Lógica y razón

Abstract

‘Logic’ is taken here exclusively as ‘formal logic’, not as ‘informal logic’. It is asserted that although logic is neutral, in the sense at least of being topic-free, it can be used in the formulation and treatment of philosophical problems. Furthermore, some philosophical problems may be raised in logic.
This does not mean that logic is a part of, or a propedeutic to, philosophy. There are between logic and philosophy “special relations”. These have been particularly intense in some philosophical schools, but questions have been raised as of recent about whether patterning of philosophical thought on logical structures and/or concepts has not gone too far. It has been pointed out, moreover, that if logical has “failed” (in philosophy), reason has failed as well.
The author does not think that either logic or reason has failed in philosophy. What may have failed is the idea that logic is to be equated to Reason, and the latter is to be compared to a kind of “Supreme Court” which has the power to give a final decision to all controversies. There is no reason why logic should be equated to Reason, and there is no reason why Reason should be capitalized. Rather than Reason there are “reason”, multitude of “courts” to which discussants appeal and which are not necessarily unrelated one to the other, but are not subordinated to one “Grand Court of Reason”.
Formal logic is one of the ingredients in these various “courts”. Although it is not the court member that ultimately “decides”, it is the one which tends to “unify” —the degree of unification depending about the subject matter discussed. In this sense logic is a kind of “normalizer” —a point that is often made when the normalizing power of formal logic is emphasized.
To be sure, there is no such thing as “the logic”, nor is any formal logic immune to changes. This, however, rather than discourage the “special relations” between philosophy and logic, should tend to intensify them.