Stipulation: Reconsidering the Standard Meter https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1706 <p>This paper criticizes Ruffino’s illocutionary defense of Kripke’s famous example of the contingent <em>a priori</em>: the standard meter. Ruffino uses Searle and Vanderveken’s speech act theory to argue that measurement stipulations generate <em>a priori </em>knowledge of contingent facts. Against this, I argue that the institutional conditions underlying these stipulations cannot be separated from the grounds of justification. Unlike mathematical or logical knowledge, knowledge that these institutional conditions are satisfied is essential to knowledge of measurement stipulations, preventing genuine <em>a priori </em>status.</p> Eduardo Villanueva Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1706 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Is Kripke’s Meter Sentence A Priori? https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1707 <p>Marco Ruffino has proposed that Kripke’s meter sentence is <em>a priori </em>because the fact it describes is created in a performative declarative speech act by the stipulator. I criticize the idea that the fact described is created by the stipulator, and go on to criticize also Kripke’s view in unpublished work, that even if his original meter sentence is not <em>a priori</em>, a suitable conditional variation is.</p> Mario Gómez-Torrente Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1707 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Contingent A Priori Truths: Reply to My Critics https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1709 <p>Abstract</p> Marco Ruffino Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1709 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Fragmentos de una identidad: reflexiones filosóficas sobre el Diario de Alejandro Rossi https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1710 <p>Alejandro Rossi, <em>Diario</em>, tres volúmenes, edición de Malva Flores, Milenka Flores y David Medina Portillo, prólogo de Malva Flores, Ariel, Ciudad de México, 2024. ISBN 978–607–569–682–9</p> Gustavo Ortiz Millán Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1710 Fri, 05 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000 José Ferreirós y María de Paz (comps.), La génesis de la geometría: una perspectiva interdisciplinaria https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1712 <p>José Ferreirós y María de Paz (comps.), <em>La génesis de la geometría: una perspectiva interdisciplinaria</em>, Plaza y Valdés Editores, Madrid, 2023, 362pp., ISBN 978–84–17121–70–9</p> Jorge Alberto Molina Copyright (c) 2025 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1712 Tue, 09 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000