La contradicción: ¿vicio formal o cifra de contenido?

Abstract

There are two ways of considering contradiction in ordinary language and philosophical writings: the logical or analytical concept, which considers it a defect of reasoning; and the dialectical or synthetic conception which considers it as a symptom of ontological density. The opposition between both concepts is at once an example of contradiction (of a dialectical kind). This situation is examined in order to decide if the two uses of the term “contradictory” are equivocal, univocal, or analogous; the dialectical use seems to contain all the meaning of the analytical use as well as an amount of additional meaning.
The object of knowledge is the concrete or real. But in order to reach the concrete it is necessary to pass through the abstract. The synthesis, which constitutes our orientation in the world, starts out as an analysis consisting in separating things that are known into elements or factors. Analysis and synthesis are related in the same way as form to content, text to context. An analysis which separates text from context, takes away part of its content; in the end, a form will remain, a text with a minimum of context. But the synthesis should reintegrate the text into the context; then the concrete will become illuminated by its passage through the abstract.
Content and formalism correspond to two fundamental linguistic dimensions: semantic and syntax. The syntactical is minimum, immediate and manageable context. The semantical is the expansive context, which takes you from itself into ever wider circles of meaning. The syntactical is a matter of calculation; the semantical, of reflection. All thought is at one and the same time both syntactical and semantical. A thought consisting of pure reflection would be incommunicable and impractical; it would continue to float indefinitely in an endless indifference without ever deciding what it wants to say or do. On the other hand, absolute formalism is impossible, because to formalize is to substitute one content for another, which for a given purpose is considered to be simpler. All formalization consists in the constitution of a model, and this model also has content. The pure structure, without a material substratum to incarnate it, simply does not exist.
To know is to assimilate essences. The empiricist ideal does not include that we should dispense with the use of the term “essence”. It is sufficient that we cast off the notion that there are eternal essences and understand that the essence is dependent upon the context. What is not essential in one context becomes so in another, and vice versa. Nor is the concept “essence” independent from a given context, and it should now be given a definition of “essence” different from the one given in the days of Aristotle. But the term “essence” is indispensable; if objects admit of classification, if uniformity exists in nature, we must have essences so as to be able to talk about it. The universe is the interrelationship of events; every object takes us to other objects, to such a degree that we can conceive of the universe as an immense network of interrelationships. In this network the especially dense nodes constitute essences. Understanding supposes that we are able to separate the essential from the accidental, the strong connections from the weak ones. But there is no distinction made in nature between the strong and the weak connections. Essence is not only contextual, but also admits degrees.
Everything real is interconnection; knowledge is real, it is therefore interconnection. Knowledge has as its object the real, therefore it is a triple interconnection. In order to know we interact with an interaction. It is never given in experience the pair, subject-object, but the triple, subject-object-context. All interaction is material, i.e. is a work. Knowledge has as its proper work analysis, which tries to force the context out of its triple connection in order to, methodically, attempt a double relationship between mind and object. The eliminated context reacts by infiltrating itself into the formal structure as an insufficiency which is very often a contradiction. The contradiction may serve as a key to redefinition, as a testimony of the need to restore or amplify a context. In this sense, and only in this sense, contradiction is a symptom of the complexity of the real, it shows the essence. Finding contradictions can signify the discovery of essences, since the contradiction makes necessary an amplification of the context which enriches the content of the former definitions. There may be contradictions that are more or less severe, just as there are richer and less rich essences. It is possible to have degrees of contradiction, just as there may be degrees of essence. The principal contradiction, which demands the most severe context reformulations, is the essence of the situation in the most proper sense. Thought progresses from definition to definition through contradiction: this is what constitutes dialectics. Contradiction ceases to be absurd if it is understood as a call upon language to reformulate the universe of discourse.
Calculus consists in dealing with definitions. Reflection, by contrast, implies venturing beyond the definitions obtained, in search of more extensive contents. Reflection is prompted toward these new contents by the transformation of the presently accepted definitions into irritating contradictions. The contradiction crops out in the definition as an imperious need for redefinition. It can remain there for a considerable time, since the process of contextual redefinition is not an easy one. Because of the inherent difficulty of contextual redefinition, pretending to solve a contradiction quickly is frivolous and antiscientific. The worthy scientist, just as the worthy man, knows how to wait and live among contradictions, because of his conviction that it is often a good thing for contradictions to subsist and even become sharper in order that his powers of penetration may reveal with greater clarity the essence of the situation.
In conclusion, it is established that both concepts of contradiction, when they themselves form a contradiction (a dialectical one), reveal an inadequacy in the theoretic context and call for a reelaboration of that context.
The reelaboration required for removing the inadequacy includes a generalization of the thesis in such a way that it may be understood to apply to any contradiction of a similar nature: every dialectic contradiction is an analytic contradiction which calls for removal through the reelaboration of its context.