Contradicción y contenido perceptual: desafíos para el modelo proposicional
Main Article Content
Abstract
Perception and Its Content by Daniel Kalpokas argues that perceptual experience is a propositional attitude with conceptual, propositional, and worlddependent content. The account is hybrid: it includes a Fregean component— providing modes of presentation and intentional structure—and a Russellian component— anchoring content in objects and properties. I argue that, despite this formulation, Kalpokas’s view can be understood as primarily committed to a Fregean type of content. This commitment raises three challenges: clarifying how the two components interact, avoiding the over-individuation problem, and accounting for perceptual experiences with contradictory content, such as the waterfall illusion.
Downloads
Article Details
PLUMX Metrics
References
Bermúdez, José Luis, 2007, “What Is at Stake in the Debate about Nonconceptual Content?”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 55–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00120.x)
Crane, Tim, 1988, “The Waterfall Illusion”, Analysis, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 142–147.
Fish, William, 2021, Philosophy of Perception, Routledge, Londres.
Frege, Gottlob, 1991, “Sobre sentido y referencia”, en Luis Valdés Villanueva (comp. y trad.), La búsqueda del significado, Tecnos, Madrid, pp. 24–45.
Kalpokas, Daniel, 2024, Perception and Its Content. Toward the Propositional Attitude View, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland.
McDowell, John, 2013, “Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful”, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 144–157. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12005)
McDowell, John, 2009, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, Having the World in View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 265–272.
Rorty, Richard, 1989, La filosofía y el espejo de la naturaleza, trad. Jesús Fernández Zulaica, Cátedra, Madrid.
Schellenberg, Susanna, 2018, The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Serrano, Nicolás, 2025, “Daniel Kalpokas, Perception and Its Content: Toward the Propositional Attitude View, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2024, 162 pp.”, Análisis Filosófico, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 548–553. (https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1233)
Siegel, Susana, 2021, “The Contents of Perception”, en Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, disponible en https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/ [fecha de consulta: 11/11/2025].
Siegel, Susana, 2010, The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Thau, Michael, 2002, Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.
Creado a partir de la obra en http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica.