La consideración del futuro y las teorías del tiempo: una objeción a las perspectivas estrechas temporales en ética de poblaciones
Main Article Content
Abstract
According to certain views in population ethics, future beings count for less, or do not count at all. In order to justify this, it is possible to appeal to any of the perspectives that deny the existence of the future in philosophy of time. If there are no future beings, it could be argued that they cannot be considered, since they would have to exist in order to be taken into account. This paper shows the problems faced by these moral views if the universe in which we live lacks absolute simultaneity.
Downloads
Article Details
PLUMX Metrics
References
Agustín de Hipona, 2005, Confesiones, intr., trad. y notas de Silvia Magnavacca, Losada, Buenos Aires.
Aristóteles, 1995a, Física, introd., trad. y notas de Guillermo de Echandía, Gredos, Madrid.
Aristóteles, 1995b, “Sobre la interpretación”, en Tratados de lógica (Órganon), vol. II, introd., trad. y notas de Miguel Candel, Gredos, Madrid.
Arrhenius, Gustaf, 2009, “Can the Person-Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?”, en Melinda Roberts y David Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons, Springer, Heidelberg-Londres-Nueva York, pp. 289–314.
Arrhenius, Gustaf, 2003, “The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People”, Ethical Perspectives, vol. 10, pp. 185–195.
Arrhenius, Gustaf, 2000, Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Upsala.
Beckerman, Wilfred, y Joanna Pasek, 2001, Justice, Posterity, and the Environment, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Beckstead, Nick, 2013, On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future, tesis doctoral, Universidad Rutgers, New Brunswick.
Chalmers, David, 1999, La mente consciente: en busca de una teoría fundamental, Gedisa, Barcelona.
Craig, William Lane, 2008, “The Metaphysics of Special Relativity: Three Views”, en William Lane Craig y Quentin Smith (eds.), Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, pp. 11–49.
Craig, William Lane, 2001, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, Springer, Dordrecht.
Craig, William Lane, 1998, “McTaggart’s Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 122–127.
Davidson, Matthew, 2003, “Presentism and the Non-Present”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 113, no. 1, pp. 77–92.
Dieks, Dennis (ed.), 2006, The Ontology of Spacetime, Elsevier, Ámsterdam.
Dolev, Yuval, 2006, “How to Square a Non-Localized Present with Special Relativity”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 177–190.
Dorato, Mauro, 2012, “Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second”, Philosophia Naturalis, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 25–41.
Dorato, Mauro, 2008, “Putnam on Time and Special Relativity: A Long Journey from Ontology to Ethics”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 51–70.
Dorato, Mauro, 2006, “The Irrelevance of the Presentist/Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 93–109.
Ekeli, Kristian Skagen, 2005, “Giving a Voice to Posterity: Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 18, pp. 429–450.
Golding, Martin Philip, 1972, “Obligations to Future Generations”, The Monist, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 85–99.
González-Ricoy, Íñigo, y Axel Gosseries (eds.), 2016, Institutions for Future Generations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Griffith, Aaron M., 2018, “Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations”, Erkenntnis, vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 693–710.
Griffith, Aaron M., 2017, “The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time”, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 58–70.
Horta, Oscar, 2014, “In Defense of the Internal Aspects View: Person Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments and Inconsistent Intuitions”, Law, Ethics, and Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 87–107.
Janssen, Bert, 2005, “Breve repaso de la Relatividad Especial”, sin pie de imprenta, disponible en: https://www.ugr.es/~bjanssen/text/repaso.pdf [último acceso: 26/03/2025].
MacAskill, William, 2022, What We Owe the Future, Basic Books, Nueva York.
MacKenzie, Michael K., 2016, “Institutional Design and Sources of Short-Termism”, en González-Ricoy y Gosseries 2016, pp. 24–45.
Maxwell, Nicholas, 2006, “Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism and Ultimate Reality”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 229–245.
Maxwell, Nicholas, 1985, “Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 23–43.
McCall, Storrs, 2006, “Philosophical Consequences of the Twins Paradox”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 191–204.
McCall, Storrs, y E.J. Lowe, 2003, “3D/4D Equivalence, the Twins Paradox and Absolute Time”, Analysis, vol. 63, pp. 114–123.
Meyer, Ulrich, 2005, “The Presentist’s Dilemma”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 122, no. 3, pp. 213–225.
Monton, Bradley, 2006, “Presentism and Quantum Gravity”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 263–280.
Orilia, Francesco, 2016, “Moderate Presentism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 173, no. 3, pp. 589–607.
Parfit, Derek, 2017, “Future People, the Non-Identity Problem and Person-Affecting Principles”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 118–157.
Parfit, Derek, 2004, Razones y personas, Antonio Machado Libros, Madrid.
Peacock, Kent, 2006, “Temporal Presentness and the Dynamics of Spacetime”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 247–261.
Petkov, Vesselin, 2006, “Is There an Alternative to the Block Universe View?”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 207–228.
Putnam, Hilary, 2008, “Reply To Mauro Dorato”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 71–73.
Putnam, Hilary, 1967, “Time and Physical Geometry”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 240–247.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1950, “Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 47, no. 22, pp. 621–633.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1939, “Designation and Existence”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 36, no. 26, pp. 701–709.
Raki´c, Nataša, 1997, “Past, Present, Future, and Special Relativity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 257–280.
Rietdijk, C.W., 1966, “A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 341–344.
Savitt, Steven, 2021, “Being and Becoming in Modern Physics”, en Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), disponible en: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-bebecome/ [último acceso: 28/05/2023].
Savitt, Steven, 2006, “Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective”, en Dieks 2006, pp. 111–127.
Savitt, Steven, 2000, “There’s No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, no. 3, pp. S563–S574.
Searle, John, 2000, El misterio de la conciencia, trad. Antoni Domènech, Paidós, Barcelona.
Sider, Theodore, 2001, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Stein, Howard, 1968, “On the Einstein-Minkowski Space-Time”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 5–23.
Sullivan, Meghan, 2012, “The Minimal A-Theory”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 158, no. 2, pp. 149–174.
Vrousalis, Nicholas, 2016, “Intergenerational Justice”, en González-Ricoy y Gosseries 2016, pp. 49–64.
Weingard, Robert, 1972, “Relativity and the Reality of Past and Future Events”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 119–121.
Williamson, Timothy, 2002, “Necessary Existents”, en Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 233–251.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.
Creado a partir de la obra en http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica.