La agencia intencional no humana a la luz de razones: una crítica a Robert Brandom
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Abstract
The article examines the notion of intentional agency proposed by Robert Brandom in his work Making It Explicit (1994). This is a differentialist notion, since only linguistic creatures capable of producing and understanding reasons qualify as intentional agents. To question this conception, the paper reconstructs Brandom’s argument as a transcendental one, which posits the necessary conditions for intentional agency. On this basis, it presents empirical evidence and alternative theories that undermine certain aspects of his argument. Finally, it suggests that Brandom’s account can be situated within a pluralist and continuist framework regarding intentional agency.
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