Is Kripke’s Meter Sentence A Priori?
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Abstract
Marco Ruffino has proposed that Kripke’s meter sentence is a priori because the fact it describes is created in a performative declarative speech act by the stipulator. I criticize the idea that the fact described is created by the stipulator, and go on to criticize also Kripke’s view in unpublished work, that even if his original meter sentence is not a priori, a suitable conditional variation is.
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References
Kripke, Saul A., 2011, “The First Person”, in Saul A. Kripke, Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers, Volume I, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 292–321.
Kripke, Saul A., 1986, “Rigid Designation and the Contingent A Priori: The Meter Stick Revisited”, unpublished transcript of the Exxon Lectures delivered at the University of Notre Dame in 1986.
Kripke, Saul A., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253–355, pp. 763–769. Book edition with an added preface: Naming and Necessity, 1980, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Ruffino, Marco, 2022, Contingent A Priori Truths. Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics, Springer, Cham.
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